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THE SUPREME COURT
2016 TERM
FOREWORD:
1930s REDUX: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
UNDER SIEGE
Gillian E. Metzger*
INTRODUCTION

E

ighty years on, we are seeing a resurgence of the antiregulatory and
antigovernment forces that lost the battle of the New Deal.
President Trump's administration has proclaimed the "deconstruction of
the administrative state" to be one of its main objectives.1 Early Trump
executive actions quickly delivered on this pledge, with a wide array of
antiregulatory actions and a budget proposing to slash many agencies'
3
funding. 2 Invoking the long-dormant Congressional Review Act
(CRA), the Republican-controlled Congress has eagerly repealed numerous regulations promulgated late in the Obama Administration. 4 Other
major legislative and regulatory repeals are pending, and bills that
would impose the most significant restrictions on administrative governance since the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was adopted in

* Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Jessica BulmanPozen, Ariela Dubler, Dick Fallon, Barry Friedman, Jesse Furman, Michael Hyman, Vicki Jackson,
Jeremy Kessler, Tom Merrill, Henry Monaghan, Anne Joseph O'Connell, Eric Posner, David Pozen,
Daphna Renan, Neil Siegel, Kevin Stack, Peter Strauss, Kristen Underhill, Adrian Vermeule, Laura
Weinrib, as well as commenters at faculty workshops at Chicago, Duke, Harvard, and Penn law
schools, for their very helpful (and speedy!) comments and suggestions - especially to those who
willingly undertook multiple reads. Zachary Bannon and Eve Levin provided excellent research
assistance. Particular thanks to the HarvardLaw Review editorial board and staff for their excellent
editorial suggestions and efforts in publishing this piece.
1 See Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for "Deconstruction of the
Administrative State," WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-

wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/o 3 f6b8
da-fgea-iie6-bfoi-d47f8cfgb64 3 _story.html [https:Hperma.cc/8KJ 3 - 5 TRR]. Although the Trump
Administration official who made this proclamation, Steve Bannon, has since been removed from
his position as President Trump's Chief Strategist, that removal is unlikely to result in a large-scale
change in the Trump Administration's objectives with respect to the administrative state. See
Donald J. Trump (@realDonald'hump), TWITTER (Aug. 29, 2017, 5:26 AM), https:Htwitter.com/
realDonald'hump/status/90250785558409216o [https:Hperma.cc/8LFX-LCGH]
(reiterating the

need to "reduce [the] size of government"); see also Josh Dawsey & Nolan D. McCaskill, Bannon
Out as White House Chief Strategist, POLITICO (Aug. i8,2017, 6:i6 PM), http://www.politico.com/
story/2017/o8/i8/bannon-out-as-white-house-chief-strategist-241786
2 See infra pp. 9-ii.
3 5 U.S.C. §§ 8oi-808 (2012).
4 See infra pp. i o-ii.

[https://perma.cc/DJH2-JJ 5 D].
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like the proposed Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA) - now
stand a chance of enactment. 5 This resistance to administrative government reflects antigovernment themes that have been a consistent presence in national politics since President Reagan's election in 1980.6 But
the immediate trigger for the current resurgence of attacks on the administrative state is the national regulatory and administrative expan7
sion that took place under President Obama.
Of particular relevance here, an attack on the national administrative state is also evident at the Supreme Court. The anti-administrative
voices are fewer on the Court than in the political sphere and often speak
in separate opinions, but they are increasingly prominent., Led by
Justice Thomas, with Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and now
Justice Gorsuch sounding similar complaints, they have attacked the
modern administrative state as a threat to liberty and democracy and
suggested that its central features may be unconstitutional. 9 Conservative legal scholars have joined the fray, issuing a number of academic
attacks on the constitutionality of the administrative state that conservative jurists then feature prominently in their opinions.10 These judicial
attacks on administrative governance share several key characteristics:
they are strong on rhetorical criticism of administrative government out
of proportion to their bottom-line results; they oppose administration
and bureaucracy, but not greater presidential power; they advocate a
greater role for the courts to defend individual liberty against the everexpanding national state; and they regularly condemn contemporary national government for being at odds with the constitutional structure the
Framers created, though rarely - with the marked exception of Justice
Thomas - do they develop this originalist argument with any rigor.1 1
5 See infra section IA; see also Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, ii 5 th Cong.
(2017); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, ii 5 th Cong. (2017).
6 See infra p. 14.
7 See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 5-1

, 31-32, 77-82 (2012) (tying Tea Party mobiliza-

tion to President Obama's progressive policy agenda); Zeke J. Miller, President Trump's Lawyers
Plan a White House Legal Attack on FederalAgency Power, TIME (Mar. I3, 2017), http://time.com/

470031 i/donald-trump-white-house-counsel-steve-bannon [https:Hperma.cc/M 7 SP-JFN 7] ("But the
fight against [the administrative state's] growth became a crusade during the Obama years, particularly in conservative legal circles as they watched the former president rel[y] on regulatory action
to circumvent an obstructionist Congress."); see also Robert Moffit, Todd Gaziano & Joseph Postell,
How to Limit Government in the Age of Obama, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 25, 2013), http:/www.
heritage.org/political-process/report/how-limit-government-the-age-obama
[https:Hperma.cc/XLX6PB9G] (discussing tactics to fight against President Obama's regulatory policy through Congress
and the courts).
8 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the PluralAims of Administrative
Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42-43.

9 See infra sections I.B.i-3, pp. 17-31.
10 See infra section I.B. 4 , pp. 31-33.

n See infra section IC, pp. 33-46.
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These features, particularly the strong rhetorical condemnation of
administrative government, typify what I call here contemporary antiadministrativism. The presence of such rhetorical anti-administrativism
in the political sphere is not surprising, but its appearance in judicial
opinions is more striking. This rhetorical anti-administrativism forms a
notable link between the contemporary political and judicial attacks on
national administrative government. Further connecting these two is
the political flavor of many of the lawsuits underlying the current judicial attacks, as well as a shared network of conservative lawyers, organ12
izations, academics, and funders involved in both.
The 2016 Term saw few cases embodying the judicial attacks on administrative governance and administrative law doctrines that have surfaced in recent years. Nonetheless, anti-administrativism was central to
the Term's most important event: the appointment of Justice Gorsuch
to the Court. In a concurring opinion issued shortly before his nomination, then-Judge Gorsuch staked out a strongly anti-administrative position. He warned against "permit[ting] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate
federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square
with the Constitution of the framers' design," and drew a straight line
from such institutional expansion to "governmental encroachment on
the people's liberties. '13 These anti-administrative views quickly became a centerpiece of Gorsuch's Senate confirmation hearings - surely
never before have so many senators spoken at such length about the
Chevron 14 doctrine of judicial deference to administrative statutory
interpretations. 15
Whether these anti-administrative attacks will ultimately prove successful - and which ones - remains to be seen. The lack of administrative retraction under President Reagan offers reason for doubt that
major politically imposed transformations will occur, and President
Trump's campaign promises for infrastructure development, an enhanced military, and a crackdown on illegal immigration all entail the
12 See infra sections IC, pp. 33-46; IIB, pp. 62-71.
13 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, 1149 (ioth Cir. 2o16) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Gorsuch had signaled such concerns before, though not quite as vociferously. See Caring Hearts
Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3 d 968, 969 (ioth Cir. 2o16); De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803
F.3 d 1165, 1171 (ioth Cir. 2015); Neil M. Gorsuch, Lecture, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 911-15 (2o16).
14 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15 In their brief opening statements, three of the eight Democratic senators expressed their concerns over then-Judge Gorsuch's views on Chevron. See Nomination of the Honorable Neil M.
Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY at 42:33 (Mar. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Gorsuch Confirmation Hearings (Day 1)],
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/watch?hearingid=DDI 59112-5056-Ao66-6024-CF8 3 9 2 0
AgEI 7 [https://perma.cc/DKR 7 -2M9E] (opening statement of Sen. Feinstein); id. at 2:06:49 (opening
statement of Sen. Klobuchar); id. at 2:2 9:01 (opening statement of Sen. Franken).
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administrative state's expansion, not its deconstruction. On the judicial
front, the most radical constitutional challenges so far have gained little
traction, with majority support limited to claims that tinker with the
administrative state at the margin. 16 With Justice Gorsuch on the
Court, some constitutionally rooted pullback in deference doctrines appears increasingly likely.17 But whether these doctrinal tweaks will
make much of a difference in practice is a matter of substantial
dispute. "I
Yet dismissing the present anti-administrative moment as a passing
craze with little long-term impact would be a mistake. Enactment of
measures like the RAA, regulatory rollbacks, and significant cutbacks
in agency funding could have a lasting effect on the administrative
state's functioning and capacity. Challenges to administrative adjudication on the horizon may portend more dramatic judicial decisions, and
some seemingly limited constitutional challenges could yield significant
administrative disruption. Even kept to a vocal minority, moreover,
constitutional attacks can have an outsized effect by sowing doubts
about administrative legitimacy and thereby limiting the progressive potential of - and public support for - administrative government in the
future. And the vocal minority on the courts is likely to grow so long as
the political branches remain in conservative hands and openly antiadministrative organizations dominate the judicial appointments process. 19 The Trump Administration inherited an extraordinarily large
See infra section ID, pp. 46-5 .
Justice Gorsuch has expressed more open hostility to doctrines such as Chevron than his
predecessor, Justice Scalia, did. See Emily Bazelon & Eric Posner, The Government Gorsuch Wants
16

17

to Undo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. i,

2017), https://www.nytimes.coM /2017/04/0i/sunday-review/the-

government-gorsuch-wants-to-undo.html [https:Hperma.cc/S 5 E5 -A6UR].
18 See infra pp. 48-49. Compare Adrian Vermeule, The Separation of Powers RestorationAct
(in the Age of Trump), YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. io, 2o6), http:/
yalejreg.com/nc/the-separation-of-powers-restoration-act-in-the-age-of-trump-by-adrian-vermeule/
[https://perma.cc/3VuC- 5 9 3 L] (noting that even without Chevron, courts "might decide that deference just is what the statutory law commands"), with Bazelon & Posner, supranote 17 (arguing that
without Chevron ambiguous statutory text may have to be sent back to Congress "to redo or not").
19 Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipeline to the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Apr. 17,
2017),

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-conservative-pipeline-to-the-supreme-

court [https:Hperma.cc/DW 4 3 -NYXF] (describing the role of Leonard Leo, Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society, in the Trump Administration's judicial-selection process); About Heritage, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/about-heritage/impact [http://perma.cc/TC 7 BKB 4 E] ("Since our founding in i973, The Heritage Foundation has been working to advance the
principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values,
and a strong national defense."). For an example of the Federalist Society's views on administrative
government, see generally LIBERTY'S NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF THE
STATE (Dean Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2oi6). The national administrative state is the subject of
the Federalist Society's annual convention this year. See 2017 National Lawyers Convention: Administrative Agencies and the Regulatory State, FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR L. & PUB. POL'Y
STUD., https://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/2017-national-lawyers-convention [https:Hperma.cc/
9FVD-69TR].
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number of judicial vacanciesmore than any recent President since
Bill Clinton - and will likely have additional Supreme Court vacancies
to fill. 20 The potential thus exists for a significant erosion of administrative power, albeit perhaps one achieved more incrementally and more
targeted to particular substantive areas than a sudden or broad retraction in the administrative state.
Equally important, the current judicial attack on the administrative
state merits attention because of the potential harm it poses for the
Court and for constitutional law. Although resistance to strong central
government has a long legacy in the United States, the real forebears of
today's anti-administrative movement are not the Framers but rather
the conservative opponents of an expanding national bureaucracy in the
193os. Like today, the 193os attack on "agency government" took on a
strongly constitutional and legal cast, laced with rhetorical condemnation of bureaucratic tyranny and administrative absolutism. 21 These
efforts were plainly political, fueled by business and legal interests
deeply opposed to pro-labor regulation and economic planning. The
Supreme Court's constitutional opposition to early New Deal measures
carried heavy political salience as well, triggering President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's contentious plan to pack the Court. 22 A similar political aspect is inseparable from the contemporary administrative at23
tack, as the nomination process for Justice Gorsuch demonstrated.
To acknowledge the political cast of contemporary anti-administrativism is not to question that genuine constitutional concerns animate it.
Such close intertwining of the political and constitutional is characteristic of efforts to construct a new institutional order - and was as true of
progressive efforts to build out the New Deal administrative state in the
193OS as it is of contemporary anti-administrativism's effort to reign in
that state today. But recognizing this political cast, and the parallels to
the 1930S conservative attacks on the New Deal, demonstrates antiadministrativism's radical potential. It also underscores the extent to
which judicial opinions that decry the dangers of the ever-expanding
administrative state risk reinforcing the intense politicization of the

20 See Jonathan H. Adler, How President Trump Will Shape the Federal Courts, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2 01 7/ 1/2
o/how-president-trump-will-shape-the-federal-courts/ [https://perma.cc/PAD 4-2 D4P]; Ryan
Lovelace, Trump Adviser Leonard Leo Details Plans to Overhaul Judiciary, WASH. EXAMINER
(May 12, 2017, 2:00 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-adviser-leonard-leo-detailsplans-to-overhaul-judiciary/article/2622956 [https:Hperma.cc/UPT 3 -6HAW] (noting that Trump already has 134 judicial openings to fill and may eventually have as many as 2oo, as well as three
Supreme Court vacancies).
21 See infra section ILA, pp. 52-62.
22 See id.; see also WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-62 (1995) (discussing Pres-

ident Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan and the controversy surrounding it).
23 See infra section I.B, pp. 62-71.
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Court - a result particularly hard to justify when (at least so far) these
opinions' bottom-line impact does not match their polarizing rhetoric.
Perhaps most problematic, anti-administrativism misdiagnoses the
administrative state's constitutional status. Anti-administrativists paint
the administrative state as fundamentally at odds with the Constitution's separation of powers system, combining together in agencies the
legislative, executive, and judicial authorities that the Constitution vests
in different branches and producing unaccountable and aggrandized
power in the process. In fact, however, the administrative state is essential for actualizing constitutional separation of powers today, serving
both to constrain executive power and to mitigate the dangers of presidential unilateralism while also enabling effective governance. Far from
being constitutionally suspect, the administrative state thus yields important constitutional benefits. Anti-administrativists fail to recognize
that the key administrative state features that they condemn, such as
bureaucracy with its internal oversight mechanisms and expert civil service, are essential for the accountable, constrained, and effective exercise
of executive power.
Even further, the administrative state today is constitutionally obligatory, given the broad delegations of authority to the executive branch
that represent the central reality of contemporary national government.
Those delegations are necessary given the economic, social, scientific,
and technological realities of our day. Not surprisingly, therefore,
very few anti-administrativists are willing to call such delegation of
power into serious constitutional question. But they fail to realize
that delegation comes with substantial constitutional strings attached.
In particular, many of the administrative state's features that antiadministrativists decry follow as necessary consequences of delegation.
By refusing to recognize the administrative state's essential place in
our constitutional order, contemporary anti-administrativism forestalls
development of a separation of powers analysis better tailored to the
reality of current government. Rather than laying siege to the administrative state, such an analysis would seek to maximize the constitutional
benefits that the administrative state has to offer. And it would reorient
constitutional analysis to considering not just constitutional constraints
on government but also constitutional obligations to govern.
Part I of what follows describes the current attacks on the administrative state and assesses their central analytic moves, focusing in particular on judicial anti-administrativism. It then takes up the question
of whether the current attack is likely to make a difference, arguing that
this attack holds greater significance for national administrative governance than might at first appear. Part II adopts a historical lens, identifying contemporary anti-administrativism as the latest episode in a conservative campaign against administrative governance that stretches
back to the early twentieth century, in particular to battles over the New
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Deal in the 193os. After highlighting parallels between the contemporary attacks and 193OS efforts to hamstring New Deal administrative
agencies, Part II draws out cautionary historical lessons for the Court.
Part III turns to analyzing the constitutional functions of the administrative state. Here, too, the 193os hold important lessons, underscoring
the administrative state's constitutional role in both enabling and constraining executive power. Recognizing these constitutional functions
opens the door to a very different account of the administrative state's
constitutional status from what the anti-administrativists offer. This
Part then takes the constitutional argument a step further, contending
that the contemporary reality of delegation makes core features of the
administrative state constitutionally obligatory.
A word on terminology at the outset: The term "administrative state"
is frequently bandied about, but often carries very different meanings.
In promising to deconstruct the administrative state, for instance, the
Trump Administration presumably does not mean to include the mechanisms of bureaucratic power that allow the President to oversee agency
actions. As used here, the administrative state includes those oversight
mechanisms, as well as other core features of national administrative
governance: agencies wielding broad discretion through a combination
of rulemaking, adjudication, enforcement, and managerial functions; the
personnel who perform these activities, from the civil service and professional staff through to political appointees, agency heads, and White
House overseers; and the institutional arrangements and issuances that
help structure these activities. In short, it includes all the actors and
activities involved in fashioning and implementing national regulation
and administration - including that which occurs in hybrid forms and
spans traditional public-private and nation-state boundaries. 24 An unfortunate implication of invoking the administrative state writ large is
that it conveys the idea of a single monolithic entity, whereas in reality
national administrative government contains within it tremendous variety, cooperation, and rivalrya pluralistic dynamic that obtains
within individual agencies as well. The administrative state writ large
is nonetheless a helpful analytic conceit here as a stand-in for the archetypal characteristics of national administrative government now under
attack.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY ATTACK ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Across a range of public arenas - political, judicial, and academic
in particularconservative and libertarian challenges to administrative governance currently claim center stage. Sustained resistance to

24

See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 855-63

(2014).
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national administrative power is no stranger to American public life. It
has been a feature of national politics for decades, going back to the
Reagan revolution of the I98Os and Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential
campaign that preceded it.25 The striking feature of the current challenges, however, is the extent to which they are surfacing in court and
being framed in terms of constitutional doctrine. The problems these
attacks identify with the administrative state are not simply the policies
it advances, its role as the engine for social regulation, or its domination
by progressive bureaucrats. More than this, the national administrative
state is attacked as fundamentally unconstitutional. While still a minority position, this view is gaining more judicial and academic traction
than at any point since the 1930s.
The first step in assessing the significance of the current attack is
understanding its full contours. This Part takes on that descriptive task,
detailing the current attacks on administrative governance. It focuses
in greatest detail on the attack in the courts, where a variety of legal
challenges, some constitutional and some not, are surfacing. This Part
then identifies and examines several central features that these attacks
on the administrative state share and assesses their likely impact.

A. The PoliticalAttack
The political attack on the national administrative state is hard to
miss. Even separate from the Trump Administration's promise to "deconstruct[] the administrative state" or its identification of a dangerous
"deep state" opposed to the President, the Administration's initial actions have been aggressively antiregulatory.26 These actions include specific area rollbacks, such as instructions that agencies repeal, waive, or
delay implementation of major Obama Administration regulatory initiatives in the environmental, financial regulation, and health care arenas.2 7 But they also encompass dramatic transsubstantive measures, in
particular requirements that agencies establish task forces focused on

25 Leading accounts of contemporary American conservatism date its birth to the I 95Os, but it
only appeared in contemporary national political life with the Goldwater campaign and did not
gain significant popular traction until Reagan. See LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE
ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT i--46,

x87-216 (2001).

26 See Rucker & Costa, supra note i; Matthew Nussbaum et al., Trump's Obsession over Russia
Probe Deepens, POLITICO (May 28, 2017, i:io
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/28/
trump-russia-advice-23891 1 [https:Hperma.cc/94U8- 3 PAJ].
27 Exec. Order No. I3,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (Promoting Energy Independence
and Economic Growth); Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 8, 2017) (Core Principles

for Regulating the United States Financial System); Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan.
24, 2Q17) (Minimizing the Economic Burden of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Pending Repeal); see also Fiduciary Duty Rule, Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor, 82 Fed.
Reg. 9675 (Feb. 7, 2Q17).
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regulatory repeal, 28 repeal two regulations for each new regulation they
propose, and keep additional regulatory costs at zero. 29 President
Trump's cabinet is composed of individuals who have long opposed the
agencies and programs they now lead 30 and his budget proposes to dra3 1
matically slash funding for a large swath of nonmilitary agencies.
Business interests are enjoying a regulatory retraction of unprecedented
proportions, with the combination of executive branch actions and
Congress's disapproval of late Obama Administration rules under the
CRA. 32 By the time the window for disapproval closed, Congress had
overturned fourteen Obama regulationswhich was thirteen more
regulatory disapprovals than had previously occurred in the CRA's
28 See Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017) (Enforcing the Regulatory
Reform Agenda); Danielle Ivory & Robert Faturechi, The Deep Industry Ties of Trump's Deregulation Teams, N.Y. TIMES (July ii, 2017), https://www.nytimes.coMn/2017/07/ii/business/the-deepindustry-ties-of-trumps-deregulation-teams.html [https:Hperma.cc/ 7 XRZ- 3 ZYJ].
29 See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017) (Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs); Memorandum from Dominic J. Mancini, Acting Adm'r, Office of Info.
& Regulatory Affairs, to Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies & Managing &
Exec. Dirs. of Certain Agencies and Comm'ns (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2017/02/ 02/interim-guidance-implementing-section-2 -executive-order-january-30-2017
[https:Hperma.cc/2NBH-LW 5 6].
For early assessments of President Trump's administrative
agenda, see DanielA. Farber, PresidentialAdministration Under Trump 16-21 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3o15591 [https:Hperma.cc/B 7 82MCA9]; and Peter L. Strauss, The Trump Transition and American Administrative Law (May 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
30 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Steven Mufson, Trump Taps Former Texas Gov. Rick Perry to Head
Energy Department He Once Vowed to Abolish, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2o16), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2o16/12/ 13/trump-taps-former-texas-gov-rick-perryto-head-energy-department-he-once-vowed-to-abolish/ [https://perma.cc/JLH 5 -CHBR]; Eric Lipton & Coral Davenport, Scott Pruitt,Trump's E.PA. Pick, Backed Industry Donors over Regulators,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/oi1/4/us/scott-pruitt-trump-epapick.html [https:Hperma.cc/DP 3 W-CJW2]; see also Kate Zernike, Betsy DeVos, Trump's Education
Pick, Has Steered Money from Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2oi6), https://www.nytimes.coMr/2oi6/i1/23/us/politics/betsy-devos-trumps-education-pick-has-steered-money-from-public-schools.html [https:Hperma.cc/X96D-29UK] (describing Secretary DeVos's prior efforts to shift
funding away from public schools).
31 Gregor Aisch & Alicia Parlapiano, How Trump's Budget Would Affect Every Part of Government, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/23/us/politics/trump-budget-details.html [https://perma.cc/U 5 H5 -JHCX]; Kim Soffen & Denise Lu, What
Trump Cut in His Agency Budgets, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/politics/trump-presidential-budget-2 o1 8 -proposal/ [https://perma.cc/RHC7-BXTY].
32 Per a count by the New York Times, over ninety Obama-era regulations were delayed, suspended, or reversed in President Trump's first month and a half in office alone. Eric Lipton &
Binyamin Appelbaum, Leashes Come off Wall Street, Gun Sellers, Polluters and More, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.cOM/2017/03/05/us/politics/trump-deregulation-guns-wall-stclimate.html [https:Hperma.cc/HF 7 E-WS5 Y]; see also Barry Meier & Danielle Ivory, Under Trump,
Worker ProtectionsAre Viewed with New Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.coM/201-7/o6/o/business/under-trump-worker-protections-are-viewed-with-new-skepticism.
html [https:Hperma.cc/TY 3 H-XRZJ]; Hiroko Tabuchi & Eric Lipton, How Rollbacks at Scott
Pruitt'sE.PA. Are a Boon to Oil and Gas, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/2 o/business/energy-environment/devon-energy.html [https://perma.cc/ZgNU-SKZB].

20,7]

THE SUPREME COURT-

FOREWORD

twenty-one year life. 3 3 Agency teams - often with business ties - have
sought to delay numerous rules immediately, although such efforts have
already faced resistance from courts.3 4 Importantly, the Trump Administration has also proposed some measures that would expand the administrative state - for example, by adding over 15,000 more immigration employees.3 5 And some ostensibly deregulatory measures, such as
congressional Republicans' efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act,
3 6
may well entail substantial grants of new administrative authority
But the overall thrust since the Trump Administration came into office
has been in a strongly deregulatory direction.
Even more significant for the administrative state would be enactment of congressional measures like the proposed RAA. The Senate's
version of the RAA would require agencies, upon request, to hold oral
evidentiary hearings on any "specific scientific, technical, economic, or
other complex factual issues that are genuinely disputed" in high-impact
rulemakings (those with an expected annual economic impact of $i billion or more) and in some major rulemakings (those with an expected
annual economic impact of $ioo million or more).3 7 It would also limit
the use of interim final rulemaking, require high-impact rules to meet a
higher evidentiary standard, and limit judicial deference to an agency's
33 See Alex Guillen, GOP Onslaughton Obama's "MidnightRules" Comes to an End, POLITICO
(May 7, 2017, 7:io AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/07/obama-regulations-gop-mid-

night-rules-238051 [https:Hperma.cc/Y29R-MM8B]. Conservative leaders within and outside Congress are trying to expand the CRA's reach further, arguing that it should apply to guidance and to
rules never properly submitted for congressional review in the past. PHILIP A. WALLACH & NICHOLAS W. ZEPPOS, BROOKINGS INST., HOW POWERFUL IS THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

ACT? (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-powerful-is-the-congressional-review-act/
[https:Hperma.cc/P 3 NJ-K2U8]; Arianna Skibell, GAO to Review Guidance Docs as Republicans Test
CRA's Reach, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (May 25, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/io6oo551-71 [https://perma.cc/ 3 CCC-J 9 B2].

34 See, e.g., Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F. 3d i (D.C. Cir. 2017) (invalidating the EPA's stay
of methane rule); Juliet Eilperin & Damian Paletta, Trump Administration Cancels Hundreds of
Obama-EraRegulations, WASH. POST (July 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/trump-administration-cancels-hundres-of-obama-era-regulations/2017/07/2 /55f5oicc-6d
68- iie7-96ab-5f 3 8 14ob38cc-story.html [https://perma.cc/5 QPL-AMU 5 ].
35 Eric Katz, Trump's Orders Callingfor 15,ooo New FederalEmployees Could Face Setbacks,
GOV'T EXECUTIVE (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.govexec.com/management/2017/oi/trumps-orders-

calling- I5ooo-new-employees-could-face-setbacks/ 34929 [https:Hperma.cc/P6VG-VYCG].
Most
recently, President Tump proposed and then signed into law a multibillion dollar expansion in
federal disaster relief. See Mike DeBonis & Kelsey Snell, Trump Signs $i5 Billion Harvey Aid
Package After Republicans Booed Top White House Officials, WASH. POST. POWERPOST (Sept. 8,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-set-to-vote-today-on-harvey-aid-package-that-would-also-raise-debt-ceiling/2017/09/08/728ddce8-9494

-iIe7-8754-d478688d2 3 b4_story.

html [https://perma.cc/8478- 3 6ZZ].
36 Stan Dorn & Sara Rosenbaum, Senate Health Care Legislation Would GrantHHS Unprecedented Power over States, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 24, 2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2 017/
07/24/senate-health-care-legislation-would-grant-hhs-unprecedented-power-over-states [https://perma.cc/
SXA6-QQM2].
37 S. 951, ii 5 th Cong. §§ 2- 3 (2017).
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interpretations of its own rules. 3 8 The House version is more extreme,
requiring an agency to hold formal trial-like hearings when proposing a
high-impact rule and, for all rulemakings, often to hold an initial hearing
at which interested parties can challenge the information on which the
agency plans to rely.3 9 Both bills would also impose additional evaluation requirements on agencies and expand the availability of judicial
review of agency actions; 40 and the House version forbids agencies from
implementing rules until all legal challenges to them are resolved. 4 1 Additionally, the House incorporated the proposed Separation of Powers
Restoration Act in its version, which would require courts to "decide de
novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of con'42
stitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies.
Although some question how burdensome the Senate version would
be, 43 past experience with oral hearing and trial-type procedures under
the APA's formal rulemaking provisions and other statutes strongly suggests that both measures would be significantly onerous and resource
consuming for agencies. 4 4 A separate proposed measure, the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, would not
impose additional procedures on agencies but instead require Congress
enact a joint resolution of approval before any major rule could go into
effect. 45 Given the notorious difficulty Congress has had recently in

Id. § 3-4.
H.R. 5, 115 th Cong. § 103 (2017).
See id.; S. 951 88 3-4.
H.R. 5 § 402 (Require Evaluation Before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act).
Id. §§ 201-202; see also H.R. 76, ii 5 th Cong. (2017) (as a standalone bill).
Compare Kent Barnett, Opinion, Looking More Closely at the Platypus of Formal Rulemaking, REG. REV. (May ii, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/ ii/Barnett-platypus-formalrulemaking [https:Hperma.cc/D 7 DX-Y 7 DP], and Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, A Regulatory Reform
Bill that Everyone Should Like, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 22, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017 -o6-22/a-regulatory-reform-bill-that-everyone-should-like
[https://perma.cc/
6HHT-D8V 5 ] (largely supporting the RAA), with William W. Buzbee, Opinion, Regulatory "Reform" that Is Anything But, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.coMn/2017/o6/i/
opinion/regulatory-reform-bills-congress-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/K 3 QW-5ED6]
(arguing
against the RAA), and William Funk, Opinion, Requiring Formal Rulemaking is a Thinly Veiled
Attempt to Halt Regulation, REG. REV. (May 18, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05S8/
funk-formal-rulemaking-halt-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/2Y88-WDBS].
44 See Funk, supra note 43; see also Martha Roberts, Opinion, The Misguided Regulatory Accountability Act, REG. REV. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/03/29/roberts-misguided-regulatory-accountability-act/ [https:Hperma.cc/ 3 86L-RVKW] (arguing that the RAA would
impose cost assessment and formal rulemaking requirements that hobbled the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697 (2012), prior to that Act's reform). But see Aaron L. Nielson,
In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 240-42 (2014) (arguing that the lengthy
delays of prior formal rulemakings could have been averted and that the benefits of formal rulemaking may justify such cost in some circumstances).
45 See H.R. 26 § 3, ii 5 th Cong. (2017).
38
39
40
41
42
43
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passing legislation, the REINS Act would even more clearly stop regu46
lation in its tracks.
Much advocacy for these legislative and regulatory measures describes administrative government in harsh terms, for example invoking
the need to rein in an "out-of- control bureaucracy '4 7 intent on imposing
costly, "job-crushing" regulations. 48 An equally frequent refrain is condemnation of rampant "Obama administration overreach. '49 Yet in
2017 the RAA's backers adopted a more constitutional register, arguing
that "[iun recent years .. .we have seen th[e] separation of powers undermined by an overzealous bureaucracy that creates laws, then executes those laws, and then acts as their own appeal authority. ' 50 No
doubt this constitutional turn reflects in part the separation of powers
concerns now expressly in the bill. But such constitutional rhetoric also
surfaces in the REINS Act, which emphasizes that the Constitution
vests the legislative power in Congress.5 1 It was also strongly present
in the 2016 Republican national platform, which repeatedly portrayed
the growth in the national administrative state as a constitutional crisis.52 And it echoes the heavily constitutional discourse of the Tea Party,
whose 2010 protests against the financial bailouts and the Affordable
Care Act in the name of limited government and fiscal constraint
53
marked the advent of the current anti-administrative moment.
Trump is hardly the first or even the most anti-administrative modern President. President Richard Nixon also repeatedly attacked the

46

Ronald M. Levin, The REINS Act: UnbridledImpediment to Regulation, 83 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 1446, i458-6o (2015).
47 I63 CONG. REC. Hgoo (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2017) (statement of Rep. Walorski on H.R.J. Res. 40,

ii 5 th Cong. (2017)).

48 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks in Joint Address to Congress (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/remarks-president-trump-joint-addresscongress [https:Hperma.cc/HQT 4 -L88A]; see also i6i CONG. REC. H2 4 9 (daily ed. Jan. I3, 2015)
(statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("What is killing the American Dream ...is the endless drain of resources that takes working people's hard-earned wages to Washington ....
");i57 CONG. REC.
i8,685 (2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (noting the "job-killing cost of regulations"); id. at 18,687
(statement of Rep. Coble) (stating the "regulatory process is out of control").
49 I63 CONG. REC. Hgoo (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2017) (statement of Rep. Walorski on H.R.J. Res. 40,
ii 5 th Cong. (2017)); 163 CONG. REC. H 7 6I (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2017) (statement of Rep. Newhouse
on H.R.J. Res. 38, ii 5th Cong. (2017)); see 163 CONG. REC. H9o3 (daily ed. Feb. 2,201-7) (statement
of Rep. Arrington on H.RJ. Res. 40, ii 5 th Cong. (2017)).
50 I63 CONG. REC. H2 5 3 (daily ed. Jan. io, 2017) (statement of Rep. Bacon); see also 163 CONG.
REC. H 3 28-29 (daily ed. Jan. ii, 2017) (statement of Rep. McCarthy).
51 See H.R. 26, ii 5 th Cong. § 2 (2017).
52 See 2oi6 REPUBLICAN NAT'L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 206, at 9-IO
(2oi6), https:Hprod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT 12 FINAL[i]-benI468872234.
pdf [https:Hperma.cc/YFJ 4 -VB 7 5].
53 SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 7-10, 31-32, i6o; Christopher W. Schmidt, The
Tea Party and the Constitution,39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 193 (2011) (discussing the Tea Party
as a form of popular constitutionalism).
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federal bureaucracy,5 4 and President George W. Bush was famous for
centralizing and politicizing the executive branch to bring administrative government more under his control. 55 Democratic Presidents have
done their share of bureaucracy bashing as well, with President Bill
Clinton proclaiming that the "era of big Government is over" 56 and Vice
President Al Gore spearheading the New Performance Review, an effort
"to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement" and to provide the "honest and efficient" government that the "American people deserve ...[but] for too long ... haven't gotten. '57 The closest parallel to President Trump, however, is
President Ronald Reagan, who campaigned on similar promises of dramatically cutting back the national government and made regulatory
relief "one of the four 'cornerstones"' of his program for economic recovery.5 Reagan is credited with prominently injecting antigovernmental rhetoric back into national political discourse; he famously proclaimed in his first inaugural address that "government is not the
solution to our problem; government is the problem. '59 Reagan, too,
appointed outsiders committed to rolling back the agencies they led,
slashed agency budgets, and pushed for repeal of statutes requiring
ex60
tensive regulatory regimes as well as abolition of some agencies.
The promises of regulatory reduction and downsizing of government,
however, largely went unfulfilled. Much of the deregulation achieved
under Reagan resulted from controlling implementation and administration of existing statutes, not from legislative repeals. 61 More to the point,

54 RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 8-9 (1983).

55 See, e.g., David J. Barron, Foreword, From Takeover to Merger. Reforming Administrative
Law in an Age of Agency Politicization,76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1128

(2008);

Peter L. Strauss,

Foreword, Overseer,or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 696, 719-38 (2007).

56 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1PUB. PAPERS 79
(Jan. 23, 1996).
57 Remarks Announcing the National Performance Review, 1 PUB. PAPERS 233-34 (Mar. 3,
1993).
58 Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 253, 261 (1986)

(quoting Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Statement of the President on Regulatory Relief (June 5, 1981), reprintedin MATERIALS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROGRAM OF
REGULATORY RELIEF I (98), https://reaganlibrary.gov/digitallibrary/smof/cos/cicconi/Box-12/
40-94-6914308-012-007-2oI6.pdf [https:Hperma.cc/8 5 6R-MABF]).
59 Inaugural Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS i (Jan. 20, 1981); see also ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, WHITE
PROTESTANT NATION:

THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE

MOVEMENT 350

(2008); SEAN WILENTZ, THE AGE OF REAGAN: A HISTORY, 1974-2oo8, at 127-28, 136 (2008).
60 WILENTZ, supra note 59, at 140-41, 169; Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospectsfor

Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of Reagan's First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 297-303 (1985);
McGarity, supra note 58, at 262-68.
61 LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 354; MEG JACOBS & JULIAN E. ZELIZER, CONSERVATIVES
IN POWER: THE REAGAN YEARS, 1981-1989, at 38-39 (2011).
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the Reagan Administration's efforts at deregulation and curtailing administrative government are largely considered a failure. 62 Governmental spending increased, no major domestic programs were terminated,
and by the start of Reagan's second term regulatory relief was firmly off
the agenda. 63 If anything, the Reagan era sowed the seeds for what
conservatives today view as executive overreach. It was the Reagan
Administration's deregulatory efforts that produced the Chevron doctrine and deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes that it implements. 64 It was also the Reagan Administration
that developed centralized regulatory review and pushed for recognition
65
of constitutionally protected presidential control of administration.
Over subsequent decades both Republican and Democratic Presidents
developed these tools of presidential control even further. In particular,
President Obama used his powers of administrative direction and oversight to push progressive policies stymied in Congress. 66 Once Republican mainstays, Chevron deference and presidential administrative con67
trol quickly became the bttes noires of conservatives.
Thus, if past experience is any guide, the current political attack
seems unlikely to dramatically transform the administrative state. Administrative government's endurance reflects basic political as well as
economic, social, and technological realities. An administrative state is

62 WILENTZ, supra note 59, at 194-96.
63 JACOBS & ZELIZER, supra note 6i, at 28-33, 40-4i; Fix & Eads, supra note 6o, at 293, 304;
McGarity, supra note 58, at 268-70. Similar antiregulatory promises from Presidents Nixon and
Bush were equally unfulfilled. In fact, national administrative government dramatically expanded
under Nixon's watch with the enactment of the major environmental, labor, and health statutes
that ushered in a new era of national social regulation. JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN GovERNMENT 15, 20-22 (2o16).
64 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (-984).
65 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 374-83 (2008); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on CongressionalPower. PresidentialInfluences on
ConstitutionalChange, 78 IND. L. 363, 383 (2003) ("Reagan sought not only to advance his vision
of [limited national] government through policy choices and political discourse, but also to enshrine
it in constitutional doctrine.").
66 Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Agencies, Polarization,and the States, u5 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,
1741, 1752-57, 1774-77 (2015) [hereinafter Metzger, Agencies, Polarization,and the States].

67 See, e.g., Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States (Day 3), S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY at 1:46:o8 (Mar. 22,
2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/watch?hearingid=8325DA5C-5 o56-Ao66-6059-5F
D8D 3 12A9BB [https:Hperma.cc/L 7 4 Q-GK 5 M] (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I am troubled by the
suggestion that skepticism of Chevron ... means that one is somehow reflexively opposed to regulation .... After all, it's important to remember that Chevron deference first flourished as a reaction
against liberal judges overturning the.., actions of the Reagan Administration."); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 8i Mo. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2oi6) (noting that conservative Chevron
skepticism may be attributable to "conservative frustration with eight years of a Democratic administration, contrasted with enthusiasm for the doctrine at its outset in the Reagan years").
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unavoidable today for the country to function; the question is not
whether an administrative state will exist, but rather what will be the
scope and focus of its activities. 68 Many government programs are popular or lobbied for by well-connected interest groups; 69 even those clamoring vociferously for a rollback of national government, such as the Tea
Party, are strongly committed to some features of modern administrative
governance.7 0 Moreover, Presidents need the administrative state to
achieve their policy goals. This is as true of President Trump as of his
predecessors: Trump's campaign promises of significant infrastructure
development, growing the military, and a crackdown on immigration all
entail administrative expansions. 1 Further, enactment of burdensome
procedural constraints or legislation retracting deference would only
serve to make the Trump Administration's efforts to repeal regulations
significantly harder. 2 Instead, a more likely move - again following
in the footsteps of Reagan and subsequent Presidents - would be for
the Trump Administration to seek to achieve deregulation from within
the executive branch, as it already has started to do.
But past experience in fact may not be a good guide, because the
national political situation today differs in important ways from that of
the i98os. Most salient here is the alarming increase in political polarization, with the two parties significantly more ideologically divided from
each other and more internally ideologically consistent than they were
when Reagan was President.7 3 Moreover, the divergence between the
68 Pojanowski, supra note 67, at 1075.

69 See Paul Pierson, The New Politicsof the Welfare State, 48 WORLD POL. 143, 143-44 (1996);
Lauren Etter & Greg Hitt, Farm Lobby Beats Back Assault on Subsidies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27,
2008, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBi2o6 5 7 6 4 5 4 1 9 9 6 7 0 7 7 [https:Hperma.cc/ 5 FU26Z 3 G]; Robert Y. Shapiro & Greg M. Shaw, Why Can't the Senate Repeal Obamacare?Because Its
Policies Are Actually Popular, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/201-7/07/19/why-cant-the-senate-repeal-obamacare-becauseits-actual-policies-are-popular/ [https:Hperma.cc/ZLR6-TRUG].
70 SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 59-6o (noting that "Tea Party people know that
Social Security, Medicare, and veterans' programs are government-managed, expensive, and
funded with taxes," but support the programs because they feel the recipients have "earned" it).
71 David Lewis, Why Donald Trump Needs the "Administrative State" that Steve Bannon Wants
to Destroy, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/02/why-donald-trump-needs-the-administrative-state-that-steve-bannon-wants-to-destroy/ [https://perma.cc/M 3 2V-PKYM]; Brian Naylor, Trump's Plan to Hire i5,ooo
Border Patroland ICE Agents Won't Be Easy, NPR (Feb. 23, 2017, 5:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2 017/02 /23/51671298otrumps-plan-to-hire- 5-Ooo-border-patrol-and-ice-agents-wont-be-easy-tofulfill [https:Hperma.cc/SP 5 P-GNNZ].
72 See Vermeule, supra note 18.
73 See Cynthia R. Farina, Essay, CongressionalPolarization:Terminal ConstitutionalDysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 170-05 (2015) (noting increases in congressional polarization
since the i98os with current levels of polarization being the highest since the Civil War). Although
some debate the extent of polarization, there is general agreement that polarization is strongly present at the level of party elites and party activists. See, e.g., id. at 1705-17 (describing debate and
concluding that evidence shows polarization among party activists and members of Congress); Gary
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parties is particularly stark when it comes to the role of government,
with recent surveys indicating that Republicans and Republican-leaning
independents strongly prefer a smaller government providing fewer services (74%), whereas Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents
strongly prefer a bigger government with more services (65 %).74 This
divide is plainly evident in Congress, where the barrier to the RAA's
enactment is near-solid Democratic opposition in the closely split
Senate, making it difficult for the RAA's backers to secure the necessary
supermajority of sixty votes to overcome a Democratic filibuster. Were
the makeup of the Senate to turn more Republican, or were the Senate
to do away with the filibuster, the RAA might well be enacted - particularly if Republicans conclude (as Democrats did in 1946 with respect
to the APA) that their control of the executive branch is likely to be
limited and enactment of the RAA is thus in their long-term interests.5

B. The Judicial and Academic Attack
The current judicial challenges to national administrative government fall into three general categories: separation of powers challenges;
subconstitutional challenges with a separation of powers background;
and other constitutional challenges. Academic scholarship sounds similar themes, albeit with more of an individual rights flavor.
. Separation of Powers. - The separation of powers challenges can
further be subdivided by subject matter, again into three groupings:
presidential power, in particular presidential appointment and removal
authority; administrative adjudication; and delegation of authority to
the executive branch.
(a) PresidentialPower.So far, presidential power challenges
have been the most successful, in part reflecting longstanding doctrinal
uncertainty about the scope of the President's removal powers. In the
2010 case of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board,76 a 5-4 Court invalidated for-cause removal protections for
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), an entity that oversees the accounting industry and whose
members are appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). According to Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion, because
the members of the SEC also enjoyed for-cause removal protection, the
C. Jacobson, PartisanPolarizationin American Politics: A Background Paper,43 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 688, 690-700 (2013) (describing polarization in Congress and arguing that it reflects increased polarization in party bases).
74 With Budget Debate Looming, Growing Share of Public Prefers Bigger Government, PEW
RES. CTR. (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2Q17/04/24/with-budget-debate-loominggrowing-share-of-public-prefers-bigger-government/3/ [https:Hperma.cc/8 4 JW-2JZX].
75 McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, x5 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. I80, I80-83 (I999).

76 56I U.S. 477 (2010).
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result was a double for-cause protection that eviscerated the President's
control over the PCAOB and thereby impaired his ability to ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.77 Free Enterprise has sparked a cottage
industry of separation of powers challenges, including PHH Corp. v.
Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau,7 8 in which a 2-i panel of the
D.C. Circuit invalidated the removal protections for the Director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency newly created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Fairness
Act (Dodd-Frank).7 9 According to the panel decision, now vacated
pending en banc review, the concentration of CFPB's significant powers
in a single director, rather than a multimember commission such as other
independent agencies, removed important checks on accumulated power
and rendered the arrangement unconstitutional.8 0
Both Free Enterprise'sprohibition on double for-cause removal protection and PHH Corp.'s requirement that independent agencies be
headed by multimember commissions represent new constitutional limits on Congress's power to fashion administrative arrangements. Both
decisions in turn justified their results in part on the novelty of the administrative structures they confronted. 1 In Free Enterprise, Chief
Justice Roberts's majority opinion maintained that "the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem ... is the lack of historical
precedent" for Congress's action, 2 a principle on which the D.C. Circuit
panel heavily relied in PHH Corp.8 3 The constitutionally suspect character of administrative novelty was also emphasized by the Court in
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 4 which provided the Supreme Court with its
first occasion to interpret the meaning of the Recess Appointments
Clause. 5 President Obama's actions underlying Noel Canning were
novel; no President had previously made recess appointments during a
pro forma session - nor, indeed, had pro forma sessions been used to
stymie recess appointments before 2007.86 In Noel Canning, Justice
77 Id. at 495-99.
78 839 F.3 d i (D.C. Cir. 2o16), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 15-1177, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2733 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
79 Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
80 PHH Corp., 839 F.3 d at 16.
81 Antinovelty has surfaced in a number of structural constitutional challenges of late. See Leah
M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1415-21 (2017).
82 561 U.S. at 505 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3 d
667,
83
84
85
86

699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
8 3 9 F.3 d at 22.
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
Id. at 2560; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-PoliticalDivide, 64 DUKE

L.J. 1607, 16o9, 1619-20 (2015); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separationof Powers, 124 YALE
L.J. 2, 46 (2014).
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Breyer's majority opinion underscored the importance of historical practice in holding that President Obama's unprecedented action fell outside
the scope of the recess appointments power.8 7 But on the same basis,
the majority ruled that recess appointments can be used during intrasession recesses and to fill vacancies that already exist when the recess occurs, concluding these practices were by now long established and accorded with the purpose of the clause.8 8 Here Justice Scalia, writing
also for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, disagreed
that longstanding historical practice was clear and also challenged the
majority's reliance on twentieth-century historical practice as an abandonment of the Court's constitutional responsibilities.8 9
Hence, in addition to rejecting administratively novel arrangements,
at least three current members of the Court would appear to give little
weight to the tenure of administrative arrangements in assessing their
constitutionality. 90 This asymmetry - novelty can condemn an administrative arrangement, but lack of novelty can't save it- displays a
skepticism toward administrative government on the part of a sizeable
group on the Court. Although no constitutional separation of powers
challenges came before the Court in the 2016 Term, the question of historical practice surfaced in NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 9 1 a case on the
scope of the President's power to fill vacancies under the Federal
Vacancies Reform Act 92 (FVRA). Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
Court that the Act barred those who were nominated to a vacant office
requiring Senate confirmation from serving in the same office in an acting capacity (with an exception for nominees who had previously served
a set period as first assistants to the office at issue). 93 Ever since I998,
when the FVRA was enacted, both the Office of Legal Counsel and the
General Accountability Office had read the Act's prohibition as applying more narrowly.94 Concluding "[h]istorical practice is too grand a

87 I34 S. Ct. at 2567, 2574.
88 Id. at 2566-68. This approach to novelty marked a change from Justice Breyer's approach

in Free Enterprise. Dissenting there, Justice Breyer thought this novelty of no moment, emphasizing the variety of administrative structures and the importance of "flexibility needed to adapt statutory law to changing circumstances." 56i U.S. 477, 520 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at
514-20.
89 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

90 Itseems quite likely that Justice Gorsuch would be of a similar view, given his approach to
related separation of powers challenges. See supra notes 13-- 7 and accompanying text.
91
92
93
94

]37 S. Ct. 929 (2017).
5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349 (20i2).
SW General, 137 S.Ct. at 932.
See id.at 943; Guidance on Application of Federal Vacancies Reform Act of '998, 23 Op.
O.L.C. 6o, 64 (i999) (interpreting the FVRA's ban as applying only when a first assistant became
an acting officer before serving the requisite ninety-day period, but not applying to other officers
the FVRA made eligible to serve in an acting capacity).
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title for [this] evidence," Roberts rejected the relevance of these past interpretations without calling Noel Canning into question. 95 The most
extreme claim in SW General was made by Justice Thomas, who argued
in a concurrence that the Constitution likely prohibited any non-Senateconfirmed appointment to a principal officer position, even in an acting
96
capacity.
(b) Administrative Adjudication.Free Enterprise has also surfaced in the administrative adjudication context, with a number of cases
challenging the appointment and removal processes for administrative
law judges (ALJs) at the SEC. Defendants facing administrative enforcement proceedings as a result of Dodd-Frank's expansion of the
SEC's adjudication authority have argued that the ALJs presiding over
their proceedings are inferior officers. 97 Under governing statutes, ALJs
are competitively selected by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), with agencies choosing an ALJ to hire from the three highestscoring names on a list that OPM compiles. 98 By SEC rule, the agency's
chief ALJ selects which of these three candidates to hire - an arrangement that all concede would be unconstitutional if ALJs were indeed
inferior officers, given the requirement that inferior officers be selected
by the President (with or without Senate confirmation), heads of department, or courts of law. 99 Moreover, ALJs enjoy elaborate independence
protections. Those protections include not only strong salary and forcause removal protection for themselves, but also removal only after a
formal on-the-record hearing by the Merit Systems Protection Board,
the members of which also enjoy for-cause removal protection. 100 These
95 SW General, 137 S. Ct. at 943 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96

Id. at 948-49 (Thomas, J., concurring).

97 See, e.g., Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (ioth Cir. 2o16); Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v.
SEC, 832 F.3 d 277, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2oi6), aff'd by an equally divided en banc court, No. 15-1345,
2017 WL 2727019 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2017) (per curiam); Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3 d 1236, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2o16); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3 d 382, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
98 See 5 U.S.C. § 3317-3318 (2012); Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 797, 804-05 (2013).

99 See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30 -o(a)(2) (delegating to the Chief ALJ the power "[t]o designate administrative law judges"); see also Barnett, supra note 98, at 800 ("If... ALJs are 'inferior Officers'
(not mere employees), the manner in which some are currently selected is likely unconstitutional.").
Appointment Clause problems may exist even in other agencies where the agency head does select
the ALJs, given OPM's role in limiting the pool of ALJ candidates and the fact that some agency
heads may not qualify as department heads for constitutional purposes because their agencies are
nested within bigger administrative entities. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511 (2Q10) ("[A] freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such component,... constitutes a 'Departmen[t]' for the
purposes of the Appointments Clause." (second alteration in original)); Jennifer L. Mascott, Who
Are "Officers of the United States"?, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (Mar. 2017 draft at 6468) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
100See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5335 (setting pay schedule for permanent employees, including ALJs); id.
§ 5362 (protecting permanent employees from pay decreases); id. § 7521 (establishing procedures to
be followed before adverse action can be taken against an ALJ); see also id. § 1202(d) (providing
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protections are a core feature of the current system for administrative
adjudication under the APA, which combines initial adjudication by an
ALJ with de novo review at the agency head level. 10 1 As a result, if
ALJs are inferior officers, not only would the current systems many
agencies use to appoint them be at odds with the Appointments
Clause, 10 2 but also these removal protections might well run afoul of
10 3
Free Enterprise'sdouble for-cause bar.
Whether or not this challenge to ALJ appointment ultimately proves
successful in court, the mere fact that such a long-established feature of
the national administrative state is under question is striking. This
point is only more true with respect to the other constitutional attacks
on administrative adjudication now being raised, such as the claim that
such adjudication violates the Seventh Amendment jury trial right and
claims that the combination of adjudicatory, prosecutorial, and enforcement powers in an agency violates due process. 10 4 The Roberts Court's
position on these challenges is hard to read. In other contexts, the Chief
Justice has worried about agencies wielding a combination of de facto
legislative, executive, and adjudicatory power.1 0 5 In addition, a majority of the Court has indicated some resistance to non-Article III jurisdiction, invalidating bankruptcy court jurisdiction over state law private right counterclaims in Stern v. Marshall.10 6 Subsequently, in

Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,10

7

the Chief Justice,

writing for himself and two other Justices, strongly dissented over what
he perceived as a rollback from Stern. He insisted that "[w]ith narrow
exceptions, Congress may not confer power to decide federal cases and

that any member of the Merit Systems Protection Board "may be removed by the President only
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").
101 See id. § 556(b)( 3) (providing that an ALJ may preside over the taking of evidence); id.
§ 557(b) (providing that the presiding employee shall make an initial decision, binding on the agency
unless appealed).
102 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
103 However, Free Enterprise's express reservation of its import for ALJs, 561 U.S. at 507 n.mo,
suggests that the Court may be unwilling to invalidate double for-cause removal in the adjudicatory
context, and precedent going back to Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), suggests that
constitutional requirements of presidential control are different when adjudication is at issue, id. at
135.
104 See, e.g., Complaint at 12-13, Chau v. SEC, 72 . Supp. 3 d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-cv1903); Complaint at 7-8, Jarkesy v. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3 d 32 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 14-114); Complaint
at 13-23, Bebo v. SEC, 2015 WL 905349 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2015) (No. i5-C-3). The influx of
litigation challenging the administrative adjudicatory practices at the SEC has been attributed in
part to the increase in power of SEC ALJs brought on by Dodd-Frank. See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretionat the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1190-210 (2oi6) (discussing possible infirmities
of SEC ALJ adjudication).
105 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313-14 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
106 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
107 I35 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
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controversies upon judges who do not comply with the structural safeguards of Article III."108 On the other hand, the Stern majority expressly stated it was not reaching broader questions of administrative
adjudication, acknowledged that public rights do not require Article
III adjudication, and appeared to sanction a broad definition of
public rights as rights that are "integrally related to particular Federal
Government action." 10 9 In addition, the Court's return to a more flexible approach to Article III's requirements in Wellness InternationalNetwork perhaps signals some hesitancy to disrupt existing arrangements
that significantly.110
The 2017 Term may well shed light on how far the Roberts Court is
willing to pull back on administrative adjudication. A circuit split now
exists on the question of whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers or employees, and thus also on the constitutionality of SEC adjudications. 1 1
And the Court has already granted certiorari in a case challenging
whether the Patent and Trademark Office's inter partes review of
the validity of existing patents violates Article III and the Seventh
Amendment. 112

(c) Delegation.- In Department of Transportation v. Ass'n of
American Railroads,113 the D.C. Circuit invalidated a statutory scheme
for improving passenger rail service on the grounds that it contained a
delegation of regulatory power to private hands that violated due process and the separation of powers. 1 14 Given that the ostensibly private
hands at issue were those of Amtrak, a statutorily denominated private
corporation that the Supreme Court had previously found to be a governmental actor for constitutional purposesas well as the Supreme
Court's consistent unwillingness to invalidate delegations as unconstitutional - the Court's subsequent rejection of the D.C. Circuit's private
delegation holding was predictable. 115 Far less expected, however, were

108 Id. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
109 564 U.S. at 490-91.
110 See '35 S.Ct. at 1944-46.
111 Compare Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 .
3 d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2o6) (holding SEC ALJs to
be constitutionally hired employees), aff'd by an equally divided en banc court, No. 15-1345, 2017
WL 2727019 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2017) (per curiam), and Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3 d 1125 (D.C. Cir.
2000), with Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3 d ii68 (ioth Cir. 2oi6) (holding SEC ALJs to be unconstitutionally appointed inferior officers), and Burgess v. FDIC, No. -7-60579, 2017 WL 3928326 (5 th
Cir. Sept. 7, 2017).

112 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., 639 F. App'x 639 (Fed. Cir. 2o6)
(mem.) (per curiam), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017) (mem.).
113 721 F.3 d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015), aff'd on reh'g,
821 F.3 d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2o16).
114 Id. at 677.
115 Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S.Ct. at 1232-35; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
457, 492 (2001) (rejecting unconstitutional delegation holding below).
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the "concurrences" of Justices Alito and Thomas. Both Justices expressed concern that delegations make lawmaking too easy and threaten
individual liberty. 116 Justice Alito mainly targeted the possibility that
required performance standards for Amtrak might be set by binding
arbitration using an arbitrator appointed by the federal Surface Transportation Board. 117 In his view, this possibility likely rendered the
scheme unconstitutional: if a private arbitrator were used, the scheme
would violate what he posited as a categorical constitutional ban on
private delegations; and if the arbitrator were public, the fact that her
decisions would be binding meant that she was a principal officer who
had to be appointed by the President.1 18 Meanwhile Justice Thomas,
concurring only in the judgment, offered a broad-ranging disquisition
on the original understanding of separation of powers and the unconstitutionality of modern-day delegations of regulatory authority. Condemning the reigning intelligible principle test as failing to prevent delegation of legislative power, Justice Thomas advocated "return[ing] to
the original understanding of the federal legislative power," which
would "require that the Federal Government create generally applicable
rules of private conduct only through the constitutionally prescribed legislative process" and deny the executive "any degree of policy judgment"
in establishing such rules. 119 Concurring this Term in an otherwiseunanimous case on preemption, Justice Thomas reiterated his attack on
delegation, stating that a "statute that confers on an executive agency
the power to enter into contracts that pre-empt state law ... might unlawfully delegate legislative power to the President insofar as the statute
'120
fails sufficiently to constrain the President's contracting discretion.

116 Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The principle that Congress

cannot delegate away its vested powers exists to protect liberty. Our Constitution, by careful design,
prescribes a process for making law, and within that process there are many accountability checkpoints." (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (I983))); id. at 1245 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("At the heart of this liberty were the Lockean private rights: life, liberty, and property.
If a person could be deprived of these private rights on the basis of a rule (or a will) not enacted by
the legislature, then he was not truly free.").
117 Justice Alito also attacked the method for appointing Amtrak's president; he argued that the
president was a principal officer requiring presidential appointment, and further contended that,
even if Amtrak's president were an inferior officer, Amtrak was likely not a department, so the
president's selection by the Amtrak board was still unconstitutional. See id. at 1239-40 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
118 Id. at 1235-39.
119 Id. at 1246, 1251 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
120 Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1199 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). While Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of Coventry Health
Care, he previously expressed a similar view. See Gorsuch, supra note 13, at 914-I5 (criticizing the
blend of executive power with delegated legislative and judicial power that characterized the De
Niz Nobles case); see also Bazelon & Posner, supra note 17 ("Judge Gorsuch is skeptical that
Congress can use broadly written laws to delegate authority to agencies in the first place.").
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Broad delegations of policymaking power represent the backbone of
the modern administrative state, and reliance on private actors for governmental functions is also a major trend. 121 Hence, a centrally important feature of the Court's American Railroads decision is the fact
that both Justices wrote singly; all the other Justices did was overturn
the D.C. Circuit's private delegation holding and remand the appointments and due process claims for that court to consider in the first instance. 122 This fact did not lead the D.C. Circuit to change its tune,
however. On remand the same panel of the D.C. Circuit essentially
reinstated the logic of its earlier decision by holding that Amtrak was
an economically self-interested entity, even if governmental, and allowing such an entity to exercise regulatory power over its competitors for
123
track time violated due process.
2.

Subconstitutional Doctrines and the Separation of Powers.-

More members on the Court have signaled some support for Justice
Thomas's concerns about delegation when advanced indirectlyas a
basis for pulling back on judicial deference to agencies - rather than
as a frontal constitutional assault. 124 So far, only two Justices have concluded that Chevron deference to agency statutory interpretations is unconstitutional, 125 though several more are willing to limit Chevron's
scope. 1 2 6 Even more have signaled their willingness to dispense with
judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations deference which is reflected in the line of cases from Bowles v. Seminole

121 Gillian E. Metzger, Delegation, Accommodation, and the Permeability of Constitutionaland
Ordinary Law, in

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 409, 410 (Mark

Tushnet et al. eds., 2015).
122 Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1233-34.
123 Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep't. of Transp., 821 F.3 d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2o16). The panel also
agreed with Justice Alito that the arbitrator was an unconstitutionally appointed principal officer.
Id. at 38-39. The D.C. Circuit denied the government's petition for en banc review, and the government opted to not seek certiorari. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., No. 12-5204 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2o16)
(mem.) (per curiam).
124 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Decker
v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615-16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (Justice Alito joined
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion); id. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F. 3 d 1142, 1149 (ioth Cir. 2o16) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
125 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("These cases
bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to
countenance in the name of Chevron deference."); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F. 3 d at 1149 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) ("But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow
huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that
seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers' design."); see also
Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting Chevron's problematic
basis but justifying it as "in conformity with the long history of judicial review of executive action").
126 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Rock & Sand Co.12 7 through Auer v. Robbins. 128 Although such retraction in deference is justified in part by reference to the language of the
APA, separation of powers concerns are also frequently invoked. Hence,
for example, Justice Scalia maintained that deferring to agency interpretations of their own rules "contravenes one of the great rules of separa'129
tion of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.
These attacks on deference are of very recent vintage. It was just
twenty years ago, in 1997, when Justice Scalia penned Auer for a unanimous Court and reaffirmed that courts defer to agency interpretations
of their own regulations "unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.' ' 130 In the 2oi6 Term, the Court came close to deciding
a case that raised questions about the scope of Auer deference. In G.G.
ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,131 the Fourth Circuit
deferred to guidance from the Departments of Education and Justice
interpreting Title IX and a Department of Education (DOE) regulation
as requiring the Gloucester County School Board to allow G.G. access
to the boys' bathroom at his school. 132 Although declining the School
Board's request to reconsider Auer deference writ large, the Court
granted certiorari on the question of whether deference to the specific
guidance at issue was appropriate. 133 When the Trump Administration
127

325

128 5i

9

U.S. 410 (I945).

U.S. 452 (1997). Justices Thomas and Alito have indicated that they believe Auer may

well be incorrect and should be reconsidered, which was also Justice Scalia's view. See Perez, 135
S. Ct. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1212-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Gorsuch's view that Chevron deference is unconstitutional and violates the APA strongly
suggests he would take a similar stance on Auer deference. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3 d at
1152-55 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In addition, Chief Justice Roberts signaled his willingness to
revisit Auer in an appropriate case, see Decker, 568 U.S. at 615-i6 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), but
also joined the majority opinion in Perez, which treated Auer as good law - albeit emphasizing
the limited scope of Auer deference as it did so, 135 S. Ct. at 12o8 n.4.
129 Decker, 568 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Perez,
135 S. Ct. at 1216-21 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S.
290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
130 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
359 (989)).
131 822 F. 3 d 709 (4 th Cir. 2oi6), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
132 Id. at 715. The Department of Education letter at issue provided that, in situations where
sex segregation is allowed in schools, such as in bathrooms under 34 C.F.R. § Io6.33 (2o6),
"transgender students must be allowed to participate in such activities and access such facilities
consistent with their gender identity." Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students from
Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Justice 3 (May 13, 2o6),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20I605-title-ix-transgender.pdf
[https:/
perma.cc/K6K 9 -Q 3 NL].
133 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S.
Ct. 369 (2oi6) (No. I6-273) (presenting the questions: (i) should the Court retain Auer deference, (2)
is Auer deference appropriate for the guidance document at issue, and (3) is the DOE guidance
appropriate); Gloucester County, 137 S. Ct. at 369 (granting certiorari on questions (2) and (3)).
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rescinded the guidance, however, the Court simply remanded the case
back to the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the issue without reaching the
merits. 134 Despite the Court's failure this Term to act on Gloucester
County or other cases raising Auer deference, 13 5 continuing controversy
suggests that the Court will likely address Auer's scope and propriety in
coming Terms.
Even more striking than the attacks on Auer are judicial efforts to
overturn the longstanding deference to agency statutory interpretations
provided under the Chevron framework. Newly minted Justice Gorsuch
emerged this year as a pointed critic of Chevron. In a series of opinions
on the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch attacked Chevron deference
as at odds with the separation of powers:
Chevron . .. permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of
core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way
that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the
framers' design.... Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for
the abdication of the judicial duty... When does a court independently
decide what the statute means and whether it has or has not vested a legal
right in a person? Where Chevron applies that job seems to have gone
extinct.... Under any conception of our separation of powers, I would have
thought powerful and centralized authorities like today's administrative
agencies would have warranted less deference from other branches, not
more. 13 6
Although Chevron has certainly sparked its share of criticism over
the years, such a frontal constitutional assault on Chevron in a judicial
opinion is a relative novelty. Indeed, in 2005 Justice Thomaswho
now agrees Chevron is unconstitutional - wrote a majority opinion for
the Court holding that under Chevron a lower court must defer to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, even if the court had al137
ready interpreted the statute differently in another context.
Other Justices have pursued a more modest attack on Chevron. For
example, in King v. Burwell1 38 a majority signed on to Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion summarily rejecting the Chevron framework in interpreting an admittedly ambiguous statute, on the grounds that at issue
134 Gloucester County, 137 S. Ct. at 1239.
135 See, e.g., Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3 d 839 ( 7 th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1607, i6o8 (2o16) (Thomas,

J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Flytenow, Inc. v.

FAA, 8o8 F.3 d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 618 (2017); Diamond Sawblades Mfrs.
Coal. v. Hyosung D & P Co., Sg F.3 d 626 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1325 (2017);

Noble Energy, Inc. v. Jewell, 65o F. App'x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2o16) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom.
Noble Energy, Inc. v. Haugrud, 137 S. Ct. 1327 (2017).
136 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F. d 1142, 1149, 1152, 1155 (ioth Cir. 2o16) (Gorsuch, J.,
3
concurring); see also Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3 d 968, 969 (ioth Cir.
2o16); De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3 d 1165, 1171 (ioth Cir. 2015).
137 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
138

'35

S.

Ct. 2480 (2015).
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was "a question of deep 'economic and political significance' that [was]
central to th[e] statutory scheme. ' 139 Strongly dissenting in City of
Arlington v. FCC, 140 the Chief Justice, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Alito, argued that courts failed to perform their constitutional and stat141
utory duties if they deferred to agency jurisdictional determinations.
In addition, several decisions have read statutes aggressively to discern
a plain meaning at odds with the agencies' interpretations, 1 4 2 displayed
increasing skepticism about changed agency interpretations, 143 and read
procedural restrictions on agencies expansively. 144 Justice Gorsuch has
also offered cabining principles, holding for the Tenth Circuit that
Chevron does not apply when an agency issues a new rule in an adjudication 145 and similarly that agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions apply prospectively, at least when the agency's interpretations are
6
at odds with existing judicial interpretations.14
Far too many judicial decisions sustain administrative actions on
147
deferential review to identify a clear move toward rejecting Chevron.
The Supreme Court has also rebuffed lower court efforts to impose procedural requirements on agencies' ability to promulgate new statutory
interpretations beyond those mandated by Congress. 148 But combined
with the various lines of constitutional attack on administrative action

Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
140 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
139
141

Id. at 314-I6 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

142

See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, I35 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07 (2015) (rejecting agency interpretation as

unreasonable under Chevron's deferential second step); Texas v. United States, 80g F.3 d 134, 17987 ( 5 th Cir. 2015) (concluding from express statutory authorization of certain immigration relief that
plain text of statute prohibited agency's interpretation of statute as allowing additional relief), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2oi6) (mem.) (per curiam); see also Waterkeeper All.
v. EPA, 853 F.3 d 527, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring) (underscoring importance of
Chevron's first step).
143 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2o6) (finding a
change in agency interpretation arbitrary and capricious because the agency inadequately explained
why the interpretation was changed); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015)
(noting that it is arbitrary and capricious to change an interpretation that has been relied upon
without explaining why). But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009)
(holding that not all changes in agency interpretation need be justified by reasons more substantial
than those required to adopt an interpretation in the first instance).
144 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3 d at 170-78 (finding that promulgation of an alleged guidance document was procedurally defective because it was not submitted for notice and comment).
145 De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3 d ii65, 1171-72 (ioth Cir. 2015).
146

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, 1144-49 (ioth Cir. 2o6).

Indeed, Professor Adrian Vermeule recently argued that courts are moving toward greater
deference. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW'S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW'S EMPIRE TO THE ADMIN147

ISTRATIVE STATE 157-58 (2o16).
148 See Perez, 135 S.Ct. at 12o6 (rejecting additional procedural requirements for changed agency
interpretations); see also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S.Ct. 760, 782-84 (2o6) (rejecting
the D.C. Circuit's contention that FERC did not adequately engage with reasonable arguments
against the adopted rule).
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and the Court's at times strong anti-administrative rhetoric, these statements questioning deference contribute to the sense of a growing judicial
resistance to administrative governance and judicial concern over the
constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state.
3. Other ConstitutionalClaims. - Finally, the Supreme Court and
lower courts have also cut back on administrative governance by constitutional means other than separation of powers. In recent years, the
Roberts Court has expanded First Amendment protections in ways that
pose challenges to major regulatory schemes. 14 9 This antiregulatory tilt
is particularly evident with respect to corporate speech and speech in
economic contexts, including most prominently the First Amendment
invalidation of bans on direct corporate election spending in Citizens
United v. FEC.150 It is also demonstrated by the D.C. Circuit's protection of employers' refusals to post statements of workers' statutory
rights to organize 151 and the Supreme Court's protections for corporate
access to information for drug marketing. 152 A similar phenomenon has
occurred in relation to religion, with regulatory requirements being sig15 3
nificantly pared back in the name of religious free exercise.
Both of these trends were on display in the 2016 Term. Expressions
Hair Design v. Schneiderman15 4 involved a challenge by merchants to
a New York statute that precluded them from imposing a surcharge on
consumers who pay by credit card; the merchants claimed that the statute violated their First Amendment rights by regulating how they communicate their prices. 15 5 The Court did not reach the question of
whether the statute actually violated the First Amendment; instead it
simply found that the statute regulated speech and remanded for the

149 See Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism:Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2014, at 195, 198-203. See generally Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2o16 Wis. L. REV. 133, 178-82. As Professor Jeremy Kessler has described, these First Amendment challenges to economic regulation have a long history over the twentieth century. See Jeremy
K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1941-76
(2016).
150 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

151 See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3 d 947, 959 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Leslie Kendrick, First
Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199 (2015).
152 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571-80 (2011).
153 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775-85 (2014) (invalidating

on religious freedom grounds regulations requiring employers to provide health insurance with coverage for contraceptive drugs); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1453, 1466-71 (2015). Although constitutionally infused, these decisions are often based on
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb (2012), rather than direct constitutional
free exercise claims. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
154 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2Q17).
155 Id. at 1146-48.
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Second Circuit to assess its constitutionality in the first instance. 1 5 6 The
Court was somewhat more forthcoming in Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,15 7 where by a 7-2 vote it ruled that Missouri's
refusal to allow a church to participate in a government-subsidized playground resurfacing program violated the Free Exercise Clause. 158 But
the majority limited its holding to express discrimination in the context
of playground resurfacingan oddly specific limit, but one that
avoided reaching questions of more religious uses or other types of gov159
ernment funding, and also served to secure Justice Breyer's vote.
In other individual rights contexts, however, the Roberts Court's
willingness to overturn regulatory schemes has been more muted. Of
particular note, other than protection of commercial and corporate
speech, the Roberts Court has not indicated much interest in revitalizing
individual economic rights doctrines in a way that would force a significant curtailment in government regulation. For example, the Court has
shown little interest in reviving direct economic due process protection
of the Lochner 160 variety. It has also proceeded cautiously on the takings
front, invalidating a longstanding agricultural marketing arrangement,
but on grounds that accord with well-established doctrine and yielded
broad support among the Justices. 1 6 1 This Term's decision in Murr v.
Wisconsin1 62 continued this restrained stance, with Justice Kennedy's
5-3 opinion insisting that regulatory takings analysis must be flexible to
balance individual property rights with the government's power to regulate, and therefore rejecting a categorical rule that property lot bound1 63
aries must define the extent of property for takings purposes.
Although Murr provoked a dissent by Chief Justice Roberts that Justices
Thomas and Alito joined, the dissent expressly limited its objections to
the majority's methodology, stating that the majority's finding of no taking was not troubling and that the type of zoning ordinance at issue "is

156

Id.

at 1147; see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (invalidating statutory prohi-

bition on registration of trademarks that disparage persons or bring them into contempt or disrepute
as violating the First Amendment).
157 i37 S. Ct. 2012 (2o17).

Id. at 2024-25.
Id. at 2024 n.3; see also id. at 2026-27 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court
will confront a Free Exercise challenge next Term that lacks express discrimination against religion
and also involves government regulation rather than government benefits. See Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3 d 272, 276-77 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 127 S. Ct. 2290 (2o17) (mem.).
160 Lochner v. New York, -98 U.S. 45 (I905).
161 See Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S.Ct. 2419 (2015); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 56o U.S. 702 (2010) (upholding Florida's Beach and Shore Preservation Act against takings challenge).
158

159

162

I37 S. Ct. I933 (2017).

163

Id. at I944-47.
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a commonplace tool to preserve scenic areas ... for the benefit of land'164
owners and the public alike.
Instead of developing economic rights directly, the Court has turned
to constitutional surrogates to limit economic regulationthe First
Amendment claims identified above 165 and also federalism limits to the
scope of national authority. The prime example of the latter move is
NFIB v. Sebelius, 166 where the Court ruled that Congress's commerce
power did not extend to requiring individuals to buy health insurance,
although it ultimately upheld the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate as a tax. 167 A prohibition on congressional regulation of inaction
is unlikely to have much import in practice, given the rarity of such
regulatory regimes and the ease with which inaction usually can be reformulated as action - not to mention a majority's willingness to allow
Congress to rely on its taxing power to similar effect. Thus, NFIB suggests the Roberts Court's hesitancy to pull back significantly on national
regulatory power.168 Yet the fact that the Court came close to invalidating the most significant national social welfare program in a generation, and asserted constraints on the spending power for the first time,
again indicates the extent to which judicial views on national power
may be changing.
Moreover, several lower court judges have given voice to strong offthe-court libertarian attacks on administrative government, 169 as well
as occasional on-the-court diatribes. Perhaps the most dramatic of the
latter was Judge Brown's concurrence in Hettinga v. United States, 17
joined by Judge Sentelle, invoking "the gap between the rhetoric of free
markets and the reality of ubiquitous regulation" and characterizing regulation of a dairy farmer as "impermissibl[e] collectiviz[ation]," despite
concluding the statute at issue was sanctioned by a long line of constitutional adjudication.1 71 Similar sharp libertarian statements appear at
other levels of government, with Texas Supreme Court Justice Willett
164 Id. at 195o (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
165 See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
166 567 U.S. 519 (2012).

167 Id. at 574-75; see also Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265,
277-84 (2012) (arguing that the NFIB challengers relied on federalism arguments as a proxy for
debunked Lochnerian substantive due process).
168 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term - Comment: To Tax, to Spend, to
Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 112-16 (2012) ("[I]t is not at all clear that there is substantial
sentiment on the Court for curbing the national government in favor of the states.").
169 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, LibertarianAdministrative Law, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 393, 403-06 (2015) (describing speeches from Judges Ginsburg and Brown on the D.C.
Circuit).
170 677 F.3 d 4 7 1 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
171 Id. at 480 (Brown, J., concurring); see also Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep't of Transp., 821 F.3 d
19, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2o16) ("The Constitution's drafters may not have foreseen the formidable prerogatives of the administrative state ....").
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describing a state constitutional challenge to a hair braider licensing requirement as being "about whether government can connive with rent172
seeking factions to ration liberty unrestrained."
4. Academic Attacks. - This growing judicial resistance to administrative government is supported by increasing academic attacks on the
constitutional legitimacy of administrative government. To be sure, academic complaints about the current scope of national regulatory power
are well established, 173 and some scholars have long alleged that the
modern national administrative state is fundamentally at odds with the
Constitution. 174 But these administrative challenges have expanded in
scope and become more prominent in academic debates over the separation of powers. 1 75 The most extreme example of this trend is perhaps
Professor Philip Hamburger's Is Administrative Law Unlawful?.176 In
Hamburger's portrayal, administrative government is the modern incarnation of the royal prerogative overturned in Britain at the end of the
seventeenth century: Agencies unlawfully engage in legislation and adjudication, and the combination of these functions in agencies yields
consolidated and absolute power. 17 7 The "Constitution in Exile" movement, with its attacks on contemporary delegation and commerce power
doctrine as deviating from the original constitutional plan, was an early
178
manifestation of the current academic anti-administrative trend.

172 Patel v. Texas Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W. 3 d 69, 93 (Tex. 2015) (Willett,

J.,

concurring). In September 2017, President Trump nominated Justice Willett to serve as a circuit
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Kyle Swenson, Trump Wants
Texas's "Tweeter Laureate"Judge on FederalAppeals Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2017), https:/
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/29/trump-wants-texass-twitter-laureatejudge-on-federal-appeals-court/ [https:Hperma.cc/R6M 5 -WRS].
173

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.

'387

('987).
174

For a particularly effective statement of these arguments, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and

Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237-49 (i994).
175 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 46-47.
176 Hamburger answers this question with a resounding "Yes." See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).

For a critique and an equally resounding "No," see

Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEx. L. REV. '547 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER, supra). See also Paul

P. Craig, The Legitimacy of U.S. Administrative Law and the Foundations of English Administrative Law: Setting the HistoricalRecord Straight 2-4 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Series, Paper
No. 44, 2oi6), https:Hssrn.com/abstract=28o2784 [https://perma.cc/M8UY-VAJ 5 ].
177 HAMBURGER, supra note 176, at 26-29.
178 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, Winter 1995, at 83, 84 (re-

viewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (i993)) ("So for 6o years the nondelegation doc-

trine has existed only as part of the Constitution-in-exile, along with the doctrines of enumerated
powers, unconstitutional conditions, and substantive due process, and their textual cousins, the
Necessary and Proper, Contracts, Takings, and Commerce Clauses.").
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Like the judicial attacks, scholars also target specific features of administrative governance as unconstitutional, such as delegation 17 9 and administrative adjudication.18 0 Interestingly, although Reagan-era attacks
on administrative governance challenged restrictions on presidential authority as unconstitutional,8 1 some anti-administrative scholars are now
18 2
sounding alarms about burgeoning presidential power.
Academic attacks on administrative governance additionally parallel
judicial attacks in combining full-bore constitutional assaults with more
moderate interventions. Surrounding these constitutional attacks is a
growing body of legal academic work pushing back at administrative
governance more incrementally, often through administrative law.18 3 A
particular area of focus is Chevron deference, which conservative scholars condemn as unconstitutionally biased in the government's favor and
violating Article III as well as the APA. 18 4 A notable difference between
judicial and academic anti-administrativism, however, is the strong libertarian edge to anti-administrative scholarship. Professors Randy
Barnett, David Bernstein, and Richard Epstein, in particular, have
prominently critiqued national regulation for exceeding constitutional
bounds and violating individual rights, as part of a broader effort to
18 5
revive Lochner and libertarian constitutionalism.
The recent spurt of anti-administrative scholarship is in part a response to the Obama Administration's expansive use of executive power

179 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law,

'o

N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 491-93 (2o16); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88
VA. L. REV. 327, 353-77 (2002).
180 See Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, 81
Mo. L. REV. 1023 (2Q16).
181 See Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers:
The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (1989).
182 See Josh Blackman, PresidentialMaladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 3-5) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also F.H. BUCKLEY, THE
ONCE AND FUTURE KING 12-15 (2014). On the compatibility of these two views, see John
Harrison, The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power, 126 YALE L.J.F. 374 (2017).
183 See, e.g., Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121, 178-83 (2o16) (advocating adoption of the REINS Act, cost-benefit analyses in rulemaking, and a fifteen-year sunset on major rules); Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 179, at 477 ("[O]ur
administrative law doctrines have drifted ... far from the liberal tradition."); Nielson, supra note
44 (arguing for expanded use of formal rulemaking procedures); Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication
and Judicial Nondelegation:An Article III Canon, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1569, 1575-76 (2013) (arguing for stricter judicial policing of agency reasoning and determinations when agencies adjudicate
private rights); Christopher J. Walker, Against Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE io6 (2017) (arguing against more restrictive remedial rules).
184 See Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 179, at 497-507; Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2o16); see also CHARLES MURRAY, BY THE PEOPLE 69-71 (2015).
185 See RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2016); DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014).
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in a progressive and proregulatory direction.18 6 But these academic
moves reflect a longer-term and more lasting development. They are
part of a wider and decades-old effort to reset constitutional law in a
conservative and libertarian direction, reflected in the work of conservative legal groups like the Federalist Society and the Institute for
Justice.18 7 As that suggests, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship
between judicial and academic attacks on the administrative state.
Hamburger's volume gained prominence when it was repeatedly cited
by Justice Thomas in his American Railroads concurrence, 8 8 while
Barnett and other scholars have sought to advance their scholarly views
through litigation, such as the constitutional challenge to the Affordable
Care Act.18 9 This parallel academic push thus makes the judicial
anti-administrative turn seem more likely to intensify, particularly
with appointments of judges with deep roots in the conservative legal

movement. 190
C. ContemporaryAnti-Administrativism's Core Themes
These attacks on the administrative state may seem on the surface a
diverse lot. They encompass a range of measures and challenges, and
even similar claims are advocated with varying degrees of moderation
and extremity. Nor does support for these challenges necessarily signal
antipathy to administrative government.
One can favor greater
presidential power over the administrative state while also supporting
more active administration, for example.1 91 Scholars committed to the
192
administrative project have criticized executive branch excesses,
identified agency failures, 193 and long raised concerns about Chevron

186 See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015); BUCKLEY, supra
note 182.

187 See DECKER, supra note 63, at 39-50; Brian Beutler, The Rehabilitationists,NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 30, 2015), https:Hnewrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal [https://perma.cc/ZB2P-9777] (describing increased influence of libertarian
scholars in conservative legal circles). See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008).
188 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1242-44 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

189 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note I85, at i-i8.
190 See supra notes 19-2o and accompanying text.
191 See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248-49, 2251-52
(2001).

192 See, e.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3-5 (2009); William P. Marshall, Actually We Should
Wait: Evaluating the ObamaAdministration's Commitment to UnilateralExecutive -BranchAction,
2014 UTAH L. REV. 773, 773-80.
193 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY

(199o) (detailing regulatory deficiencies at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration); see
also JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
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deference. 194 Some proposed anti-administrative measures find favor
across the political spectrum, 195 and many progressives are now turning
to the courts to counter the Trump Administration's regulatory
rollbacks, just as conservatives used litigation to resist the Obama
196
Administration's proregulatory initiatives.
Nonetheless, these current attacks evidence commonalities that justify their linkage as part of a distinct and emerging phenomenon. In
particular, three key themes run throughout: a rhetorical and almost
visceral resistance to an administrative government perceived to be running amok; a strong turn to the courts as the means to curb administrative power; and a heavy constitutional overlay, wherein the contemporary administrative state is portrayed as at odds with the basic
constitutional structure and the original understanding of separation of
powers. 19' These underlying logics offer the conceptual frame that
drives contemporary anti-administrativism, but they lack merit on
examination.
i. Rhetorical Anti-Administrativism.These political, judicial,
and academic attacks stand out for their rhetorical antipathy to administrative government. 198 Such strident rhetoric is unsurprising in the
political sphere, where bureaucracy bashing is nothing new. And
although Hamburger's repeated insistence that administrative government is "unlawful," "extralegal," and "supralegal," and represents the
"exercise of power outside and above the law" 199 is striking for academic

(i96o) (analysis for newly elected President Kennedy of regulatory problems and failures, written

by a central defender of the administrative state in the I93os).
194 See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed
and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010) (arguing that Chevron
deference is at odds with governing statutes, lacks a theoretical foundation, is inconsistently applied,
and creates uncertainty); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 497-98, 520 (1989).
195 As an example, Professor Cass Sunstein, the former head of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) under President Obama, has indicated his support for aspects of the
RAA. See Sunstein, supra note 43.
196 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, No.
i:i7-cv-00253 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2017); Eli Savit, The New Front in the Clean Air Wars: Fossil-Fuel

Influence over State Attorneys General - And How It Might Be Checked, 115 MICH. L. REV. 839,
855-57 (2017) (book review).
197 Two other important connections are the shared network of lawyers, scholars, advocates, and
funders that lies behind the current spate of attacks and the parallels to claims raised against administrative government in the 193Os, discussed below in Part II.
198 Professor Edward Rubin has characterized this phenomenon as an "anti-administrative impulse," a "preanalytic hostility to the modern administrative state," and "an anti-bureaucratic pastoralism that feeds on nostalgia for simpler, more integrated times." Edward Rubin, Essay, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073-74
(2005).
199 HAMBURGER, supra note 176, at 6-7. Similarly in this vein is Hamburger's recent short
book titled The Administrative Threat. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
THREAT 4 (2 017) ("Administrative power is thus all about the evasion of governance through law,
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commentary, diatribes against administrative government are no
strangers to legal scholarship .200
Similar rhetorical excesses appear frequently in the Supreme Court's
recent separation of powers and administrative law jurisprudence.
Agency officials are overregulating "bureaucrats ' 20 1 who seek to expand
their authority by exploiting judicial deference 20 2 and who wield their
broad delegated powers arbitrarily 20 3 or with the intent of advancing
their own interests at the expense of the regulated public.2 0 4 National
administrative government consists of "hundreds of federal agencies
poking into every nook and cranny of daily life '20 5 as part of a "titanic
administrative state. '20 6 This harsh condemnation of the federal government is unusual in Supreme Court jurisprudence and also appears to
be a relatively recent development, largely dating back to Chief Justice
Roberts's Free Enterprise opinion.207 Often these judicial castigations
of administrative government are unnecessary to the case at hand. A
prime exemplar is Justice Gorsuch's broadside against agencies in
Gutierrez-Brizuelav. Lynch 20° when he was still on the Tenth Circuit,
20 9
which came in a concurrence to an opinion he himself had written.
But Justice Thomas is undoubtedly the king of the anti-administrative
concurrence, having used the form to issue long discursions on the unconstitutionality of administrative governance on several occasions in
2 10
recent years.

including an evasion of constitutional processes and procedural rights. These legal problems are
forceful reasons to reject all administrative power and, indeed, to consider it the civil liberties issue
of our time.").
200 See supra section I.B. 4 , pp. 31-33.

201 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 305 (2013) ("These lines will be drawn ...

by

unelected federal bureaucrats .... ").
202 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that courts sanctioned unconstitutional agency aggrandizement in stating: "[W]hen an agency interprets its own rules[,] ... [t]hen the power to prescribe is augmented by
the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely and broadly ....
(emphasis omitted)).
203 See Michigan v. EPA, -35 S. Ct. 2699, 27o6-07 (2015).

204 See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 313-i5 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Ass'n of Am.
R.Rs. v. Dep't of Transp., 821 F.3 d -9, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2o6) ("The specific fairness question we face
here is whether an economically self-interested entity may exercise regulatory authority over its
rivals.").
205 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 315 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
206 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, 1155 (ioth Cir. 2oi6) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
207 Although anti-administrative rhetoric certainly surfaced before Free Enterprise,many of the
recent manifestations cite back to that decision. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs.,
135 S. Ct. 1225, 1241, 1246, 1254 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Perez v. Mortg.

Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1218, 1221 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); City of

Arlington, 569 U.S. at 313-14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
208 834 F. 3 d 1142.

209 See id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
210 See NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 945 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring); Michigan v.
EPA, -35 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., I35 S. Ct. at 1240
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The rhetorical character of judicial anti-administrativism is reinforced by the sharp disconnect that often exists between the constitutional concerns invoked and the legal result reached. Take, for example,
Chief Justice Roberts's statement in City of Arlington that "[tihe accumulation of ...powers in the same hands is not an occasional or isolated exception to the constitutional plan; it is a central feature of modern American government .... [T]he danger posed by the growing
power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed. '211 The logical
inference from such language is that modern administrative government
is systematically unconstitutional, yet all the Chief Justice sought
was an exclusion of jurisdictional determinations from the ambit of
Chevron deference. 212 Similarly, with the exception of Justice Thomas,
anti-administrative Justices have largely kept to corralling administrative government at the edges, unwilling to significantly curtail key administrative phenomena such as delegations of power or administrative
2 13
adjudication.
As Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have argued, these
judicial attacks on administrative government "[a]t bottom ...rest[] on
the overriding fear that the executive will abuse its power. ' 2 14 This antiadministrative rhetoric interestingly reveals two related yet distinct
concerns about executive power. One is that it is unaccountable, best
captured by Chief Justice Roberts's plaintive complaint against administrative government as undemocratic in Free Enterprise:
One can have a government that functions without being ruled by functionaries, and a government that benefits from expertise without being ruled by
experts. Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive Branch,
which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life,
heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive's control, and thus
215
from that of the people.

The other concern is that executive power is aggrandized, evident in
2 16
comments singling out administrative government's "vast and varied"

(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Perez, 135 S.Ct. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
211 569 U.S. at 313-i5 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 312.
213 See supra pp. 21-22.

214 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 44.
215 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 56i U.S. 477, 499 (2oo). Dissenting,

Justice Breyer attacked the majority for adopting an unduly formalistic analysis, arguing that the
SEC had multiple mechanisms for overseeing the PCAOB other than removal and that the presence
or lack of for-cause removal protection for PCAOB members did not affect presidential control in
practice. Id. at 519-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 499 (majority opinion).
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scope and "arrogation of power. ' 2 17 Core to this concern with "aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies" is the claim that
Congress has "effective[ly] delegat[ed] ... huge swaths of lawmaking
authority" to agencies, 218 so that "agencies, as a practical matter, draw
'2 19
upon a potent brew of executive, legislative, and judicial power.
The distinction between these two concerns about executive
powerthat it is politically unaccountable and that it is aggrandizedmatters because their respective remedies may stand in some
tension. More specifically, those fearing unaccountable power often ad22 0
vocate greater presidential control over government administration.
But from an aggrandized power perspective, such a response may
simply worsen the problem, adding the President's popular authority
and political leadership to the mix of executive, legislative, and adjudicatory powers agencies wield on their own. 2 2 1 These judicial concerns
about executive power also appear particularly targeted at domestic and
administrative contexts. When it comes to foreign relations, the Roberts
Court's record is mixed, sustaining some strong claims of executive
power while rejecting others.2 22 But similar rhetorical concerns about
executive power spinning out of control or being exercised at odds with
the constitutional structure are largely - if not completely 223 - lacking. Anti-administrative Justices also appear more sanguine about executive power in the national security arena.2 24 Moreover, on issues of

217 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part); see also City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 313 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, ii55 (ioth Cir. 2oi6) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
218 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment).
219 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 327 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
220 See Free Enterprise, 56i U.S. at 484 ("The President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed' if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them." (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3 d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2o6)
("To carry out the executive power and be accountable for the exercise of that power, the President
must be able to control subordinate officers in executive agencies."). See generally Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (i995).

221 See infra section IILA, pp. 72-77; see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 47.
222 Compare Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, -35 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that the

President has exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and governments), with Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that restrictions on judicial review of executive determinations
of enemy-combatant status violated habeas corpus). See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)

(holding that an international treaty agreed to by the President is not domestic law unless it is selfexecuting or Congress passes implementing legislation).
223 See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision
to recognize an exclusive presidential power was an unconstitutional return to the royal prerogative
in foreign affairs).
224 See, e.g., Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089-90 (2017) (Thomas,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for complete lifting of stay on travel and
refugee ban issued by President Trump on national security grounds); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 802-
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specifically presidential power, anti-administrative Justices are often all
over the map, sometimes upholding strong claims of presidential power
and sometimes rejecting them. 225 Congress's response to presidential
assertions of power, on the other hand, is largely driven by partisanship
rather than institutional concerns, with congressional leaders
supporting Presidents of their party even at the cost of congressional
226
prerogatives.
Hence, although overlapping at times with more established constitutional critiques of the administrative state such as the unitary executive theory, contemporary anti-administrativism stands as a distinct
phenomenon. Further evidence of this comes from the fact that the
judicial anti-administrativists' preferred remedy frequently is not
greater presidential control. True, the Court in Free Enterprise opted
for the remedial route of invalidating limits on the President's removal
authority. But even Free Enterprise sanctioned limits on presidential
control by upholding the PCAOB's constitutionality once its structure
227
was reduced to a single level of for-cause removal protection.
2. The Judicial Turn. - Instead, the most common response to these
fears of unaccountable and aggrandized executive power is an assertion
of a greater role for the Article III courts. This judicial turn is particularly evident in the efforts to replace interpretive deference with independent judicial judgment, as well as the growing challenges to administrative adjudication.
Pulling back on deference is often justified as mandated by the APA's
instruction that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions
of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions. '228 Yet a
number of administrative law doctrines represent substantial judicial
elaboration in tension with the APA's text. 229 The Court overturned one
13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing administrative procedures available to challenge executive detention as well as limited judicial review in concluding detainees' habeas corpus rights were
not violated).
225 Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 8Oi (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and id. at 826 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), with Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and id. at 2116 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
226 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separationof Parties,Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2323-25 (2006).

227 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 - 1 o (2010).
PHH Corp. similarly accepts such protection for independent regulatory commissions, but frames
it more as mandated by governing precedent than a broader principle. 839 .3 d 1,5-6, 8-9 (D.C.
Cir. 2o16).

228 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015), Justice
Scalia advanced an additional APA argument, contending that judicial deference to agency regulatory interpretations is at odds with § 5 5 3 (b)(A), which excluded interpretive rules from notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures because they lacked the force of law. Perez, 135 S. Ct at 121112 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
229 Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, So GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1298-1300, 1305 (2012) [hereinafter Metzger, EmbracingAdministrative Common Law];
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such elaboration recently in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 2 30 rejecting the D.C. Circuit's one-bite rule allowing agencies only one chance
to issue a definitive interpretation of a regulation without having to go
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, a restriction that the Court
held was "contrary to the clear text of the APA's rulemaking provisions. '231 For the most part, however, there are few judicial calls to pull
back on these doctrines as nontextually supported incursions into agencies' rightful discretion. 232 Perhaps the biggest weakness with the APA
argument is that taking it seriously would entail dispensing with
Chevron altogether, but as of now only Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
233
are willing to go so far.
The underlying impetus thus seems less about respecting the APA
and more about reasserting judicial power over the executive branch.
Further evidence of this comes from the repeated invocations of
Marbury's famous statement that "[iut is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is '' 234 in justifying
denial of deference. To be clear, the suggestion that the courts must
independently police agency authority at some level is hardly novel; that
proposition is embodied in Chevron's step one, in which courts exercise
independent judgment in determining whether Congress has spoken
plainly to the question at hand.2 35 These new invocations go further,
however, and use Marbury to argue against granting deference even

see also Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 E 3 d 227, 245-48 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting the extent to
which current doctrine is at odds with the APA's text on notice-and-comment rulemaking). But see
Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin RationalityReview, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (2oi6) (argu-

ing that true hard look review is rare).
230 i35 S. Ct. ii99.
231 Id.

at 12o6.

232 If anything, the Supreme Court may be strengthening these doctrines, for example by holding
that an agency acted arbitrarily by failing to consider cost at the very outset (as opposed to later in
a rulemaking) when the governing statute simply instructed the agency to consider "appropriate"
factors in deciding whether to regulate. See Michigan v. EPA, I35 S. Ct. 2699, 27o6-12 (2015). But
see FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 76o, 782-84 (2oi6) (emphasizing the limited

scope of judicial review of agency reasoning in overturning lower court determination that agency
had acted arbitrarily).
233 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text; see also Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211 (Scalia, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Court had developed deference doctrines at odds with
"the original design of the APA" and urging that Auer deference be overturned but signaling reluctance to take such a step with respect to Chevron deference). Several scholars also advocate dispensing with Chevron. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 176, at 315-I7; Ginsburg & Menashi,
supra note 179, at 497-500.
234 5 U.S. (i Cranch) -37, 177 ('803).

235 Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"- The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 815, 817 (2008). See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative
State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. i (983).
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when statutory ambiguity exists. 23 6 A similar concern that agencies are
trenching on the Article III courts' purview links the deference pullback
to the attacks on administrative adjudication. 237 An emphasis on reasserting judicial power also comes from the political sphere, with prohibitions on judicial deference to any agency statutory or regulatory interpretations, as well as provisions for expanded judicial review of agency
rulemaking in the proposed RAA and Separation of Powers Restoration
238
Act.
The judicial power arguments against deference come in two varieties, one far more radical than the other. The radical attack maintains
that deference is constitutionally prohibited in a twofold sense: first, because deference allows agencies to unconstitutionally exercise judicial
power by promulgating binding interpretations of statutes, and second,
because independently interpreting statutes is necessary for courts to
perform their Marbury function and serve as a check on executive
power. 23 9 Both claims rely on a classical understanding of law as having
a fixed meaning and interpretation as distinct from policymaking, so
that determining "the best policy choice" is different from determining
"what the [statute or] regulation means. '240 This argument challenges
Chevron and Auer head-on, particularly Chevron's express elision of interpretation and policymaking in many contexts and corresponding ac24 1
ceptance that a statute's or regulation's interpretation can change.
But its radical import is even greater: This argument would also preclude Congress from expressly delegating binding interpretative authority to agencies, 242 and its insistence on a firm divide between interpretation and policymaking conflicts with broadly accepted legal realist
insights about the frequency of legal indeterminacy, and thus of policy243
making, in judicial decisionmaking.

236 See, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480,
ring);
237
238
239

2496 (2015); Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3 d 527, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurGutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, 1156 (ioth Cir. 2o16) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
See supra notes io6-O8, i8o and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the

judgment); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela,834
F.3 d at 1149-52 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
240 Perez, 135 S.Ct. at 1222 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Pojanowski, supra note
67, at 'O89-9o.
241 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984); see also
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981-82 (2005).
242 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 79.
243 Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2591-94, 2598 (2006); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 395-400 (1950).
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Further, the argument that Article III compels independent judicial
judgment for all questions of statutory interpretation runs into substantial arguments to the contrary. Article III may in fact militate in favor
of deference to expert elucidation of statutory standards if the questions
at issue require specialized expertise or experience that the federal courts
lack. In such contexts, preserving the federal courts' ability to perform
their constitutional function and reach accurate, coherent, and consistent determinations may mandate deference to agency determinations.2 44 Nor does the historical record support an independent judgment requirement. Until the early decades of the twentieth century,
direct review of executive decisionmaking was rare, and the direct challenges often took the form of mandamus actions that limited the scope
of judicial review. Moreover, a number of decisions invoked the propriety of judicial deference to executive statutory interpretations.' 45 Legal
academics dispute the extent of this deference, but there is substantial
support for the view that independent judicial judgment was not
thought required for a vast array of executive action, often including
questions of statutory interpretation.2 46 Longstanding jurisprudence
also holds that Article III courts need not be involved at all in adjudications of matters of public right, without regard to whether statutory
interpretation was involved.2 4 7 Although the Court's understanding of
what counts as public right has varied over time, historically the category included some coercive governmental action, such as forced payment of customs duties, as well as grants of privileges and licenses, such
as public land grants.2 48 Today, as Stern indicated, the Court considers
a right to be public when it is "integrally related to particular Federal

244 See Peter L. Strauss, Essay, "Deference" Is Too Confusing And "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144-48
Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. III, 130 (1944).

Let's Call Them "Chevron Space"
(2012);

see also NLRB v. Hearst

245 JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 65-78 (2012); see

also Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of JudicialDeference to Executive Interpretation,126 YALE LJ.
908, 912-13, 912 n.5 (2017) (describing sources asserting historical support for such deference).
246 Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 260 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying "a tradition of great deference to the opinions of the agency head"), and Bamzai, supra note
245, at 916- 9 (identifying a tradition of deference to longstanding and contemporaneous interpretations by executive actors and others), with Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication,
and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, iii COLUM. L. REV. 939,
951-53 (2011) (explaining that when it occurred, nineteenth-century judicial review was largely de
novo).

247 See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (i8 How.) 272, 284

(i856).
248 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, ioi
HARV. L. REV. 915, 952, 954 (1988) (detailing coercive actions classified as public right); Caleb
Nelson, Adjudication in the PoliticalBranches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 566-90 (2007) (defining
public right as including rights and privileges in individual hands).
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Either the historical or the contemporary defi-

nition could bring much contemporary regulation within the public right
category, and thus into the category of actions for which no Article III
involvement traditionally was250
thought constitutionally necessary - let
alone de novo judicial review.
The radical argument against deference and in favor of independent
judicial judgment thus is implausible. That leaves the more restrained
approach, which invokes judicial independent judgment instead of
Chevron deference in only certain situations, such as jurisdictional questions or big-ticket economic and political issues. But little principled
basis exists for singling out these situations; the driver instead appears
to be judicial intuitions about which statutory questions Congress would
want a court to decide. 25 1 As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in City
of Arlington, rejecting a jurisdictional exception to Chevron:
The [jurisdictional] label is an empty distraction because every new application of a broad statutory term can be reframed as a questionable extension
of the agency's jurisdiction .... The federal judge as haruspex, sifting the

entrails of vast statutory schemes to divine whether a particular agency interpretation 2qualifies
as "jurisdictional," is not engaged in reasoned deci52
sionmaking.

Moreover, insofar as the underlying logic of this approach is that
courts are a necessary check on an ever-growing and out-of-control executive branch, the number of situations when Justices will conclude
Congress would want independent judicial judgment seems likely only
to grow. This approach thus can quickly become less restrained and not
much different from wholesale revocation of Chevron, except in its lack
of transparency about its aims.
3. Constitutionalism and Originalism.- A third theme, evident
from the preceding discussion, is anti-administrativism's heavy consti-

249 564 U.S. 462, 490-91 (2011).
250 See Fallon, supra note 248, at 951-63 (analyzing the tensions that traditional public rights

ideas pose to viewing Article III appellate review of administrative determinations as constitutionally necessary). Although the Court has deviated from its traditional exclusion of matters of public
right from any need for judicial review, it has emphasized that "Article III does not confer ... an
absolute right to the plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court" and
upheld deferential review such as a "weight of the evidence" standard as sufficient to preserve the
"essential attributes of judicial power" in the Article III courts. Commodity Futures Tading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 852-53 (1986).
251 See Michael Herz, Essay, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1872-79 (2015) (arguing that Chevron is fundamentally a doctrine of judicial self-regulation, resting

on the courts' views of when a judicial check on the executive (or judicial turf-protection) is
warranted).
252 569 U.S. 290, 300-0l (2013).
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tutional flavor, particularly in its judicial and academic varieties. Often - though not always 253 - this constitutional dimension is marked
by originalism. According to anti-administrative accounts, the core of
the Framers' structural design was limiting government so as to protect
individual liberty. 254 But on their view the administrative state does the
opposite: where the Framers sought to make it hard for the national
government to bind individuals, administrative government makes it
easy; 255 where the Framers sought to limit the fields of national action,
administrative government expands them; and where the Framers
sought to separate out legislative, judicial, and executive power into separate hands and ensure checks among the branches, administrative government combines them into one and dramatically aggrandizes the executive branch. 256 The net result is that the "'vast and varied federal
bureaucracy' . . . now hold[s] [authority] over our economic, social,
and political activities" to a degree "[tihe Framers could hardly have
25 7
envisioned."
253 Hamburger's account, for example, trains most of its attention on seventeenth-century Britain
rather than the Framing. HAMBURGER, supra note 176; JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN
AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE'S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 6 (2017).

254 See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1245 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("At the center of the Framers' dedication to the separation of powers was individual
liberty." (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)));
City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at315 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) ("The Framers did divide governmental
power in the manner the Court describes, for the purpose of safeguarding liberty."); Stern, 564 U.S.
at 483 ("As Hamilton put it, quoting Montesquieu, 'there is no liberty if the power of judging be
not separated from the legislative and executive powers."' (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003))); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142,
1149 (ioth Cir. 2oi6) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Even more importantly, the founders considered
the separation of powers a vital guard against governmental encroachment on the people's liberties,
including all those later enumerated in the Bill of Rights.").
255 See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that "bicameralism and presentment make lawmaking difficult by design" and that the Constitution's "deliberative process" is "not something to be lamented and evaded" (alteration omitted) (quoting John F.
Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, io GREEN BAG 2D 191, 202 (2007))); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834
F.3 d at iii
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (criticizing Brand X for allowing regulatory overriding of
judicial decisions "without the inconvenience of having to engage the legislative processes the Constitution prescribes," leading to "[a] form of Lawmaking Made Easy, one that permits all too easy
intrusions on the liberty of the people").
256 See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1254-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We have overseen and sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that concentrates the power to make
laws and the power to enforce them in the hands of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus that finds no comfortable home in our constitutional structure."); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def.
Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("When the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person ... there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute
them in a tyrannical manner." (alteration in original) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS 151-52 (Oskar Piest ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748))).
257 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 313 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 56I U.S. 477, 499 (2010)).
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Separation of powers concerns have long animated administrative
law and judicial review of executive action, albeit usually remaining
tacit. 258 What is new is thus not their presence but the extent to which
constitutional concerns are now openly invoked in administrative law
opinions. Yet this express invocation is rarely accompanied by sustained
constitutional analysis - perhaps because, as noted above, few Justices
seem willing to embrace the rollback in national administrative government that the posited antimony of separation of powers and contemporary national administrative government would seem to entail. 259 The
problem for anti-administrativists, however, is that background separation of powers concerns can be addressed in a variety of ways, including
approaches that embrace the administrative state rather than cabin it.
Concerns about amalgamated powers, for example, could be met by separation of functions requirements within agencies and other internal administrative checks. 260 Posited at a general level, separation of powers
principles say little about the constitutionality of the administrative
state.
A similar weakness undercuts anti-administrativists' invocations of
originalism. As others have noted, there is an unfortunate selectivity to
anti-administrativist originalism. 26 1 Part of the problem with seeking
contemporary constitutional conclusions from the original debates on
2 62
constitutional structure is that the Framers pursued multiple goals.
Limiting governmentlimiting the national government's scope, limiting the ease by which it could enact legislation, and to some extent

258 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, OrdinaryAdministrative Law as ConstitutionalCommon Law, iio COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010).
259 See supra pp. 21-22, 36.

260 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The ConstitutionalDuty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015)
[hereinafter Metzger, The ConstitutionalDuty to Supervise] (arguing for strengthening internal administrative supervision to meet constitutional structural demands); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,
622-25 (1984) (emphasizing separation of functions requirements as satisfying separation of powers
concerns); see also JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 62-70 (2o16) (identifying that separation of powers imposes an articulated governance requirement that can be satisfied by internal executive branch separation of powers functions). For

a discussion of the multitude of internal checks within agencies and the constitutional functions
that they play, see infra pp. 80-85.
261 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 85-87.
262 For an eloquent statement of this point and careful exegesis of variations in views of the
Framers on separation of powers, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1996). For a description of the normative
plurality underlying the separation of powers and an identification of liberty, effective administration, democratic accountability, and the rule of law as central commitments, see also Aziz Z. Huq
& Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-PowersJurisprudence,126 YALE L.J. 346, 382-88
(2o16).
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limiting state governments - was a concern of the Framers.2 63 But so
were nation-state building and effective government. Indeed, further
empowering the national government was the central impetus behind
the constitutional convention.2 64 While the Federalists were forced to
compromise on several features of their nationalist agenda, they succeeded in obtaining a number of powers viewed as essential to the project of creating a viable national government.2 65 The decision to create
an executive branch headed by a single President - despite the fears of
a return to monarchy that it aroused - embodied the Framers' commitment to ensuring the "energy" and capacity for efficient, coordinated,
and effective action that the Articles of Confederation system had
lacked.2 66 Moreover, some scholars resist the suggested antinomy between these goals of limiting and empowering national government for instance, arguing that supporters of the Constitution believed that
creating "an energetic government" with the "strength to deal with foreign powers and quash interstate rivalries was the surest path to per267
sonal liberty.
Of course, the general proposition that the Framers sought to empower as well as constrain says little about whether particular administrative arrangements are constitutional.2 68 But, like anti-administrativism's invocation of separation of powers, most political and judicial
anti-administrativist originalism stays at a general and abstract level.
Rather than identifying how a specific administrative arrangement is at
odds with original understandings, the claim is that the whole thrust
and purpose of modern administrative government deviates from the

263 See BARNETT,

supra note

-85,

at

52-6i; MAX M. EDLING,

A

REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF

GOVERNMENT. ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 5 (2003). However, historical accounts documenting myriad forms of regulation in the

name of collective interests, with enforcement by executive officials, suggest that this concern with
limiting government in the name of individual liberty is easily exaggerated. See WILLIAM J.
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY

AMERICA 2-3, 10-II, 32-35 (I996).

264 See EDLING, supra note 263, at 4, 7; Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term Foreword:Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 47-49 (2o6).
265 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. I-5; EDLING, supra note 263, at 7-8 (discussing the nation-state
building import of Congress's tax, army, and commerce powers); see also ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 171-76, I85-87 (1993).
266 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 70, 72, at 421-29, 434-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 2003); W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 34 (Tulane Studies
in Political Sci., Vol. IX, 1965); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE

L.J. 2, 75 (2014).
267 BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 54, 56 (2009); see also RAKOVE, supra note
262,

at

244-56.

268 Cf Martin S. Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, 1o5 YALE L.J. 1725, 1826 (1996) ("[T]he
Founding commitment to energy cannot be discussed in a relative vacuum ....
).
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Framers' separation of powers design. 269 Justice Thomas's detailed
originalist assessments of the unconstitutionality of administrative arrangements are an exception, but they are universally solo undertakings. 2 0 These assessments are also difficult to square with the nation's
practice since the Founding. As recent scholarship by Professor Jerry
Mashaw and others has established, the national administrative state
has a long lineage, with some administrative structures in place even at
the Constitution's adoption and national administrative officials playing
important governance roles from the Washington Administration onward. 27 1 But perhaps the strongest count against Justice Thomas's
originalist opinions is that they would entail a profound disruption in
the nature of contemporary government, as he acknowledges. 27 2 Other
Justices' unwillingness to sign onto his full-bore originalist account may
reflect the belief that adopting constitutional understandings that would
overturn governance relationships on which the nation has by now long
27 3
relied cannot be justified.
D. Does Contemporary Anti-Administrativism Matter?
A movement against national administrative government is thus
afoot in the political arena, the courts, and legal academe.
Its
269 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The
opinions in Noel Canning and Stern engage more extensively with original understandings, but
both have limited direct import for administrative government. Some anti-administrative scholars
engage originalism in more detail. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 185, at 203-21; EPSTEIN, supra
note 185, at 267-84.
270 See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1245-46 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that any exercise of policymaking authority by the Executive
is at odds with original understandings); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215-17
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Seminole Rock deference runs afoul
of original checks and balances principles); see also NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 948-49
(2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining the original understanding of the Appointments Clause).
271 See BALOGH, supra note 267, at 2-5, 10-11, 19, 97-105, 117-19, 138-40, 154; RICHARD R.

JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO
MORSE 1-24 (1995); MASHAW, supra note 245, at 5, 34-38, 46, 49, 98-104, 119-43. But see
POSTELL, supra note 253, at 59-102, 127-29 (accepting state and local regulation but disputing
suggestions of a significant national administrative state in the early Republic and the nineteenth
century). See generally NOVAK, supra note 263, at 51-233 (detailing state regulatory efforts). Most
of these early administrative institutions were primarily developmental and redistributive rather
than regulatory, but not exclusively so. See SAMUEL DECANIO, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 21-22 (2015); MASHAW, supra note 245, at 193200.

272 See SW General, 137 S.Ct. at 948-49 (Thomas, J., concurring); Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct.
at 1252 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
273 Cf Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("Justice
Thomas's analysis of the present issue is compelling, but ...[a] sufficient case has not been made
for revisiting [two controlling] precedents."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this
point.").
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significance, however, is unclear.
In particular, is the national
administrative state really under siege, or are we simply witnessing an
anti-administrative phase likely to have little lasting effect?
Some anti-administrative moves could prove quite significant. The
RAA, for example, would be a substantial impediment to major and
high-impact rulemakings if enacted, the REINS Act even more S.274
Scholarship documenting the deregulatory effect of OIRA review even
absent a 2-i repeal requirement suggests that the regulatory initiatives
of the Trump Administration could be momentous as well, 275 and regulatory repeals have already undone rules years in the making. The
Court's First Amendment decisions, particularly Citizens United, have
had a profound effect on certain regulatory regimes.2 76 If a majority of
the Court were to reject the constitutionality of broad delegations or the
combination of functions in a single agency, much of the national administrative state would be in immediate jeopardy. Similarly, invalidation of administrative adjudication as violating Article III or as unconstitutionally biased by virtue of agencies' additional rulemaking
and enforcement roles would have a dramatic effect, calling into question basic and longstanding features of our national administrative
landscape .277
But as noted above, good reasons exist to conclude that few of these
more radical political moves will come to pass. So far the judicial bark
has been fiercer than its bite, and when the Roberts Court has invalidated an administrative arrangement on constitutional grounds, it has
often done so narrowly (as in Free Enterprise and Noel Canning), or in
ways that could minimize the impact on administrative governance (as
in Stern and NFIB).2 78 For all their success of late, First Amendment
challenges are unlikely to render broad swaths of the national administrative state unconstitutional. Support is growing on the Court for some

274 See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
275 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,

io6 COLUM. L. REV. 126o,

1263-82 (2006) (arguing that OIRA has an inherently deregulatory bias
because (i) it focuses on cost-benefit analysis, (2) it is not rigorous regarding decisions to deregulate,
(3)it does not regulate agency inaction, and (4) it is structured procedurally to support deregulation).
276 See Purdy, supra note 149, at I95 ("Constitutional neoliberalism is broad in that it touches
many areas of legal regulation, from state controls on pharmaceutical marketing to the federal
individual-insurance mandate to corporate campaign contributions."); see also Shanor, supra note
149, at 134 ("[Tlhe First Amendment has emerged as a powerful deregulatory engine.").
277 See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (I948) (remarking that finding the FTC biased in
its adjudication of antitrust claims "would to a large extent defeat the congressional purposes which
prompted passage of the Trade Commission Act"); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (2012) (providing
for de novo review of ALJ determinations by the head of the relevant agency).
278 On NFIB's limited import, see, for example, Samuel R. B agenstos, The Anti -LeveragingPrinciple and the Spending Clause After NFIB, ioi GEO. LJ.86i, 898-902 (2013), which argues that
the use of the "anti-leveraging principle" did a reasonably good job accommodating constitutional
values without threatening the constitutionality of too many Spending Clause laws.
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pullback on judicial deference to agency interpretations, yet several
scholars argue that such a pullback would have little impact in practice.
The reasons given - first, that courts deferred before Chevron and Auer
and would continue to do so regardless, and second, that Chevron and
Auer do little work because they are riddled with exceptionsare
27 9
somewhat contradictory, but lead to the same conclusion.
All of this might suggest that the current attack on the national administrative state is of little lasting significance. 2 0 This view strikes me
as too sanguine a stance for supporters of national administrative governance to take. Deep cutbacks in resources and personnel can undercut
administrative capacity in ways that are not immediately reversible by
changing legislative and executive branch political control. 28 1 Some
seemingly moderate administrative limitations could prove quite disruptive, moreover. For example, Justice Alito's view that public arbitrators
are principal officers in American Railroads28 2 would invalidate numerous regulatory arrangements in which officials not appointed by the
President exercise some degree of unreviewable discretion, and dramatically expand the pool of positions for which presidential nomination
and Senate confirmation are required. 28 3 Similarly, if ALJs are deemed
inferior officers, there would be an immediate impact on government
operations. Moreover, that conclusion might call into question a massive number of past administrative adjudications in agencies like the
SEC where ALJs are not selected by the agency headparticularly
given the Court's reluctance to uphold decisions in similar circumstances on a de facto officer doctrine basis. 2 4 Such a holding would
279 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, 1158 (ioth Cir. 2o16) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
("We managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could do it again. Put
simply, it seems to me that in a world without Chevron very little would change - except perhaps
the most important things."); VERMEULE, supra note 147, at 31, 74-76; Beermann, supra note 194,
at 809-35, 845-50 (discussing the problems that have developed in employing Chevron and the
possibility of retaining deference toward agencies even if Chevron were overruled).
280 Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracyand Distrust:Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative
State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2017) ("[T]he administrative state has never been more
secure.").
281 See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE'S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE
TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 5, 65-70 (20ia) (describing the impact of funding shortfalls
on agencies and the political difficulty involved in expanding funding).
282 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1235-39 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito's view was adopted by
the D.C. Circuit. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep't of Transp., 821 F.3 d 19, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2o16).
283 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1377-94 (2003)
(describing a number of modern private delegations potentially compromised by the revival of private nondelegation doctrine); see also Mascott, supra note 99, at 62-69 (describing the vast array of
federal agents who could be considered "officers" subject to constitutional appointment procedures);
Jon D. Michaels, Privatization'sProgeny, ioi GEO. L.J. 123 (2013) (describing the past, present,
and future of private delegation).
284 Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 , 182-84 (1995); cf New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 56o
U.S. 674 (2010) (failing to consider the possibility of sustaining agency decisions decided when
agency erroneously thought it was authorized to act, even though the effect was to call into question
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also create serious constitutional problems with how ALJs are appointed
and removed - perhaps curable by having agency heads pick ALJs and
ending the removal protection for members of the Merit Systems Protection Board, but at the cost of making administrative adjudication less
28 5
politically insulated and undermining key features of the APA regime.
Assessing the impact of a pullback in subconstitutional deference is
difficult, given selection bias and the dynamic effects such a pullback
might have. Chevron likely deters regulated parties from bringing certain challenges and also encourages agencies to push their interpretative
powers in creative ways.28 6 A retraction in deference thus might have
a substantially greater impact than suggested by simply considering the
number of cases today in which Chevron or Auer deference is actually
determinative. Further, at the lower court level, where the bulk of challenges to agency actions are resolved, scholars have suggested that
28 7
Chevron deference is in fact more determinative than many believe.
As important, to the extent such a pullback in deference rests on an
account of interpretation as distinguishable from policymaking, the pullback could extend to situations in which interpretation occurs through
agency application of a statutory standard to different factual contextsa vast range of agency action not often thought of as falling
28 8
under the Chevron aegis.
More broadly, contemporary anti-administrativism may serve to undercut the legitimacy of national administrative governance. Professor
Richard Fallon helpfully distinguishes among three forms of legitimacy:
legal, meaning conforming with legal norms; sociological, meaning publicly accepted; and moral, meaning normatively justified.28 9 The frequent suggestion that the national administrative state is at odds with
the constitutional framework most directly challenges that state's legal
legitimacy. It is such legal doubts that led Professor James Freedman
to famously describe national administrative governance as subject to a

"more than 500 cases [the agency had] addressed during those 26 months," id. at 689 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
285 Barnett, supra note 98, at 827-6- (discussing a variety of possible remedies to "the ALJ quandary" and positing that appointment by the D.C. Circuit would resolve constitutional problems
without elevating due process concerns related to presidential control).
286 Sunstein, supra note 243, at 2598-600.
287 See Kent Barnett& Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, ii15 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 201-7) (manuscript at 67), https:Hssrn.com/abstract=2808848 [https://perma.cc/J8U 9 -LCEC].
288 See, e.g., Pojanowski, supra note 67, at io85-9o (discussing the effect eliminating Chevron
would have on the disaggregation of policymaking and statutory interpretation).
289 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, "18 HARV. L. REV. '787, 1794-96
(2005); see also Tom R. Tyler, PsychologicalPerspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (discussing different psychological theories of legitimacy).
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"recurrent sense of crisis" over its legitimacy. 290 But the constant repetition of this motif, combined with the Court's rhetorical invocations of
liberty-threatening bureaucrats, undermines the administrative state's
sociological and moral legitimacy as well. Of course, to someone who
believes that the national administrative state actually is unconstitutional and should be cast aside, such a lack of legitimacy is entirely appropriate. But few Justices, politicians, or academics appear willing to
go that far, despite their frequent rhetorical jabs at bureaucracy and
invocations of current administrative arrangements as at odds with the
Framers' plan.
Adrian Vermeule disputes this legitimacy concern, terming constitutional anxiety about the administrative state "a largely elite discourse ....

It is a conceptual mistake to think that complaints about

the administrative state, even on constitutional grounds, are necessarily
sociological evidence of the illegitimacy of the regime. ' 291 The 1930s
support his point to some extent; as Part II describes, the constitutional
battle that elite lawyers waged failed to undermine massive popular
support for the New Deal administrative state. And current political
attacks on administrative governance come in conjunction with broad
popular support for many government programs. As Vermeule notes,
"[a] nation that twice elected Barack Obama by clear margins is a nation
'
comfortable with technocratic governance. ' 292
Yet rhetoric can take on a life of its own, as recent constitutional
challenges to the Affordable Care Act showed, all the more when constitutional discourse is employed to political ends. 293 Moreover, anxiety
over the administrative state's constitutionality can operate to limit its
potential for further development and innovation. 294 That may be a
good part of the anti-administrativists' goal, particularly in the judicial
sphere. Decisions like Free Enterprise have a "this far but no further"
feel, which connects to the Court's resistance to innovative administrative structures and regulatory regimes. Indeed, absent an anti-administrative orientation, this resistance to innovation is hard to explain.
290 JAMES 0.

FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IX (1978).
291 Vermeule, supra note 280, at 2465.

292 Adrian

Vermeule,

What

Legitimacy

Crisis?,

CATO

UNBOUND

(May

9,

2o16),

https://www.cato-unbound.org/2oK-6/05/og/adrian-vermeule/what-legitimacy-crisis
[https:Hperma.cc/FVD7-DT 7 7].
293 Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012) [hereinafter Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall],
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2
o2/o6/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-themandate-challenge-went mainstream/258040/ [https:Hperma.cc/HUG8- 4 ABX]; see also JACK M.
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2011).

294 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggles for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 771
(2ox6) (reviewing DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE'S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 (2014)).
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Given Congress's broad power to structure the executive branch and
design regulatory schemes, one would expect the presumption to run in
favor of constitutionality, at least when the innovation is embodied in
legislation.2 95 Even further, such anxiety may have a corrosive effect
over time, leading to greater scrutiny of agency decisionmaking and erosion of established administrative mechanisms.2 96 In short, rhetorical
anti-administrativism can have real practical bite, even if one that
emerges gradually and indirectly.
The current attack on the administrative state has two further effects
that are explored in the Parts that follow. The first relates to the
close intertwining of contemporary political and constitutional antiadministrativism. Anti-administrativism's deeply rooted conservative
character means that constitutional attacks on administrative governance risk injecting the Court even further into national politics, at a time
when the Court is increasingly viewed as a partisan institution. The
second centers on anti-administrativism's impact on constitutional law.
By framing the debate as one of administrative government's unconstitutionality, anti-administrativism obscures the possibility that the national administrative state may actually serve important constitutional
functions, such as controlling executive power. Furthermore, this framing renders incoherent the suggestion that far from being constitutionally questionable, today's national administrative state is constitutionally obligatory. Returning to the 193Os elucidates the first of these effects
and sets the stage for reconceiving the administrative state's constitutional role.
II. 193OS

REDUX I: TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONSERVATIVE
RESISTANCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT

Building out the national state was a constant and contested process
from the Founding through the nineteenth century.2 9 7 The period of

295 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 537-38 (2012) (describing reach of congressional authority); Metzger, supra note 86, at 1639 ("The ability to design innovative governmental structures or
regulatory measures is a flexibility the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause gives to Congress."). For a thorough analysis of the flaws with the Court's opposition to innovation, see Litman,
supra note 8i.
296 See Francis Fukuyama, The Ties that Used to Bind: The Decay of American PoliticalInsti-

tutions, AM. INTEREST (Dec. 8, 2013), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/oS/the-

decay-of-american-political-institutions/ [https:Hperma.cc/Z 5 AH-VY8T] ("Distrust of executive
agencies leads [to] demands for more legal checks on administration, which further reduces the
quality and effectiveness of government by reducing bureaucratic autonomy.").
297 See, e.g., BALOGH, supra note 267, at 12-17, 379-82 (describing patterns of nation-state development over the nineteenth century); MASHAW, supra note 245, at 5-17 (arguing that the national administrative state existed and developed throughout the first one hundred years of U.S.
history); THEODORE SKY, To PROVIDE FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE: A HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL SPENDING POWER i-1247 (2003) (detailing debates over the national government's
power to undertake internal improvements that were waged throughout the first half of the nineteenth century).
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greatest relevance to contemporary anti-administrativism, however, is
the 1930s. It was in the Progressive Era at the end of the nineteenth
century and the early decades of the twentieth that national administrative government truly blossomed. And it was in the 1930s, in business
and legal resistance to the New Deal and FDR, that an existential battle
over the national administrative state was last fought. In the years
since, the national government has expanded and gained significant new
powers and responsibilities. Nonetheless, that 193OS battle bears striking parallels to the current attack and represents an important backdrop
against which to assess contemporary anti-administrativism.
A. The Liberty League and the ABA Special Committee
Anti-administrativists often identify the Progressive Era, from the
late nineteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth, as
the time when the national government went off the constitutional rails
and over to the dark side of administrative government. 298 Transformations in manufacturing, technology, and economic relations in this
era sparked expansions in both national and state regulatory authority.
The national administrative state continued to grow over the first four
decades of the twentieth century.299 FDR's election and enactment of
the broad regulatory statutes of the New Deal thus was not a sudden
move to administrative government, but it did represent a significant
30 0
intensification.
Many businesses were initially quite supportive of national intervention to address the economic crisis of the Depression. Big businesses
particularly favored the National Industrial Recovery Act's 30 1 (NIRA)
suspension of antitrust laws and reliance on industry-developed business
codes, which they controlled.3 0 2 Harper's Magazine went so far as to

298 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 185, at 123-53; MURRAY, supra note 184, at 11-29.
299 William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT
LAW'S CENTURY 249, 262-65 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) (identifying the formative period of
growth of the American state occurring between 1877 and 1937).
300 LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 58-59.
301 Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (repealed 1966).
302 See LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 68-69; see also ROBERT F. BURK, THE CORPORATE
STATE AND THE BROKER STATE: THE DU PONTS AND AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS,

1925-194o, at 112-21 (199o) (detailing Pierre du Pont's involvement in the NIRA). Business interests sometimes supported earlier progressive regulatory measures as well, such as the maximum
hours for bakers law at issue in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which established bakeries

supported as a means to push their smaller-scale competitors out of business and ease their relationship with the bakers' union. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 185, at 23; see also Barton J.
Bernstein, The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform, in TOWARDS A NEW
PAST 263, 263-82 (Barton J. Bernstein ed., 1968) (arguing that the New Deal represented conservative reform).
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dub the NIRA the "child" of big business.3 0 3 But this support soon began to sour, largely in response to growing protections for labor, expanding governmental economic regulation, and higher taxes.3 0 4 The growing business resistance surfaced in litigation and legislative reform
efforts. Such litigation was at first spectacularly successful, with A.L.A.
30 5
United States v. Butler,30 6
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 30 7 invalidating major legislation from
FDR's first one hundred days as exceeding the constitutional scope of
Congress's authority and representing unconstitutional delegations of
legislative power.3 0° Two organizations central to business efforts challenging the New Deal were the American Liberty League (the League)
and the American Bar Association's (ABA) Special Committee on Ad30 9
ministrative Law.
. The Liberty League.The Liberty League, termed the "most
articulate spokesman of ...political conservatism" 3 10 in the 1930s, was
the more overtly political of the two organizations. It was also overtly
tied to big business, being founded in 1934 by several major industrialists, in particular the brothers Pierre, Ir~n~e, and Lammot du Pont of
the E.I. du Pont de Nemours company and their associates. 3 11 The
League contained a number of well-known Republicans and Democrats;
what linked the members of the League, in addition to their economic
303 John T. Flynn, Whose Child Is the NRA?, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1934, at 385, 394.
304 See BURK, supra note 302, at 122-42; KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE BusiNESSMEN'S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NEW DEAL 3-6 (2010).
305 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating section 3 of the NIRA).
306 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
307 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 935).
308 See also, e.g., R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1934); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating a portion of the
NIRA).
309 These were not the only organizations active against the New Deal and FDR's initiatives.
Other groups with business and corporate ties included the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the Chamber of Commerce, the Crusaders, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the Sentinels of the Republic. In addition, there were groups organized to oppose the court-packing
plan, like the Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government, as well as popular leaders viewed
as quasi-fascist, such as Senator Huey Long of Louisiana and the "radio priest" Father Charles
Coughlin. See ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST. HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN,
AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION xi-xii (1982); LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 62-76, 88, 94, 114;
Kessler, supra note 149, at 1923, 1930-34, 1943-48.

310 GEORGE WOLFSKILL, THE REVOLT OF THE CONSERVATIVES: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE 1934-194o, at viii (1962); see also LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at
70 ("The Liberty League ... commence[d] the most ambitious marketing of conservative ideas in
American history.").
311 See BURK, supra note 302, at 134-41; Frederick Rudolph, The American Liberty League,
1934-1940, 56 AM. HIST.REV. 19, 21- 22 (1950). The League was in many ways a successor to the
Association Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA), an organization largely controlled by the
Du Ponts that led the national campaign to adopt a constitutional amendment repealing Prohibition. For an account of the AAPA and the Du Ponts' involvement, see BURK, supra note 302, at
I6--12 1.
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interests, was not party but conservatism. 3 12 Despite insisting that it
was nonpartisan, the League was rabidly anti-New Deal and opposed
to FDR. League pamphlets with titles like "The President Wants More
Power" and "Will It Be Ave Caesar?," not to mention statements by
League leaders that "Roosevelt desires to pass laws utterly destructive
of liberty," hardly suggested political neutrality.3 13 Thus, not surprisingly, the League was strongly attacked by FDR's backers, and FDR
3 14
himself used the League as a punching bag during the 1936 election.
After Roosevelt won by a landslide, the League quickly became dormant
until it dissolved in 1940 .315
A striking feature of the League was its insistence on attacking the
New Deal on constitutional grounds 316 - a strategic choice, as critiquing the New Deal for burdening elite economic interests would not have
been a popular move. 3 1' The League was much more concerned with
some constitutional provisions than others, however. Its focus was on
resisting economic regulation and opposing the national administrative
state, with frequent invocations of property rights and the right to work,
combined with attacks on the national government's incursion into the
proper realm of the states, profligate taxing and spending, and use of
broad legislative delegations. 3 18 Thus, for example, in its platform the
312 WOLFSKILL, supra note 31o, at 36; Arthur Krock, American Liberty League Soon to Begin
Activities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1934, at 14.
313 James A. Reed, Shall We Have Constitutional Liberty or Dictatorship?, Address Before the

Lawyers' Association of Kansas City (Apr. 14, 1936), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No.
12o, at 1, 14 (1936); see AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, LEAFLET No. i, THE PRESIDENT WANTS
MORE POWER: IS A SCRAPPED CONSTITUTION Too HIGH A PRICE TO PAY FOR IT? (1936);
AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, LEAFLET No. 6, WILL IT BE AVE CAESAR? (1936) (reprinted from
WASH. HERALD, June 24, 1935); see also WOLFSKILL, supra note 31o, at lo8.
314 See, e.g., PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 304, at 20 (noting FDR's "relentless assault on the
American Liberty League"); Kessler, supra note 149, at 1930 (quoting FDR as saying that the "tenets" of the American Liberty League "appear[] to be to love thy God but forget thy neighbor... only
God, in this case, appear[s] to be property" (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rudolph, supra note 311, at 29-3o; George S. Silzer, Letter to the Editor, A PartisanOrganization: American Liberty League Viewed as Anti-Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1934, at 20.
315 Rudolph, supra note 311, at 32-33.
316 See AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, A STATEMENT OF ITS PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES (1934).
See generally Jared A. Goldstein, The American Liberty League and the Rise of ConstitutionalNationalism, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 287 (2014) (discussing the League's constitutional focus).
317 LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 61 (quoting League founder and General Motors executive
Donaldson Brown as saying that "[a]ny organization which was known to be directly interested
primarily in the defense of established property rights" would lack public support); WOLFSKILL,
supra note 31o, at iii.
318 WOLFSKILL, supra note 31o, at ii6, 138; AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 26,
YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW: A REVIEW OF FACTUAL ANALYSES ISSUED BY THE
AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE AND SOME DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT LEGISLATIVE SITUATION (1935) [hereinafter AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 26]; Raoul E. Desvernine,
Chairman, Nat'l Lawyers Comm. of the Am. Liberty League, Speech at the Institute of Public
Affairs (July ii, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 52, THE PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW DEAL 10-12 (1935).
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League committed to "maintain the right of an equal opportunity for all
to work, earn, save and acquire property '3 19 and to "uphold the
American principle that laws be made only by the direct representatives
of the people in Congress, and that the laws be interpreted only by the
Courts, and to oppose the delegation of either of these functions to executive departments, commissions, or bureau heads. '320 Profligate congressional delegations to the executive were a common theme of League
attacks, with calls for "an immediate cessation of attempts to subvert
basic constitutional principles through ... delegation" and warnings
that such delegations represented "an abdication by the Congress of
its proper responsibilities and ... a step toward the European type of
dictatorship.'321
The League repeatedly warned of unlawful administrative assertions
of power and expanding bureaucracy. Its leaders frequently invoked
the Framers, declaring that "[o]ur forefathers were suspicious of government ... [and] erected barriers in the Constitution to prevent government from ever placing the deadening hand of bureaucracy upon the
'3 22
initiative, enterprise, energy and self-reliance of the private citizen.
The League sometimes put the point more floridly, insisting that "[tihe
Federal bureaucracy has become a vast organism spreading its tentacles
'323
Simover the business and private life of the citizens of the country.
ilarly, sounding a note eerily relevant today, the League condemned the

319 AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, ITS PLATFORM 3 (I935).

320 Id. at 4; see also Jouett Shouse, President, Am. Liberty League, Speech at the Young Men's
Hebrew Association of St. Louis, Missouri (Feb. 12, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT
No. i6, THE CONSTITUTION STILL STANDS io

(1935) (decrying "the establishment of a central-

ized Federal Government such as was never contemplated" and "the dangerous relinquishment of
legislative powers to the Executive" present in New Deal legislation); WOLFSKILL, supra note 310,

at i-6.
321 AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 26, supranote 318, at 4, 8; see, e.g., AM. LIBERTY
LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. x9, THE PENDING BANKING BILL: AN ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL
TO SUBJECT THE NATION'S MONETARY AND BANKING STRUCTURE TO THE EXIGENCIES
OF POLITICS (1935) (arguing that the proposed Banking Act of 1935 represented congressional
abdication and further expansion of executive power); R.E. Desvernine, Member, Nat'l Advisory
Council, Am. Liberty League, Speech over the Blue Network of the National Broadcasting Company (May i6, I935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 35, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1935) ("[I]nnumerable commissions have been created with the most farreaching delegated legislative powers and with absolute discretion to interpret, administer and enforce....").
322 Borden Burr, Member, Nat'l Advisory Council, Am. Liberty League, Speech Before the Kiwanis Club at Columbus, Mississippi (Sept. 19, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT
o
No. 7 , THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 9 (I935); see also Jouett Shouse, Pres-

ident, Am. Liberty League, Speech Before the Philadelphia County League of Women Voters (Feb.
4, 1935), in AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 14, DEMOCRACY OR BUREAUCRACY
(I935).
323 AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 133, FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY IN THE
FOURTH YEAR OF THE NEW DEAL 4 (1936); see also AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No.
57, EXPANDING BUREAUCRACY 2 (I935) ("The mushroom growth of the Federal bureaucracy
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increased use of executive orders, arguing that "[flaws enacted since
March, 1933, delegating broad power to the Executive, have ...[countenanced] lawmaking by executive order.., to a degree unprecedented
324
and almost unbelievable.
The League regularly turned to lawyers to make its constitutional
arguments. Soon after its founding, the League assembled a National
Lawyers Committee (NLC) composed of many eminent business lawyers
of the day.325 The NLC undertook to assess the constitutionality of several major pieces of New Deal legislation, all of which it deemed to
violate constitutional limits on the commerce power, economic due process, and (in some cases) the jury trial right or prohibitions on delegation
of legislative power to the executive. 326 Its first report, condemning the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as unconstitutional on
Commerce Clause and due process grounds, 321 sparked a public outcry,
with the NLC lawyers attacked for serving their business clients' antilabor interests. 328 The NLC provided ammunition for these claims, describing the report not just as providing a detailed brief for why the
statute was unconstitutional but also as justifying noncompliance by
regulated companies. In the words of the NLC lawyer who led the
NLRA report: "When a lawyer tells a client that a law is unconstitu'329
tional,... it is then a nullity and he need no longer obey that law.
Several of the League's lawyers also argued constitutional challenges
in court. NLC lawyers filed briefs in many of the early challenges to
New Deal legislation at the Supreme Court, including Butler, Carter

Coal, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,330 Jones v. SEC,3 31 and
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.332 Lawyers who were fellow
during the past two years represents ...
citizens and business enterprises.").

a menace to the liberties, rights and welfare of individual

324 AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, DOCUMENT No. 6o, LAWMAKING BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 3

(1935); see also id. at 21 ("By no stretch of the imagination can many of these orders be regarded
merely as ministerial acts in execution of laws enacted by the Congress.").
325 See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE

NEW DEAL 81, 89-92 (1995). Professor Daniel Ernst notes that lawyers were divided on the New
Deal and growing administrative state, with corporate lawyers often being more favorably disposed
to administrative adjudication subject to limited judicial review (provided such adjudication was
subject to procedural constraints) than trial lawyers. ERNST, supra note 294, at 5-6.
326 WOLFSKILL, supra note 31o, at 72-78.
327 See NAT'L LAWYERS COMM. OF THE AM. LIBERTY LEAGUE, REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (1935).

328 See WOLFSKILL, supra note 31o, at 73 (quoting attacks on the NLC report in The Nation
and The New Republic).
329 Id. at 72 (quoting the chairman of the subcommittee that drafted the report).
330 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
331 298 U.S. 1 (1936).

332 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Memorandum from Eve A. Levin on The NLC, ABA, and Anti-New
Deal Litigation to Gillian Metzger 4-1o (June l-,2017) [hereinafter Levin] (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (detailing the NLC's participation in legal challenges to the New Deal).
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travelers, if not actual NLC members, played a major role in many
moreincluding most prominently Frederick H. Wood, a litigation
partner at Cravath who led the constitutional challenges in the
Schechter Poultry, Carter Coal, and Morgan v. United States333 cases,
among others. 334 After its early success, this full-bore constitutional attack on the New Deal famously hit a judicial wall in '937, with Jones
& Laughlin sustaining the NLRA as within congressional power and
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish335 sustaining minimum wage legislation
against a due process challenge. 336 Scholars debate whether this represented a sudden switch to stave off FDR's court-packing threat or a
more gradual doctrinal evolution, but all agree that within a few
years - and after FDR had appointed seven new Justices - constitutional limits to economic regulation and national administration had
33 7
largely disappeared.
2. The Special Committee.The ABA Special Committee was
formed in 1933 to address perceived deficiencies in administrative law
and administrative procedures raised by lawyers representing clients before administrative agencies. Many of these concerns predated FDR's
election, but with the advent of the New Deal the Special Committee's
ambit became more ambitious and more politically charged. 338
Although the memberships of the League's NLC and the Special
Committee were different, there was extensive overlap between the
NLC and the ABA, with NLC members often in leadership positions at
the ABA and involved in other ABA committees targeting the New
Deal. 339 Indeed, this overlap became a liability for the ABA, subjecting
3 40
it to the same criticisms of serving the interests of economic privilege.
One particularly fitting connection between the NLC and the Special
Committee was the claim by Ollie Roscoe McGuire, the many-year
333

298 U.S. 468 (1936).

334 See SHAMIR, supra note 325, at 81-92 (detailing an elite network of lawyers that fought the
New Deal); Levin, supra note 332, at 4-8 (describing the connections among lawyers involved in
these challenges). Although Wood is not included on lists of NLC members, Professor Peter Irons
reports that Wood was an NLC member and that the League helped subsidize Wood's representation in Schechter Poultry. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 98 (1982).
335 300 U.S. 379 (-937).

336 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i, 31-32 (i937); West Coast Hotel Co., 300
U.S. at 379-99.
337 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 229-35 (2009).
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 5-7 (998),

Compare BARRY

with LEUCHTENBURG,

supra

note 22, at 213-36.
338 ERNST, supra note 294, at 119; JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 20-22 (2014); Dan Ernst, The Special Committee on Administrative Law, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2008, 12:38 PM), http://legalhistory-

blog.blogspot.com/2oo8/o9/special-committee-on-administrative-law.html [https://perma.cc/ 3 M 5 DALMT].
339 See SHAMIR, supra note 325, at 88-92; Levin, supra note 332, at I-4.
340 See SHAMIR, supra note 325, at 30-31, 68-70, 92; Levin, supra note 332, at 4.
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Chair of the Special Committee, to have written much of prominent
NLC member (and former Solicitor General) James Montgomery
Beck's tirade against administrative government, Our Wonderland of
3 41 Moreover, like the League, the Special
Bureaucracy.
Committee
claimed neutrality on the New Deal policies but repeatedly expressed
concern about the spreading expanse of national power and national
administration. Its initial report described the legislation of FDR's first
one hundred days as "represent[ing] an advance of federal administrative machinery, on a scale and to an extent never before attempted, into
'3 42
fields not heretofore brought under federal regulation.
Early on, the Committee flagged separation of powers and due process concerns with the delegation of legislative and judicial powers to
the executive branch as well as these powers' combination in a single
agency's hands, often without provision for judicial review.3 4 3 Yet, unlike the League, identifying constitutional infirmities with expanding
administrative government was not the Special Committee's focus. Instead, the Committee devoted itself to recommending legislative reforms
that would tame "administrative absolutism" and abuse, advocating for
greater and more uniform procedural requirements, independence for
administrative adjudication, and broad judicial review. 3 44 For several
years the Committee urged the creation of a single administrative court
in which all administrative adjudication would occur, but repeatedly
ran into opposition from lawyers who practiced before existing administrative tribunals and did not want consolidation. 4 5 After failing in
that effort, the Special Committee switched gears and began to push

341 JAMES M. BECK, OUR WONDERLAND OF BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF THE GROWTH
OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND ITS DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT UPON

THE CONSTITUTION (1932); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, go NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1573-74 (1996).
342 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 56 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 407, 408 (1933);
see also id. at 415; Shepherd, supra note 341, at 1569-75 (discussing the 1933 Committee's objections
and solutions to perceived problems with agency authority).
343 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, supra note 342, at 409-11, 414, 424 25; see also Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 56
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 57, 141 (1935) ("[T]he citizen's right to engage in an honorable calling is subject
to revocation for violation of some regulation which a commission has made, and the same commission prosecutes for violation of the regulation and sits as judge in its own case ....
(statement
of Louis G. Caldwell, Chair of the Special Committee)).
344 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 342-46
(1938).
345 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 57 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 539, 539-40
(1934); Louis G. Caldwell, A FederalAdministrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 966 (1936) (describing
the proposal). The question of whether to push for a single administrative court proved internally
contentious in the ABA, as lawyers with established practices before existing tribunals wanted those
tribunals preserved. Shepherd, supra note 341, at 1577-78.
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for broad procedural limits on agencies' use of rulemaking and
3 46
adjudication.
The League may have provided some political cover for the Special
Committee, making the Committee's efforts to rein in the New Deal
state seem more moderate than the League's all-out constitutional attack. At any rate, it was after the League had faded from public view,
and constitutional challenges to the New Deal had failed, that the
Special Committee took over responsibility for curbing administrative
government. Chaired during 1937-i938 by Roscoe Pound, who had just
stepped down as Dean of Harvard Law School, the Committee issued a
proposed administrative reform bill in I938. 3 4 7 In 1939, the Committee's proposed legislation was introduced in Congress essentially unchanged as the Walter-Logan Act and passed both houses. 34 The bill
would have imposed broad hearing and judicial review requirements
and other limitations on agency action.3 49 Ultimately, FDR's veto and
creation of an Attorney General's Committee that would undertake further study of national administration prevented Walter-Logan's adoption.3 50 The Special Committee's influence continued to be felt, however. The Attorney General's Committee produced majority and
minority bills; the minority bill, which called for more procedural constraints, stronger judicial review, and a comprehensive administrative
code, was proposed by the three dissenters including the former head of
the ABA and the future Chair of the Special Committee.3 5 1 Ultimately,
in 1946 - after the intervention of World War II - the minority, ABA3 52
friendly bill was largely adopted as the Administrative Procedure Act.

3. The Entrenchment of the National Administrative State. the end of World War II and the

1940s,

By

the basic legal postulates of the

346 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 62 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 789 (I937);
Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 64 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 281 (i939).
347 ERNST, supra note 294, at 121-23; Mark Tushnet, Lecture, Administrative Law in the ip3os:
The Supreme Court's Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 6o DUKE LJ. 1565, 1630-31

(201-). For a detailed discussion of Pound's view, arguing that he did not support the proposed
legislation, see ERNST, supra note 294, at 121 -32.

But see Kessler, supra note 294, at 754-57 (noting

that Pound endorsed the Walter-Logan Act and disputing Ernst's account of Pound as more moderate).
348 S. 915,

7 6th

Cong. (1939); H.R. 6324,

7 6th

Cong. (1939).

349 See GRISINGER, supra note 338, at 62-64; Shepherd, supra note 341, at 1599-6oo (discussing
SEC General Counsel Chester Lane's objections to the bill). The bill was watered down somewhat
during the legislative process, exempting some agencies and targeting its restrictions more on those
most at odds with business. ERNST, supra note 294, at 137.
350 GRISINGER, supra note 338, at 64-67; see also Shepherd, supra note 341, at 1614-21, 162528.

351 For more information on the views of the minority report drafters Carl McFarland, E. Blythe
Stason, and Arthur T Vanderbilt, see ATTORNEY GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT

203-i6 (i94i).

352 See Shepherd, supra note 341, at 1649; see also Pub. L. No. 79-404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codi-

fied as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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modern national administrative state were firmly in place. In Wickard
v. Filburn353 in 1942, the Court had outlined the scope of national authority with breadth that still applies today: Congress can regulate intrastate activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
including purely local economic activity that only affects interstate commerce when viewed in the aggregate across the nation.3 5 4 Similarly,
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 355 in I938 confirmed the Court's
acceptance of economic regulation and its rejection of searching due
process scrutiny of economic measures. 3 56 Also by 1939, the Court had
sanctioned broad congressional delegations of policymaking power to
the executive branch, including delegations to private entities, with the
high-water mark of broad delegation coming in Yakus v. United
States 351 in 1944.35 The constitutionality of administrative adjudication subject to limited judicial review, established in Crowell v.
Benson 35 9 in 1932, was now incontrovertible and sanctioned by the APA
as well as subsequent case law. 360 By 1937, the Court had implicitly
sanctioned the combination of legislative, adjudicatory, and executive
functions against separation of powers attack, and it definitively rejected a due process challenge to such combined functions in 1948.61
The Court also indicated that it was sometimes willing to defer to agencies' interpretative judgments, in particular when an agency elucidated
3 62
the meaning of a statutory term through application.

353 317 U.S. III (1942).
354 Id. at 125, 127-28; see also NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2012) ("Wickard has long
been regarded as 'perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity."' (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 56o (199))).
355 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
356 Id. at 148; see also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (upholding a
law providing minimum wages for women).
357 321 U.S. 41-4 (1-944).
358 Id. at 424-25; see also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943) (upholding a delegation to regulate in the "public interest" under the Communications Act of 1934); Currin
v. Wallace, 306 U.S. i, 16-18 (1939) (upholding delegations under the Tobacco Inspection Act).
359 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
360 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 706 (2012); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. III, 130-32 (1944); St.

Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 49-53 (1936); see also NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i, 48-49 (1937) (rejecting Seventh Amendment argument on the
grounds that it does not apply where a "case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a
suit"); ERNST, supra note 294, at 52 -56 (discussing Crowell).
361 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935) (upholding the for-cause removal structure of members of the Federal Trade
Commission); see also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 420-21 (1941) (rejecting a bias chal-

lenge against the Secretary of Agriculture, who was tasked with enforcing rules promulgated by his
agency).
362 See, e.g., Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. at 13o; Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1941); see also
Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, io6 MICH. L. REV. 399, 406 (2007) ("New Deal policymakers subscribed to ... a
prescriptive vision [under which] ...[ilnexpert, inflexible, rule-bound courts were to recognize their
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This did not mean the Court ceded all constitutional controls on administrative governance. Of particular importance, the Court periodically voiced the need for some outer congressional limit on executive
authority, and concerns about the fairness of administrative hearings
and executive branch overreach periodically surfaced.3 63 But, strikingly,
decisions overturning administrative arrangements and decisionmaking
were based overwhelmingly on the APA and other statutory requirements, even if the Court read these statutes with an eye to constitutional
concerns.3 64 Rather than call the national administrative endeavor into
constitutional question, these decisions represented an ordinary working
out of its details.
The League and the Special Committee thus failed to overturn the
New Deal administrative expansion. Indeed, the League has been
deemed "a colossal failure' ' 3 6s and it never gained much popularity, being widely viewed as a foil for conservative industrial leaders seeking
to protect their own economic interests. If anything, in 1936 the
League likely damaged Republican presidential candidate Governor Alf
Landon's chances by association.3 66 The conservative resistance to
FDR did not start to gain real strength until '937-I938, when the
League was no longer active. This growing opposition was a result of

proper role by allowing agencies to act with minimal judicial interference. By 1940, the federal
judiciary had accepted this prescriptive model of policymaking and its reduced role in it." (emphasis
omitted)).
The Court's jurisprudence on deference to agency statutory interpretations in this period was
notoriously unclear. See St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 78-81 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing the various circumstances in which due process does and does not require de novo judicial
review); Bamzai, supra note 245, at 978-8i.
363 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting presidential
power to seize steel mills absent statutory authorization); Yakus, 321 U.S. 414; Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. i, i8-19 (-938) (finding no fair hearing where regulated parties lacked notice of, or
opportunity to respond to, government's proposed findings, and agency prosecutors consulted ex
parte with decisionmaker).
364 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. ii6, 128-29 (1958) (refusing to presume Congress intended
to give the Secretary of State broad discretion to refuse a passport given constitutional rights involved); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-90 (1951) (holding that the APA and
the Taft-Hartley Act require courts to assess the whole record and "assume more responsibility for
the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions than ... in the past"); Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1950) (emphasizing APA concern to separate the roles of prosecutor
and judge and invoking due process hearing rights in concluding that the APA's separation of functions requirements applied to deportation hearings).
365 Sheldon Richman, A Matter of Degree, Not Principle:The Foundingof the American Liberty
League, 6 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 145, 150 (1982); see also LICHTIMAN, supra note 59, at 69 (discussing the lack of business response to request for further League funding); WOLFSKILL, supra
note 31o, at 62 (noting that at its peak the League had no more than 125,000 members).
366 See BURK, supra note 302, at 236-49; Rudolph, supra note 311, at 31; see also President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency (June 27,
1936), 5 PUB. PAPERS 229, 233-34 (-938) (attacking "economic royalists" who opposed his candidacy, widely understood to be a reference to the League).
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economic recession and FDR's overreach with his court-packing and
367
executive reorganization plans.
The Special Committee was more effective than the League. The
ultimate enactment of the APA reflected its efforts, and the APA has
played a critical role in governing the national administrative state in
the years since - in particular providing an opening for extensive judicial review of administrative actions and the development of administrative law.3 68 But the APA was only adopted once the New Deal administrative state was solidly in place, and while the statute regularized
and constrained administrative practice in some respects, it is also credited with broadly legitimizing administrative governance.3 69 In the
Court's words, the APA "settle[d] long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enact[ed] a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest. ''370 Moreover, one of the central compromises built into the APA, that of imposing trial-like procedures on
administrative adjudication but creating a category of informal rulemaking subject only to notice-and-comment requirements, proved criti371
cal to the expansion of regulatory governance over the decades since.

B. The ContemporaryRelevance of the League
and the Special Committee
Eight decades later, the national administrative state has expanded
significantly from its New Deal and Progressive Era roots. The I96Os
and i97os marked the addition of major Great Society programs like
Medicare and Medicaid, as well as the enactment of major new social
regulatory statutes addressing the environment, worker health and

367 ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION
AND WAR 16-30 (1995); GRISINGER, supra note 338, at 14; BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY
STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, at 154-58, i6o, 167 (1983); see RICHARD
POLENBERG, THE ERA OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1933-1945, at 173-8o (2000).

368 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (noting that the APA imposes a presumption in favor of judicial review); Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, supranote
229, at 1314-1 6.
369 GRISINGER, supra note 338, at 61-io8 (discussing the political history of the APA); see
ERNST, supra note 294, at 137; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 169, at 466 (describing Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), as
treating the APA "as an organizing charter for the administrative state - a super-statute, if you
will"). But see PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 304, at 33-34, 53-67 (discussing sustained and growing

opposition to administrative government after World War II); Kessler, supra note 294, at 762-73
(discussing continuing opposition to the administrative state even after adoption of the APA).
370 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
371 Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, supra note 229, at 1298-31o (discussing

the transformation of administrative law from its textual roots in the APA); Shepherd, supra note
341, at 1649-75.

20,7]

THE SUPREME COURT-

FOREWORD

safety, and consumer protection.3 72 Meanwhile, the first decade and a
half of this century witnessed the national security state's dramatic
growth andalbeit now under threatnew or expanded national
roles in health insurance, financial regulation, and other regulatory
373
contexts .
Despite these changes, the history of the League and the Special
Committee offers an instructive parallel for understanding and assessing
contemporary anti-administrativism. The 193os represent the first and
the last time that the national administrative government was subject
to the type of sustained constitutional challenge that we are seeing today.
Strikingly, many of the current constitutional attacks are made in terms
nearly identical to those used by the League, and the League's antiadministrative rhetoric rivals that of some members of the Roberts
Court. 374 In addition, the legislative initiatives being offered today are
closely similar to the Special Committee's proposal from eighty years
before. A comparison of the Walter-Logan Act and the RAA is edifying:
The Walter-Logan Act would have required a public hearing, upon request, before a rule could be adopted, while the RAA would essentially
do the same for a broad range of costly rulemakings.3 75 Walter-Logan
would also have provided for broad access to judicial review and increased the stringency of judicial review, with the version that passed
the House imposing a clearly erroneous standard that would have allowed courts to independently assess the record.3 76 As noted above, the
RAAand particularly the Separation of Powers Restoration Act377
expand judicial review.
similarly
would

372 DECKER,

supra note 63, at i6-25; see Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical

Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. ix89, 1272-95 (i986) (discussing regulatory politics in the Great

Society and in the "Public Interest era").
373 See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America. A Hidden World, Growing Beyond
Control, WASH. POST (July I9,

2oio), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/

articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/ [https:Hperma.cc/ 7XNS- 3 W96] (detailing unprecedented growth in national security programs following 9/II); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. i-i148,
124 Stat. II9 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. iii-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).

374 Compare sources cited supra notes 321 and 323 (describing League pamphlets discussing delegation as leading to "dictatorship" and characterizing the "Federal bureaucracy" as "a vast organism spreading its tentacles"), with soures cited supra notes 201, 2o5, 2o6, 216, and 217 (decrying

"bureaucrats" and agencies that "pok[e] into every nook and cranny" and the "titanic administrative
state" with its "vast and varied" scope and "arrogation of power").
375 Compare S. 915, 7 6th Cong. § 2 (I939), with S. 951, ii 5 th Cong. § 3(e) (2017).
376 See James M. Landis, CrucialIssues in Administrative Law: The Walter-Logan Bill, 53 HARV.
L. REV. 177, 1093 (1940); see also Shepherd, supra note 341, at 162 1 (noting removal of the clearly
erroneous standard by the Senate but questioning whether that removal altered the scope of judicial
review under the bill).
377 See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, constitutional challenges to the modern national administrative state have surfaced more recently than the 193os. The Reagan
Administration, for example, coupled its anti-administrative political
rhetoric with constitutional criticisms.3 78 But President Reagan's constitutional legacy on administrative power is quite ambiguous. His administration advocated a narrowing in the scope of congressional authority and sought to advance this federalism agenda through executive
orders and memoranda.3 7 9 Yet these documents remained largely internal to the executive branch; the Reagan Administration's greatest federalism impact was indirect, through its appointment of conservative
Justices to the Court.38 0 Moreover, despite some support for property
rights, the administration's states' rights focus limited its constitutional
libertarianism. 38 1
On the separation of powers front, the Reagan
Administration is most famous for urging the Court to adopt a unitary
theory of executive power, under which the President can remove all
executive branch officials and control all executive branch decisionmaking. 3s 2 Such a view, though logically consistent with advocating a narrower scope to national authority, does not suggest hostility to national
administrative governance so much as a desire for greater presidential
control over it. And in practice, the turn to greater presidential control
over administration that began with President Reagan has led to an expansion of national administrative government, as both Republican and
Democratic Presidents have seized upon administration as a central
3 3
means for achieving their policy goals. 1
Recognizing contemporary anti-administrativism's connections to
the failed challenges of the 1930S thus reinforces its radical potential; if
accepted, its claims would require a reformation of the constitutional
order that has governed for the last eighty years. The League and the
Special Committee are equally important in highlighting the role that
supra note I8I, at 628-30.
379 See Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (I987). For example, an Office of Legal Policy
memo outlining guidelines that DOJ attorneys were required to follow argued against the aggregate
approach to identifying activities subject to the commerce power demonstrated in Wickard v.
378 Rosenberg,

Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE-

(1988); see also CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW:
A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 186-88 (1991) (discussing
concerns for federalism in the Reagan Administration).
380 Johnsen, supra note 65, at 387-99 (describing the content of Reagan-era Office of Legal Policy
memos but noting "President Reagan's greatest influence on the development of constitutional
meaning came, not through his administration's litigation positions, but through his judicial appointments," id. at 397).
381 Roger Pilon, On the Origins of the Modern LibertarianLegal Movement, 16 CHAP. L. REV.
255, 261-64 (2013) (discussing President Reagan's appointment of conservative, not libertarian,
judges); W. John Moore, Stopping the States, NAT'L J., July 21, 199o, at 1758; see also CLINT
LINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION -

BOLICK, GRASSROOTS TYRANNY: THE LIMITS OF FEDERALISM 1-92 (i993).
382 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
383

See infra notes 454-56 and accompanying text.
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business interests and conservative forces have played, and continue to
play, in fostering resistance to national administration.38 4 As noted
above, business interests benefitted far more from - and initially were
far more supportive ofNew Deal programs and interventions than
is traditionally acknowledged. That dynamic has only continued over
the years since, with many businesses working closely with national administrative government or supporting liberal policies. Today, major
industry leaders are often at the forefront in pushing for greater social
regulation, for example on matters affecting civil rights.38 5 Moreover,
conservative anti-administrativism has many bases, reflecting the multiple strandsbusiness and economic conservatism, religious and social conservatism, and nationalist and military conservatismthat
make up the American conservative movement.38 6 Accounts of the Tea
Party, for example, identify the close interweaving of economic conservatism and racial and ethnic resentment in the group's anti-administrative views.38 7 As a result, conservative antistatism often has a selective
character, with simultaneous calls for reducing administrative government 3 8 and for expanding major parts of that government, in the form
38 9
of the military and immigration enforcement.
Yet it remains true that business and economic conservatives were
critical in developing the New Deal attack on the modern national administrative state. They were joined in this effort by elite lawyers concerned that an expanding administrative state threatened not just their
business clients' interests but also their own livelihoods by diminishing
384

For a detailed account of this role, see PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 304, at io-25, describing

the role of the American Liberty League, and LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 67-76, 128-30, 306-

07, 369, describing business support for conservative groups and their antigovernment message
from the 1930S through the i98os.
385 See Jena McGregor & Damian Paletta, Trump's Business Advisory Councils Disband as CEOs

Abandon President over Charlottesville Views, WASH. POST (Aug. i6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/201-7/o8/i6/after-wave-of-ceo-departures-trump-ends-business-andmanufacturing-councils [https:Hperma.cc/NH 7Y-7UN7] (describing disbandment of the Trump
Administration business councils after leading CEOs threatened to leave the councils to protest
President Trump's equivocal statements on white supremacy); Nick Wingfield, Tech Leaders Call
for Anti-Discrimination Laws to Protect Gays in All 5o States, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Apr. i, 2015,

4:45 PM), https://nyti.ms/2ud9r24 [https:Hperma.cc/6 7TH-DFZ 5 ].
386 See James R. Kurth, A History of Inherent Contradictions:The Origins and End of American
Conservatism, in AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: NOMOS LVI I3 (Sanford V. Levinson et al. eds.,

2oi6).
387 SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 59-6o (noting that members oppose government
programs seen as benefitting the "undeserving"- a category that often includes minorities - at
taxpayers' expense, like mortgage bailouts or healthcare subsidies for the poor, but view programs
with benefits felt to have been "earned," such as Medicare and Social Security, more positively); see
also ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD,

STRANGERS

MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT 214-15, 21-8
388 See Rucker & Costa, supra note i.

IN THEIR
9

OWN LAND: ANGER AND

(2oi6).

389 Katz, supra note 35; Michael D. Shear, Touring Warship, Trump Pushes Plan to Expand Military, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017), https:Hnyti.ms/2mxfvDt [https:Hperma.cc/MAH 5 -F 7 XY].

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VoI. 131:1

the importance of courts and legal representation.3 90 It was also a few
business and economic conservatives who continued to resist the national administrative state after World War II. Their opposition was
based heavily in anticommunist, antilabor, and anticollectivist sentiments, and they were clearly a distinct minority - not just in American
society, but also within the business community.3 9 1 Over the course of
the following decades, however, business conservatives moved from
fringe to center, drawing on business opposition to the expansion of social regulation, public interest litigation, and public protests in the I96Os
and I97OS. 3 9 2 In 1971, soon-to-be Justice Lewis Powell penned his famous memo to the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce's Education
Committee, calling for a litigation strategy to defend business interests
and the capitalist system.3 93 In historian Kim Phillips-Fein's words, the
conservative business organizations created in response represent "the
fulfillment, in a quiet way, of the long-ago vision of the Liberty
League.

'3 94

The fruits of Powell's strategic legal vision are evident in contemporary anti-administrativism. Business interests are particularly tied to
regulatory rollbacks occurring under the Trump Administration and in
Congress, 395 and business associations like the Chamber of Commerce
and the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) are fre3 96
quent participants in litigation challenging administrative action.

390 See Shepherd, supra note 341, at 1571-72.
391 LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 1-3 (noting the centrality of anticommunist sentiments to the
conservative movement); PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 304, at 22-25, 33, 56-67, 87-114 (detailing
the relationship between conservatives and McCarthyism, anticommunism, and antilabor); see also
ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE DE-

PRESSION 102-22 (2012) (discussing the diverse interests that went into the formation of Friedrich
Hayek's Mont Pelerin Society).
392 DECKER, supra note 63, at 39-72; PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 304, at 15o-212, 236-62;
TELES, supra note 187, at 6o-63; Paul Pierson, The Rise and Reconfiguration of Activist Government, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND

THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 19 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007); Julian E. Zelizer,
Seizing Power. Conservatives and Congress Since the ip970, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS, supra, at 105, 1-1.

393 Memorandum from Lewis F.Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm.,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise System (Aug. 23, 1971),
http://law2 .wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%2 oArchives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf
[https:Hperma.cc/8X 5 P-MRG 3 ]; LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 303. For a list of foundations behind
the funding of the Chamber of Commerce, see LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 305.
394 PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 304, at 266.

395 See Ivory & Faturechi, supra note 28; see also William Kovacs, Opinion, Separating Fact
from Fiction in the Regulatory Accountability Act, THE HILL (May 18, 2017, 7:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/uncategorized/334136-separating-fact-from-fiction-in-the-regulatory [https:Hperma.cc/LR8U-QTKS] (demonstrating Chamber of Commerce support for the

RAA).
396 See Memorandum from Zachary Bannon on Lawyers and Organizations in Administrative
Challenges to Gillian Metzger (May ii, 2017) [hereinafter Bannon] (on file with the Harvard Law
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Just as a network of business lawyers was behind litigation challenging
the New Deal, so too a group of lawyers appears frequently in the current judicial attacks.3 9 7 They are joined by a number of conservative
think tanks and "attorney-activists" committed to challenging the national regulatory state.3 98 Conservative institutions also provide support
for scholarship challenging the administrative state, helping to bring
these conservative ideas more into the academic mainstream.3 99 This is
in keeping with extensive conservative efforts since the 1970s to develop
and foster a field of lawyers, academics, and judges to advance the conservative legal agenda - nowhere more evident than in the central role
of the Federalist Society's Leonard Leo in pushing then-Judge Gorsuch
for the Supreme Court. 40 0 And as with the League, over the years a few
wealthy conservative donors, using business-created fortunes, have pro40 1
vided extensive resources to support these efforts.
The parallels to the 1930s are perhaps nowhere stronger than with
respect to Charles and David Koch, the modern-day equivalents of the
Du Pont brothers. 40 2 The Koch brothers' funding extends to a wide
range of organizations associated with contemporary anti-administrativism, from conservative political organizations like the Tea Party,
Americans for Prosperity, and FreedomWorks; to the libertarian Cato
Institute and the conservative Heritage Foundation; to George Mason
University and even more specifically George Mason's Antonin Scalia
Law School, just to name a few. 40 3 Their engagement reflects a clear

School Library) (listing firms, counsel, and organizations involved in litigation described in section
LB); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. i6, 2008),
https:Hnyti.ms/21GVrg6 [https://perma.cc/M6BZ-VJJ 5 ] (detailing the Chamber of Commerce's involvement and success in litigation before the Supreme Court).
397 See Bannon, supra note 396; see also Savit, supra note I96, at 855-56 (detailing the role of
Republican state attorneys general in litigation challenging Obama administrative regulations).
398 DECKER, supra note 63, at 220-21.
399 See, e.g., Steve Eder, Neomi Rao, the Scholar Who Will Help Lead Trump's Regulatory Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (July 9,2017), https:Hnyti.ms/2uZNkNz [https:Hperma.cc/R8NG-CNY6] (detailing the Charles Koch Foundation's significant contribution to the Antonin Scalia Law School's

Center for the Study of the Administrative State); Adam White, Welcome to the Centerfor the Study
of the Administrative State, CTR. FOR STUDY ADMIN. ST., ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH., GEO.
MASON U., https:Hadministrativestate.gmu.edu [https:Hperma.cc/9328-ULNP] (identifying current

"[p]roblems of administrative accountability," "the growth of the federal government outside the
checks and balances of the Constitution," and the "heavy economic, political, and social costs" of
regulation as the focus of the Center's study).
400 Eric Lipton & Jeremy W. Peters, In Gorsuch, Conservative Activist Sees Test Casefor Reshaping the Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. i8, 2017), https:Hnyti.ms/2nDbryT [https://perma.cc/JAK 3 D 3 BS]; Toobin, supra note I9.
401 LICHTMAN, supra note 59, at 305; Savit, supra note I96, at 857-6I.
402 See Frank Rich, Opinion, The Billionaires Bankrolling the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
2oio), https:Hnyti.ms/2jHYWmO [https://perma.cc/6UKQ-LABL].
403 JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND
THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 2-10, 149-56, 178-85 (2ox6); SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON,
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strategy of seeking to reshape the nation's intellectual and constitutional
backdrop. 40 4 They have pursued this strategy particularly with respect
to global warming, wielding political candidate funding and broader institutional funding to change the background
terms of debate as well as
40 5
oppose particular regulatory initiatives.
In short, as was true in the 1930s, business conservatives' support
has been critical to the growing prominence of contemporary antiadministrativism. Moreover, this growing prominence suggests that the
strategy of business conservatives like the Koch Brothers is working. To
use Professor Jack Balkin's terms, this strategy has moved the conservative constitutional critique from "off the wall to on the wall. ' 40 6 In this
regard, a historical discontinuity with the 1930s emerges. The League
not only failed to generate popular support for its constitutional arguments, but also by its own unpopularity contributed to Roosevelt's land40
slide win in 1936. 1
Finally, the League and the Special Committee are significant in
demonstrating the inescapably political aspect of the current constitutional attack on administrative government. Despite the League's
wrapping itself in the Constitution, no one doubted the political and
economic interests that motivated its members or the lawyers on the
NLC. The members of the Special Committee were similarly seen as
acting in their business clients' interests. Their attacks on administrative government reflected disagreement with New Deal policies, in particular New Deal economic reforms and support for labor. 401 Against
the background of the League and the Special Committee, the current
attack appears as the latest in a series of conservative attempts to rein
in national administrative government that have recurred over the past
eighty years. From this perspective, it is not a coincidence that the current attack on the administrative state rose to the fore during a period
supra note 7, at 102-04, 174 (describing Koch funding of the Tea Party); Nicholas Fandos, University in Turmoil over Scalia Tribute and Koch Role, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2oi6),
https:Hnyti.ms/21qzNNr [https:Hperma.cc/8ZXQ-PFJ8] (detailing Koch connections to George
Mason University, including funding of the Mercatus Center, a libertarian economic think tank).
404 MAYER, supra note 403, at 171; Eder, supra note 399; Fandos, supra note 403.
405 See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P Leaders Came to View Climate Change as
Fake Science, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017), https:Hnyti.ms/2rDMtna [https:Hperma.cc/JNM 7 - 4 XSC];
Andy Kroll, Exposed: The Dark-Money ATM of the Conservative Movement, MOTHER JONES
(Feb. 5, 2013, ii:o6 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/donors-trust-donor-capitalfund-dark-money-koch-bradley-devos/ [https:Hperma.cc/X 3 E 4 -gTXC].
406 Balkin, From Offthe Wall to On the Wall, supra note 293 (discussing "the history of formerly
crazy arguments moving from off the wall to on the wall, and then being adopted by courts" in the
context of NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).
407 See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
408 See Landis, supra note 376, at 1078, 1o89 (emphasizing economic interests behind the WalterLogan Act); Shepherd, supra note 341, at 156o ("[A] central purpose of the proponents of administrative reform was to constrain liberal New Deal agencies, especially the National Labor Relations
Board and [the] Securities and Exchange Commission.").
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of activist government and progressive regulatory initiatives by the
Obama Administration.
Acknowledging this political character is not to deny contemporary
anti-administrativism's deep constitutional roots. It is instead to deny
the inseparability of politics from efforts to mold the constitutional contours of the American state. Constitutional scholars often distinguish
between constitutional interpretation, identified as a more text-based
endeavor of discerning constitutional meaning, and broader efforts at
''constructing" constitutional meaning: "The process of constitutional
construction is concerned with fleshing out constitutional principles,
practices and rules that are not visible on the face of the constitutional
text and that are not readily implicit in the terms of the [C]onstitution. ' 40 9 Moreover, constitutional construction is an inherently political
as well as judicial activity, with "[tjhe political branches build[ing] out
the Constitution through everyday politics. ' 410 The League and the
Special Committee were part of such a process of constitutional construction in the 1930s, which ultimately resulted in constitutional ac4 11
ceptance of the national administrative state and the APA regime.
Contemporary anti-administrativism may be best understood as another
effort at constitutional construction, seeking to revise the reigning constitutional order and build a version of the national state more in
keeping with conservative principles. 4 12 Viewing contemporary antiadministrativism in this way underscores the deep connections between
its political, judicial, and academic varieties. To succeed, contemporary
anti-administrativism will need to bring about broad-ranging changes
in national institutions and constitutional culture.
Yet this political overlay poses a particular challenge for contemporary judicial anti-administrativism. Even if clothed in constitutional
garb, judicial efforts to cut back on administrative governance will inevitably be seen in political terms, as part of an ongoing national struggle between conservatism and progressivism. That framing was clearly
on display at Justice Gorsuch's confirmation hearings, where references

409 Keith E. Whittington, Constructinga New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
119, 120 (2010); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-6, 69-73 (2011) ("Constitu-

tional construction, however, involves far more than developing doctrines and precedents that implement the Constitution. All three branches of government build institutions and create laws and
doctrines that serve constitutional purposes, that perform constitutional functions, or that reconfigure the relationships among the branches of the federal government, the states, and civil society."
Id. at 5.); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-ConstructionDistinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, lO-08 (2010) (describing interpretation as "the activity that aims at discovery of the
linguistic meaning" of the Constitution, id. at oi, and construction as giving "legal effect to the
semantic content of a legal text," id. at 103).
410 BALKIN, supra note 409, at 298.

411 See supra pp. 58-59.
412 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 46-54.
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to Chevron deference surfaced frequently during the four days of congressional questioning and in public commentary. 413 Chevron in this
context served as a stand-in for administrative government writ large,
with overt connections drawn to conservative political campaigns
against the administrative state. 414 The Roberts Court separately has
gained a reputation as a pro-business court, thereby reinforcing perceptions of it as antiregulatory. 415 And it has been increasingly politically
polarized, with the Justices divided into conservative and liberal blocs
4 16
that overwhelmingly vote together in ideologically contentious cases.
Politicization of the Court generally reached an apogee in 2oI6, with
Republicans limiting the Court to eight Justices for over a year in a
successful effort to control the appointment of Justice Scalia's successor.
This external politicization may have served to dampen polarization
within the Court, with the 2oi6 Term setting recent records for consensus and its low number of ideologically split decisions. But this was in
part a result of the Court's avoiding more ideologically contentious issues and seems unlikely to last, given the number of such cases already
417
on the docket for next year.
Put together, all of this might suggest that the Court risks longlasting institutional harm were it to follow through on its antiadministrative rhetoric and significantly cut back the administrative

413 See Gorsuch Confirmation Hearings (Day i), supra note 15 (opening statements by Sens.
Feinstein, Klobuchar, and Franken); Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Day 4), S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY at
3:51:48 (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/watch?hearingid=Ai64B7915o56-Ao66-6oD6-FF2C1 4 8F66C 9 [https:Hperma.cc/B 7 L 4 -MASN] (testimony by Professor Jonathan Turley on Chevron and administrative government); id. at 3:5 7:25 (testimony by Sierra Club
Environmental Law Program Director Pat Gallagher on Chevron and administrative government);
id. at 4:02:21 (testimony by NFIB Small Business Legal Center Executive Director Karen Harned
on Chevron and administrative government).
414 See, e.g., Tessa Berenson, How Neil Gorsuch Could DramaticallyReshape Government, TIME
(Mar. 19, 2017), http://time.com/4701114/neil-gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-chevron-doctrine/
[https:Hperma.cc/8B 7 M-T8 4 Z]; Allan Smith, Trump's Supreme Court Nominee Just Had His First
Real Day of Grilling- And There's More to Come, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2017, 9:O' AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/neil-gorsuch-senate-confirmation-hearing-2Q17-3
[https:Hperma.cc/L2 EP-PKP 4 ].
415 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013) (concluding that "the Roberts Court is much
friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts"); see also Jonathan H. Adler,
Introduction: In Search of the Probusiness Court, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT I,
-i 12 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2o16) ("[W]hile there is little evidence the Court seeks to help business,
as such, there are aspects of the Court's dominant jurisprudence that work to the advantage of
business interests.").
416 See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party PolarizationTurned the
Supreme Court into a PartisanCourt, 2o16 SuP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https:Hssrn.com/abstract=2432111 [https:Hperma.cc/gFRH-K2J 7 ].
417 See Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2Q17), https:Hnyti.ms/2uci8Kw [https://perma.cc/DXF 9-METV].
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state. The 1930S offer an interesting parallel here as well, in the institutional threat that the Court faced as a result of its opposition to the
early New Deal. To be sure, the contemporary political climate is dramatically different from the 193os. FDR's 1936 mandate made clear
that the Court stood at odds with overwhelming national sentiment in
favor of more active national government and that broad support existed for the Court changing its stances, even if FDR's court-packing
plan raised popular concerns. 4 18 Today, national politics are deeply divided, and contemporary anti-administrativism appears to resonate
with a sizeable part of the electorate. In pushing anti-administrativism,
then, the Court is not at risk of being out of sync with most of the nation.
Instead, the institutional risk it faces is of being viewed increasingly as
nothing more than another arena for political combat.
III. 193os

REDUX II: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
AND EXECUTIVE POWER

Contemporary anti-administrativism's core constitutional attack is
that the national administrative state enables the exercise of unaccountable and aggrandized executive power: Unelected bureaucrats wield a
combination of de facto legislative, judicial, and executive powers outside of meaningful political or judicial constraint. 4 19 Contemporary
anti-administrativists differ on whether the result is modern-day tyranny or, more moderately, a system of government in tension with the
Constitution's commitment to separating and checking governmental
power in the name of individual liberty.4 20 Either way, the national
administrative state is painted as constitutionally suspect.
Anxieties about executive power are understandable, particularly in
our current era of presidential unilateralism and a seemingly hamstrung
Congress. But the anti-administrativists' analysis gets the constitutional
diagnosis almost exactly backward. The administrative statewith
supra note 337, at 3-5, 202-34.
See supra pp. 36-37. Other constitutional concerns are that the administrative state violates
constitutional limits on national power and individual economic rights, but as noted above these
concerns are less developed in current judicial challenges and surface more in academic commentary. See supra pp. 29-32.
420 Compare, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
("It would be a bit much to describe the result as ... tyranny, but the danger posed by the growing
power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed." (internal quotations omitted)), with Dep't
of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1244 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands,... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." (alterations in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003))), and
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, 1149 (ioth Cir. 2oi6) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
("Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial
and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult
to square with the Constitution of the framers' design.").
418 FRIEDMAN,
419
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its bureaucracy, expert and professional personnel, and internal institutional complexity - performs critical constitutional functions and is the
key to an accountable, constrained, and effective executive branch. Indeed, far from being constitutionally suspect, the administrative state
today is constitutionally obligatory, rendered necessary by the broad
statutory delegations of authority to the executive branch that are the
defining feature of modern government. Those delegations are here to
stay; only the most extreme and resolute anti-administrativists are willing to suggest their invalidation, and the Supreme Court has almost
never done so. From delegation, however, core features of the national
42 1
administrative state follow.

A. The Brownlow Committee and PresidentialAdministration
The 193os are again a useful starting point for assessing the relationship between the administrative state and executive power. Two prominent accounts of this relationship - one arguing for strong presidential
control of administrative government, the other emphasizing administrative expertise and specializationwere offered in 1937 and 1938,
respectively. Although competing in important ways, these two accounts shared a central insight: that the administrative state was the key
to ensuring accountable as well as effective exercise of executive power
and guarding against its abuse. More importantly, both these accounts
remain relevant today, with their combined insights capturing important
constitutional functions that the administrative state performs.
Notwithstanding FDR's disdain for the Liberty League, he accepted
the proposition that New Deal agencies needed more oversight. In 1936,
he commissioned a committee of public administration experts, headed
by Louis Brownlow, to study administration and management in the
executive branch and propose recommendations. 4 22 Issued nearly one
year later in January 1937, the Brownlow Committee's report sounded
concerns strongly resonant with the anti-administrativists of its era and
today. Despite its commitment to the New Deal, the Brownlow

421 An extraordinary body of constitutional scholarship addresses whether the administrative
state can accord with the Constitution's text, structure, precedent, and history - including recently
within the pages of the Foreword. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2oi3 Term - Foreword: The Means of ConstitutionalPower, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2014). I am not going to repeat
those efforts here; the debate has been waged as ably and exhaustively as it can be, and were I to
try to list all of the important articles in this area, this would be the footnote that ate the Foreword.
Framing analysis around the question of whether the administrative state is constitutional injects
hesitancy about its constitutional status from the outset. My goal, instead, is to reframe the analysis
by focusing on the administrative state's constitutional benefits.
422 For background on the Committee and its three members, see generally BARRY DEAN KARL,
EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEW DEAL (1963), and RICHARD
POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT 3-27 (1966).
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Committee warned of the "dangers of bureaucracy '423 and viewed "safeguarding... the citizen from narrow-minded and dictatorial bureaucratic interference and control [a]s one of the primary obligations of
democratic government. '424 It particularly attacked the independent
regulatory commissions, for which it coined the phrase the "headless
'fourth branch,"' arguing that their lack of political accountability and
requirement that "the same men ...serve both as prosecutors and as
judges" did "violence" to the Constitution's tripartite separation of powers structure.4 2 5 Expanding presidential control over New Deal administration was the Committee's core solution, putting it diametrically at
odds with the League and the Special Committee but on a page with
Free Enterprise's insistence on the need for "oversight by an elected
President. '4 26 The Brownlow Committee similarly insisted that greater
presidential control was essential for democracy and self-government,
proclaiming that "[tihe President is ...the one and only national officer
427
representative of the entire Nation.
Yet the Brownlow Committee differed starkly from anti-administrativists in viewing the administrative state itself as the critical means for
obtaining accountability through the President. It sought to consolidate
the executive branch and individual agencies' structures, expanding
centralized managerial, fiscal, and planning capacity under "a responsible and effective chief executive as the center of energy, direction, and
administrative management. '4 28 The Brownlow Committee urged expanding the White House staff under the cry of "[tihe President needs
help,' 429 and also insisted on the need to expand the civil service "upward, outward, and downward, '430 arguing that "[d]emocratic government today, with its greatly increased activities and responsibilities, requires personnel of the highest order. '43 1 The Committee also viewed
"centralizing the determination of administrative policy [so] that there
is a clear line of conduct laid down for all officialdom to follow," along
with "decentralizing the actual administrative operation," as essential to
accountable government. 43 2 Even more, the Brownlow Committee was
adamant on the need for active administrative government: "A weak
administration can neither advance nor retreat successfullyit can
423 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (-937)
424 Id. at 30.

Id. at 36.
426 56i U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
427 BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 423, at '.
428 Id. at 2.
429 Id. at 5.
430 Id. at 7-8.
431 Id. at 7.
432 Id. at 30.
425

[hereinafter BROWNLOW REPORT].
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merely muddle. Those who waver at the sight of needed power are false
friends of modern democracy."4 33
Roosevelt sent proposed legislation incorporating the Brownlow
Committee's recommendations to Congress in early 1937, just a few
weeks before he submitted his court-packing plan. Controversial in its
own right, the Brownlow legislation soon was attacked for being part of
a broader effort by FDR to seize dictatorial powers and was never enacted. 434 Interestingly, the Brownlow legislation also faced opposition
from New Deal supporters, most notably James Landis, Chair of the
SEC until 1937 and eventual Dean of Harvard Law School. 435 In 1938,
Landis wrote what remains the classic defense of administrative government, The Administrative Process, taking direct aim at the
Brownlow Committee Report. 436 Landis attacked the Brownlow Committee's effort to centralize control of administrative government in the
President as well as its insistence on fitting administrative government
within the traditional separation of powers framework. In lieu of presidential control, Landis offered expertise, specialization, and effective
regulation as the primary keys to the accountability of administrative
government. 437 He also defended the combination of powers held by
modern administrative agencies as essential to meeting the regulatory
challenges of a modern industrial economy, famously decrying "the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of government to deal with modern
problems. '438 Yet for all that, Landis shared more points of agreement
with the Brownlow Committee than he acknowledged. Professional and
expert staff as well as administrative structure were central to both of
their accounts, with Landis emphasizing the protections provided by
internal procedure in defending administrative adjudication. 439 Both
also underscored the practical realities that limited the value of external
checks on the executive branch and insisted that effective administrative
440
government had become a prerequisite of democracy.

433 Id. at 47.
434 See BRINKLEY, supra note 367, at 22; Shepherd, supra note 341, at 1585-86. For a detailed
account of the debate over the Brownlow legislation, see generally POLENBERG, supra note 422,
at 125-88. Despite the failure of the Brownlow legislation, presidential reorganization powers were
expanded in 1939 and, a decade later, the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government significantly expanded presidential administrative control. See HERBERT EMMERICH, FEDERAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 88-90

(1971).
435Mariano Florentino-Cuellar, James Landis and the Dilemmas of Administrative Government,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1330, 1331, 1334-35 (2015).
436 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4-5, 47 (1938).

437 Id. at 23, 28-30, 98-ioo, iii; see also VERMEULE, supra note 147, at 39, 62-63.
438 LANDIS, supra note 436, at i; id. at -0-14, 91-98.
439 Id. at ioi-ii.
440 Id. at 8-9, 30-31, 34-38; BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 423, at 47.
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Landis won this battle in the 1930s, and the independent expertise
model of the administrative state dominated the post-World War II
era.441 In the end, however, the Brownlow Committee won the war,
with presidential power over the administrative state rising to the fore
beginning with the Reagan Administration. Presidents have achieved
this control by following the Brownlow Committee's advice on expanding centralized administrative capacity. 4 4 2 But Presidents have deviated
markedly from the Committee's recommendations by also extensively
politicizing agency staff instead of expanding the civil service. 443 Even
independent agencies are also now recognized to be more susceptible to
presidential influence - and to be more varied in the extent of their
independence - than the Brownlow Committee and Landis ever envisioned. 444 The benefits and harms of this growth in presidential power
continue to be as strongly debated as in the 1930s, but presidential administration has become the central reality of the contemporary national
445
government.
Presidential administration, in turn, has accentuated the risk of executive branch unilateralism and aggrandizement. 446 The Brownlow

441 Schiller, supra note 362, at 404, 406.
442 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 486-9I (2003).
443 See Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 235, 235, 239 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., '985) (describing techniques
of politicization and centralization).
See generally DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS (2008) (discussing the possible causes of increased politicization
and providing a quantitative analysis of the level of politicization in federal offices).
444 For descriptions of the ways and success with which Presidents can exercise control over
independent agencies, see Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 8x8-24 (2013), and Neal Devins & David E.
Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarizationand the Limits of InstitutionalDesign, 88
B.U. L. REV. 459, 491-98 (2008).
445 Compare Kagan, supra note 191, at 2331-46 (arguing that presidential direction is important
for political accountability, cost-effectiveness, priority setting, and energy), and Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541 (x994)
(asserting that presidential direction is constitutionally required), with SHANE, supra note 192, at
3-5 (expressing concern over the growing concentration of power in the federal executive and the
dangers it raises), and Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997) (contending that the idea of political accountability through presidential control is unduly simplistic), and Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, PresidentialAdministration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 82-93), https:Hssrn.com/
abstract=3ox86x8 [https:perma.cc/TSH 3 -Y2AQ] (expressing skepticism about presidential administration yielding benefits in energy or accountability and noting the lack of durability of recent
aggressive presidential assertions of power as well as the judicial anxiety they have aroused). See
generally Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014).
446 See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, UnilateralAction and PresidentialPower. A Theory,
29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 85'-52 (i999); Keith E. Whittington & Daniel P. Carpenter,
Executive Power in American InstitutionalDevelopment, I PERSP. ON POL. 495, 499-502 (2003).
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Committee's exaltation of the President may have been ahead of its time,
but Presidents today are even more the focus of popular expectations for
government. Presidents increasingly are "held responsible for designing,
proposing, legislating, administering, and modifying public policy ....
[Hence, a President's] chances for reelection, . . . standing with opinion
leaders and the public, and ... historical legacy all depend on ... perceived success as the generalized leader of government. '447 Presidents
thus face strong "incentives to develop and expand their power in whatever ways they can. '448 And, given the vast powers statutorily delegated
to the executive branch, a prime means by which Presidents seek to push
their policies is through their control over administration. 44 9 They are
further encouraged to do so by the institutional and political realities
that make enactment of legislation to overturn administrative decisions
difficult. The process of passing a bill in both houses - especially given
the need to get through the committee process and to reach a supermajority of sixty votes in the Senate to avoid a filibuster - and then securing presidential agreement or overturning a veto is hard enough. But
the intense political and ideological divisions of our current era raise an
often insurmountable barrier for significant legislation, sometimes even
when the national government is under unified party control and only
450
more so when not.
The claim of unilateralism here is a qualified one. Most importantly,
Presidents and agencies rely on underlying statutes for their authority
to act and face the possibility of judicial invalidation if they overstep
that authority.45 1 Congress is hardly stuck on the sidelines. Over the
447 Moe, supra note 443, at 239; see also Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers
Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869,
1882-83 (2o16) (reporting on empirical evidence that the public credits Presidents for successful
administrative action and blames them for administrative failures). But see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable
of the NationalistPresident and the ParochialCongress,53 UCLAL. REV. 1217 (2006) (questioning
whether Presidents have the nationwide popular focus they are conventionally thought to have).
448 Moe & Howell, supra note 446, at 854.
449 See Kagan, supra note igi, at 2272-3ig; Kathryn A. Watts, ControllingPresidentialControl,
114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 693-703 (2o16).

450 See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. Sc. 85, 91-97 (2015);
Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, supra note 66, at 1748-52 ; Gerald F. Seib, As
Donald Trump Heads to Congress, a New PolarizationIs Hardening, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2 017,
5:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-donald-trump-heads-to-congress-a-new-polarization-ishardening-1488212273 [http://perma.cc/UJ 7 M- 7 V3 F]. Other factors fuel new presidential assertions of control as well, such as the need to coordinate multiple administrative actors and overlapping regimes. See Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1830-32 (2015) (noting that "horizontal administrative complexity" has empowered OIRA).
451 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 3 (2014) ("Agencies ... do not simply 'go for broke' . . . . Instead they proceed strategically, cognizant of the preferences of their political overseers and the risk of being overturned in the courts.");
Andrew Rudalevige, Old Laws, New Meanings: Obama's Brand of Presidential"Imperialism," 66
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 7-15 (2o16); Peter M. Shane, The PresidentialStatutory Stretch and the
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last decade, it has enacted several major regulatory reform statutes and
it retains the ability to influence and constrain the executive branch,
whether through hearings, investigations, appropriations, or by refusing
to move on legislation or appointments that a President seeks. 45 2 Public
opinion can be a potent force as well, with claims that the executive
branch has abused its power or exceeded its statutory authority capable
453
of generating substantial political pushback.
Even so, Presidents are able to use their oversight of the executive
branch to set the national agenda and single-handedly push national
policy in significant new directions. 454 President Obama's open embrace
of administrative power to advance his second-term agenda is a prime
example of this phenomenon. 455 Yet in strongly asserting presidential
power over administration, Obama was following in the immediate footsteps of President Bush, and President Trump is already pursuing the
same path as well. 45 6 Partisanship affects how Presidents wield their
power over administration - whether they seek to foster regulation or
stymie it, for example - but not whether they assert such power in the
first place.

B. The Administrative State's ConstitutionalFunctions
This potential for presidentially driven administrative unilateralism
and aggrandizement suggests limitations in relying on presidential control alone to guard against abuse of executive power. Yet the often over-

Rule of Law, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1231,

1235-49 (2oi6) (describing this dynamic under the Reagan,
Clinton, and George W. Bush presidencies).
452 See, e.g., Douglas Kriner & Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and CongressionalInvesti-

gations, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 295, 295, 297 (2008) (describing increases in congressional hearings
and investigations in times of divided government); Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and
CongressionalInfluence over BureaucraticPolicy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 766, 767, 773
(2010) (discussing increased use of appropriation riders); Seung Min Kim & Burgess Everett, Senate
Dems Plan to Drop Nominations Blockade if Health Bill Fails, POLITICO (July 25, 2017, 12:36
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/25/senate-democrats-drop-nomination-blockage-afterhealth-care-bill-240939 [https:Hperma.cc/SEE2-JC 9 6] (describing how Senate Democrats had
stalled confirmations of President Trump's nominees as long as Obamacare repeal was pending).
453 Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President,125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1409-14 (2012) (reviewing
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010)).
454 Kagan, supra note I9I, at 2281-84 (discussing examples of presidential agenda setting in the
Clinton Administration); Watts, supra note 449, at 706-20 (discussing examples in the George W.
Bush and Obama Administrations).
455 Freeman & Spence, supra note 451, at 17-31; Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, "We
Can't Wait": Barack Obama, Partisan Polarizationand the Administrative Presidency, 12 THE
FORUM 3, 21 -24 (2014); Rudalevige, supra note 45 1, at 4.
456 See Farber, supra note 29 (describing President Trump's approach); Watts, supra note 449, at
693-706 (discussing centralized control under George W. Bush and Obama); see also Kagan, supra
note 19I, at 2277-82, 2315- 17 (describing expanded presidential administration under the earlier
Reagan and Clinton presidencies).
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looked feature of the Brownlow Committee's approach was its recognition that both presidential control and bureaucracy were essential for
accountable government.4 57 Even more accurate is the picture that
emerges from combining the Committee's insights with those of Landis.
It is the internal complexity of the administrative state - the way it
marries together presidential control, bureaucratic oversight, expertise,
professionalism, structural insulation, procedural requirements, and the
like - that holds the key to securing accountable, constrained, and effective exercise of executive power.
These features of the administrative state are not just beneficial in a
good government sense. They also carry constitutional significance,
both in satisfying constitutional structural requirements and in ensuring
that broader separation of powers principles retain force in the world of
contemporary governance. By thus implementing the separation of
powers, the administrative state performs an essential constitutional
function.
. BureaucraticSupervision and Internal Constraints.- Consider
first the managerial supervision and oversight that the Brownlow
Committee emphasized, which occur both within agencies and at a centralized level across the executive branch. This kind of bureaucratic
accountability is necessary to guarantee both that low-level personnel
enforce politically determined policy and that important information
about administrative activity reaches high-level political officials. 458 Internal supervision is equally critical to ensuring that the executive
branch acts in a lawful manner. Judicial review of agency action can
articulate legal requirements, but only managerial oversight and supervision can translate judicial decisions into agency policies and actions.
Moreover, internal oversight and supervision reach a far broader array
of agency action than courts can, and are able to prevent unlawful
agency actions from occurring in the first place, whereas courts are
45 9
largely reactive.
Indeed, as Mashaw has long argued, the body of internal instructions, guidance, and procedures developed through operation of bureaucratic accountability is itself a form of lawthe internal law of the
administrative state. 460 For the most part, these measures are not subject to judicial enforcement, but they are law-like in that they are perceived as binding and internally enforced as such within agencies. By

457 See supra notes 422-33 and accompanying text.
458 Rubin, supra note 198, at 2119-34.
459 Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, InternalAdministrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239,
1250-58 (2017); see also LANDIS, supra note 436, at 123 ("Courts are not unconscious of the fact
that, due to their own inadequacies, areas of government formerly within their control have been
handed over to administrative agencies for supervision.").
460 MASHAW, supra note 245, at 223.
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rising above the level of specific actions and embodying officials' general
views on governing statutes and policies, these measures also foster
important rule-of-law values such as consistency, coherence, authorization, justification, and nonarbitrary governmental action. 4 6 1 In the
Brownlow Committee's words, centralizing and specifying policy "for
all officialdom to follow" is essential to prevent "narrowminded and dic46 2
tatorial bureaucratic interference and control.
In short, the mechanisms of bureaucratic accountability are central
to achieving political and legal accountability of government. 463 Moreover, both political and legal accountability are generally acknowledged
to have a constitutional basis. Political accountability is embedded in
the Constitution's electoral provisions, commitment to self-government,
and grants of legislative power to an elected Congress and executive
power to an elected President. 46 4 Legal accountability is a more implicit
but equally central structural premise, embodied in the idea of a constitutionally controlled government and represented in the President's obligation to faithfully execute the law. 465 This means, in turn, that bureaucratic accountability also has constitutional salience: It provides the
mechanisms to realize constitutionally mandated political and legal accountability. Equally constitutionally consequential is the role that bureaucratic oversight plays in guarding against abuse of executive power
by ensuring consistent, coordinated governmental action.
Yet the constitutional significance of oversight and supervision goes
further. As I have argued elsewhere, the Constitution itself imposes a
duty to supervise on government officials. 466 This duty is most clearly
embodied in Article II's direction that the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. '46 7 But it also manifests as a
broader structural requirement, implicit in the repeated constitutional
invocations of hierarchical oversight relationships in contexts of delegated power.468 Such a duty to supervise is additionally rooted in due
process's prohibition on arbitrary exercise of governmental power, given
the need for oversight and managerial control to ensure that delegated

461 Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 413 (2007); Metzger & Stack, supra note 459, at 1256-66; Rubin, supra note
-98, at 2075.
462 BROWNLOw REPORT, supra note 423, at 30.
463 Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, supra note 260, at -886-99.
464 See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. I, §§ 1-3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
465 Id. art. II, § 3; Metzger, The ConstitutionalDuty to Supervise, supra note 260, at -89466 Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, supra note 260, at 1874-1933.
467 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
468 Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, supra note 260, at i886-97.
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power is not used abusively or arbitrarily.469 Recognizing this constitutional demand for supervision may come most naturally to unitary executivists, but the duty to supervise is not limited to the President and
extends throughout the executive branch as well as Congress. The bureaucratic oversight mechanisms of the administrative state represent
the core means through which the constitutional duty to supervise is
satisfied.
Where the Brownlow Committee emphasized top-down bureaucratic supervision, Landis connected accountability more to bottom-up
and horizontal aspects of the administrative state. 470 Professor Jon
Michaels has recently elaborated a horizontal account of the administrative state as composed of different forces and interests, that are often
471
rivalrous and check each other's perceived overreaches and failures.
Civil servants - the career government employees both the Brownlow
Committee and Landis viewed as central to effective governance - are
one such internal force. 47 2 A critical characteristic of civil servants that
allows them to check overreach is their protection from employment
termination. 47 3 But independence protections are not the only strength
of the civil service. Often professionals by training, civil servants frequently "feel bound by legal, moral, or professional norms to certain
courses of action, '47 4 with their concern for legal authority forming "an
often unappreciated bulwark to the rule of law" within agencies. 47 5 Executive branch lawyers are a particularly important group when it
comes to legal accountability. Lawyers operate throughout the national
administrative state, in centralized legal offices at the White House and
Department of Justice, in agency general counsel offices, and even on

469 Id. at 1896-97; see Bressman, supra note 442, at 529-33 (describing arguments by prominent
administrative law scholars contending that "the problem of arbitrary administrative decisionmaking [is] the lack of standards controlling the exercise of administrative authority"); Evan J. Criddle,
When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV.
117, 121- 22 (2011) (arguing for a "due process model" under which delegations to agencies must be
constrained and structured so as not to "increas[e] the government's capacity for arbitrariness").
470 See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 436, at 6o-62, 98-100, 103-o6; see also William H. Simon, The
OrganizationalPremises of Administrative Law, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. i & 2, 2Q15,
at 61, 67-79 (arguing against a top-down conception of accountability).
471 Jon D. Michaels, Of ConstitutionalCustodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old
and New Separationof Powers, gi N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 234-42 (2o16).
472 Id. at 237-39; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today's Most DangerousBranchfrom Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2331-35 (2006).
473 Michaels, supra note 471, at 237-39.
474 LEWIS, supra note 443, at 30.
475 HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 408 (2006); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 445 (2009)
[hereinafter Metzger, Internal and External Separationof Powers].
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the ground with agency personnel. 476 Few agency policies and sanctioned actions go unvetted by lawyers, and agency lawyers often wield
substantial powerarguably, too much powerover agency policy.4 7 7 More broadly, the substantive expertise of agency personnel, as
well as their access to information and commitment to their agencies'
missions, can offer a potent check on perceived political abuse of administrative power.4 78 These internal forces are often externally supported. Professional networks, for example, help to reinforce procedural
479
and reputational norms among administrators.
Agencies' structures reveal further internal divisions and checks on
administrative decisionmaking. Internal separation of functions and
ALJ independence protections guard against biased decisionmaking by
keeping agency prosecutors and adjudicators apart.48 0 Independent internal agency watchdogs such as inspectors general investigate alleged
agency malfeasance, and agencies often have separate offices dedicated
to advocating for civil rights in agency decisionmaking. 4 1l Even different agencies can check one another, with statutory schemes frequently
imposing requirements of interagency consultation or building in redundancy to prevent regulatory gaps. 4 2 State and local governments also
476 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT. THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY

AFTER 9/ii, at 28, 93-94, 136-37 (2012) (describing the role of CIA and military lawyers within
the executive branch); David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 HARV. L. REV. E. 21-, 2122, 41-45 (2o12) (outlining the influence of civil service lawyers outside of the Office of Legal Counsel in the DOJ and the White House Counsel's Office); Pildes, supra note 453, at 1395-402, 141415 (discussing executive branch lawyers and presidential decisionmaking).
477 See, e.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 193, at 172-201 (describing how National Highway
Safety Administration lawyers' concerns over litigation fundamentally reoriented the agency's regulatory strategy).
478 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separationof Powers, ii5 COLUM. L. REV. 515,
544-45 (2oi5). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to UnderstandExpertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097 (2015) (analyzing
varieties of administrative expertise).
479 DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 23-30 (2001);

see also Michaels, supra note 471, at 237-39 (describing the impact of professional norms on civil
servants).
480 Barnett, supra note 98, at 803-09.
481 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 476, at 95-io8 (describing the position of CIA Inspector
General); Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in FederalAgencies,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 6o-62 (2014) (describing the work of civil rights offices within agencies,
focusing on the office at the Department of Homeland Security); Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing
Rights in the NationalSecurity Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289,316-24 (2015) (discussing the executive branch's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting
Rights from Within? Inspectors Generaland National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027,
1036-39, 1074-78 (2013) (describing and evaluating national security inspectors general's increased
role in individual rights protection).
482 See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, io5 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 13), https:Hssrn.com/abstract=2841253 [https:Hperma.cc/Q 3 VAG874] (describing four different forms of agency monitoring and interaction: hard hierarchy, soft
hierarchy, advisory or monitoring authority, and symmetrical).
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can be powerful forces pushing for changes in national administrative
governance.48 3 Although not internal to national administration in the
same manner as agency decisionmaking structures or civil servants,
states and localities are often responsible for central aspects of federal
48 4
regulation and federal program implementation.
Like bureaucratic accountability, these internal constraints also carry
constitutional significance. To begin with, they support traditional external checks on the executive branch and thus empower the Constitution's separation of powers system. Congress and the courts depend
upon agency personnel for the information and expertise they need to
perform their external review roles. This relationship is often reciprocal,
with Congress and the courts playing central roles in reinforcing internal
executive branch constraints. 48 5 Agency staff have relationships with
congressional overseers and reports of executive branch misdeeds can
trigger congressional investigation. 48 6 Courts can also reinforce internal
checks, for example by signaling that decisions made over career staff
objectionsor without internal administrative consultation and reviewmay trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.48 7 These internal
mechanisms also play a constitutional role in preventing individual
rights violations, such as biased decisionmaking. Indeed, recent historical scholarship has documented a wide array of instances in which
agency professionals and civil rights offices sought to develop rights protections beyond those available in court. 488 In the early decades of the
483 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953,
976-82 (2o16) (describing how national programmatic dependence on states has allowed state governors to force Presidents to compromise on Medicaid expansion and marijuana policy).
484 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalismas a Safeguard of the Separationof Powers, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 459, 470 (2012).
485 Metzger, Internal and External Separation of Powers, supra note 475, at 442-47; see also
Michaels, supra note 471, at 244-6o (discussing how Congress and the courts can rely on different
forces active in the administrative sphere to compete with the President for bureaucratic control).
486 See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 5-7, 95-96 (199o) (describing communication between congressional and
agency staff); see also Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA's Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law,
102 GEO. L.J. 927, 952 (2014) (detailing the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) investiga-

tion, at the request of members of Congress, into the FDA's refusal to grant the morning-after pill
over-the-counter status and the GAO's access to internal information and staff views).
487 See, e.g., Washington v. Tump, 847 F.3 d 1151, 1165-66 (9 th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (emphasizing lack of usual intra-executive branch review in closely scrutinizing President's 'hump first
travel ban); Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure:Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 694 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court reversed itself and
granted certiorari in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2oo8), after "high-ranking personnel disclosed numerous administrative mistakes in the implementation of the rules governing [Combatant
Status Review] tribunals"); Metzger, Internal and External Separation of Powers, supra note 475,
at 444-46.
488 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 73

(describing the EEOC's interpretation of sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the
(2010)
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twentieth century, for example, "[pirogressive lawyers within the executive branch took the lead in forging a new civil-libertarian consensus"
48 9
in accommodating the civil liberties of conscientious objectors.
In addition to empowering and enforcing external checks on executive power, internal administrative constraints perform a constitutional
function by embedding separation of powers values into the fabric of
administrative government. 490 Just as the constitutional separation of
powers system diffuses power among the branches to prevent its accumulation in any single branch, internal constraints diffuse power within
the executive branch to forestall presidential aggrandizement. 4 91 In this
fashion, internal constraints also help ensure that governmental power
is wielded in an articulated manner, guarding against the combination
4 92
of distinct governance functions in the same administrative hands.
Similarly, just as requirements of bicameralism and presentment are defended as fostering deliberation before legislation is enacted, internal
constraints foster deliberation by bringing a range of perspectives to
bear in setting executive policy. 493 And by ensuring a major role for
career bureaucrats and professionals in government decisionmaking,
4 94
these constraints foster rule-of-law values of continuity and stability.
Implicit in this view of internal constraints as serving to realize separation of powers principles is the idea that these principles have substance
beyond their specific instantiations in constitutional text. Some disagree

Workplace, i960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 8i-36 (2010) (describing the FCC's efforts to
expand workplace rights). A striking feature of historical scholarship on administrative constitutionalism is the extent to which it portrays individual rights as a state-building tool, rather than as
a limit on government. See Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a
Language of the State, 122 YALE LJ. 314, 320-23 (2012).
489 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 1083, io85 (2014); see also Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SuP.
CT. REV. 297, 338-48 (comparing enforcement of civil liberties at the NLRB and the DOJ during
the -93Os).
490 For an account of the need "to adapt the framers' checks and balances principles" to the
realities of contemporary governance, in particular presidential lawmaking, see Abner S. Greene,
Checks and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 6i U. CHL L. REV. 123, 124 (I994).
491 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (I9gi) ("[T]he separation and independence of
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one branch .... "); Flaherty, supra note 268, at i8io (describing "balance,
accountability, and energy" as core separation of powers values); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, I5O U. PA. L. REV. 603, 651-52 (2001) (explaining
importance of fragmented power to separation of powers).
492 WALDRON, supra note 260, at 46-5 I, 62-70.
493 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-49 (I983); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am.
R.Rs., 35 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring).
494 Huq & Michaels, supra note 262, at 387-88.
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with that proposition. 495 It remains, however, a basic aspect of the
496
Court's jurisprudence on constitutional structure.
No doubt, the suggestion that constraints limiting the President's
power over the executive branch serve a constitutional function
is anathema to those who believe that the Constitution grants the
President full and immediate control over all aspects of executive branch
decisionmaking and personnel. 4 97 That is a minority position, however - one that even the Roberts Court appeared to reject by upholding
a regulatory scheme with one level of for-cause protection. 49 In addition, many of the internal administrative checks described above do not
represent direct or formal constraints on presidential power, such as statutory independence requirements. Instead, they work indirectly and informally, for example by creating agency cultures and decisionmaking
norms that have a checking effect in practice. 4 9 9 And internal checks
can also operate to empower Presidents, to the extent they harness
greater competency and expertise in the pursuit of presidential goals.
5 00
Presidents may well support independence provisions for this reason.
In short, the administrative state is awash with internal accountability mechanisms, and executive power is far more internally constrained
than anti-administrativists admit. Of course, these mechanisms do not
always succeed in guarding against administrative abuse of authority,
and sometimes have the opposite effect. Internal administrative law can
be used to advance aggressive views of an agency's authority, for instance, and there are prominent examples of executive branch lawyers
sanctioning unlawful conduct.5 01 The very variety and multiplicity of
495 Dean John Manning has forcefully argued that "the Constitution adopts no freestanding principle of separation of powers." John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as OrdinaryInterpretation,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944 (2011) [hereinafter Manning, Ordinary Interpretation](emphasis
omitted); see also Manning, supra note 42:1, at 30-48 (critiquing the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts'
use of freestanding separation of powers and federalism principles to limit the necessary and proper
power).
496 See Manning, OrdinaryInterpretation,supra note 495, at 1942-44. I have defended reliance
on such freestanding constitutional concerns elsewhere. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional
Legitimacy of FreestandingFederalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 98 (2009).
497 See CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 65, at 420-25 (arguing that almost all Presidents have
exercised the power to direct subordinates and that perceived limits on presidential power over the
civil service and independent agencies are historically novel); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 445,
at 581-84 (arguing that independent agencies violate the Executive Power and Take Care Clauses).
498 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508-1- (2010).
499 See supra notes 470-79 and accompanying text.
500 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 476, at xv-xvi; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 453, at 13750 (arguing that Presidents often have incentives to adopt self-binding mechanisms).
501 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that deferring to agency interpretations of their own regulations leads to
aggrandizement); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1718-19
(2011) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (discussing historical examples of executive branch lawyers "upholding presidential actions of, at best, highly questionable legality").
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these mechanisms make claims of the beneficial impact of any particular
mechanism hard to verify; lack of transparency in much executive
branch decisionmaking further occludes clarity about how these mechanisms function and how much traction they have in practice. 50 2 That
administrative accountability mechanisms fail at times, however, does
not mean they are fundamentally ineffective. The many examples of
their positive impact, at both the agency and presidential level, preclude
such a conclusion. 50 3 At a minimum, whatever doubts exist about the
impact of these measures, their existence alone demonstrates the inaccuracy of anti-administrative portrayals of the administrative state as
simply power-aggrandizing and unaccountable.
2. Effective Governance. - The administrative state does more than
oversee and constrain. It also empowers and provides the means for
effective governance. As eloquently propounded by Landis, the administrative state brings expertise, specialization, and information to bear
on complicated policy and regulatory challenges, and does so in a way
that allows for public participation and proactive government action.
In particular, Landis emphasized that the combination of legislative, adjudicatory, and executive functions in agencies is essential for effective
regulation. 50 4 Similar consequentialist arguments remain at the forefront of contemporary defenses of the administrative state. 50 5 This is
not to say that administrative government always or necessarily regulates well; regulatory failures and phenomena like agency capture make
any such claim implausible. 5 0 6 The point is instead a comparative one.
Neither legislatures nor courts have the kind of expertise and institutional capacity that agencies do, or the ability to adapt policy at the pace
demanded by contemporary society, across the vast range of contexts in
50 7
which administrative government is active.
Effective governance is another important dimension of accountability in executive power. Although anti-administrativists focus on the
danger of too-active government, an executive branch that fails to effectively perform the responsibilities Congress has assigned to it should be

502 See generally Levinson, supra note 264, at 43-82 (discussing the difficulty of assessing who
wields power in different institutional arrangements).
503 For a contrary view, see D.A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV.
49, 77-92 (2017).
504 LANDIS, supra note 436, at -5,

i-.

505 See, e.g., STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 281; VERMEULE, supra note 147.
506 For recent accounts that identify these regulatory deficiencies, and caution against too quickly
assuming they are present, see REGULATORY BREAKDOWN (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012); and PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 2-12 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
507 LANDIS, supranote 436, at 20, 30, 48-49; Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, I6o8-ii (2oi6).
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equally troubling. The Brownlow Committee captured this point in insisting that democracy necessitates strong government. 508 The Committee also argued that bureaucratic oversight was the key to achieving
effective governance, indicating how the different varieties of administrative state accountability are often mutually supporting. 50 9 But they
can also work at cross-purposes. In particular, internal administrative
checks and constraints can render energetic and effective government
harder to achieve. Now-Justice Elena Kagan has warned of "inertia and
torpor" as "inherent vices" of bureaucracy that are obscured by incessant
focus on the potential for agency abuse of power. 510 Her defense of
presidential administration was premised in part on the importance of
presidential direction to ensuring achievement of coherent objectives in
an expeditious, cost-effective, and rationally prioritized way.5 11 Other
scholars disagree, emphasizing the importance of agency expertise, independent deliberation, and intra-executive branch conflict for better
5 12
Still
results and even better implementation of presidential policies.
others contend that efficacy measures such as strong presidential control
achieve their results at too great a risk of excessive and unchecked executive power.513 But underlying this debate is shared agreement on the
value of effective government, regardless of how that value is balanced
against conflicting concerns with preventing abuse of power.
Making government effective is one of the administrative state's
most important constitutional functions. 5 14 Some anti-administrativists
reject such a claim; they insist that governmental effectiveness is constitutionally irrelevant and even celebrate inefficiency as a constitutional
virtue. 5 15 In this regard, they enjoy the support of some prior Supreme
Court decisions, such as INS v. Chadha's famous insistence that "the
508 See BROWNLOw REPORT, supra note 423, at 3.
509 See id. at 46-47.
510

Kagan, supra note igi, at 2263; see also Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, iog Nw.

U. L. REV. 673, 676-78 (2015) ("In the administrative state, abuse of power is not something to be

minimized, but rather optimized.").
511 Kagan, supra note igi, at 2339-46; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,93-1o6 (1994).
512 See Farber & O'Connell, supra note 482 (manuscript at 54-57); Mark Seidenfeld, Foreword,
The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1397, 1425-26 (2013); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 101 (2000); see also LEWIS, supra note 443, at 172-2 01 (presenting data on
improved agency performance with limited politicization).

513 SHANE, supra note 192, at 4-13.
514 See N.W. BARBER, THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming 2018) (man-

uscript at 1-36) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
515 See, e.g., Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1990 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)

("But the difficulty of making new laws isn't some bug in the constitutional design: it's the point of
the design, the better to preserve liberty."); Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that "bicameralism and presentment make lawmaking
difficult by design" (alteration omitted) (quoting Manning, supra note 255, at 202)).
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fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it
is contrary to the Constitution. '5 16 But even though efficacy cannot
justify a constitutional violation, it is not precluded from carrying constitutional significance in the absence of such a violation, nor is efficacy
excluded from influencing assessments of whether a measure is unconstitutional in the first place. The Court has made this point as well,
stating that "[tihe Constitution as a continuously operative charter of
government does not demand the impossible or the impracticable....
[And it] 'has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality ... to perform its function.' '517 Moreover, the Court has refused to impose requirements that
would "stultify the administrative process" or make that process "inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the ... problems which
arise. '518 Perhaps most relevant for anti-administrativists, achieving effective governance - "the promotion of energetic and responsible governance in the common interest" - was an express and central concern
of the Framers in designing the national government. 5 19 Denying governmental efficacy constitutional significance is thus impossible to
square with the constitutional separation of powers system.
C. The Administrative State as ConstitutionallyObligatory
Far from representing a constitutional threat, the administrative
state thus plays a critical role in both cabining and effectuating executive power. Returning to the 193Os debates helps identify important
constitutional functions that the administrative state performs. But the
point can be taken even further: The modern national administrative
state is now constitutionally obligatory, rendered necessary by the reality
of delegation.
i. Delegation and Its Implications. - Congressional delegations of
authority to the executive branch date back to the nation's earliest days
of existence, and have been upheld by courts for nearly as long. 520 The

516 462 U.S. 919, 944 (I983).
517 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (I944) (second omission in original) (quoting
Currin v. Wallace, 3o6 U.S. 1, I5 ('939)).
518 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. '94, 202 ('947).
519 Pozen, supra note 86, at 75; see supra p. 45. Effective governance was also a central concern

of leading separation of powers theorists such as Locke, who defended separating out executive
power in efficiency terms. See BARBER, supra note 514 (manuscript at 4-6).
520 See Keith E. Whittington & Jason luliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, i65 U.
PA. L. REV. 379, 381 (2017) ("[T]here was never a time in which the courts used the nondelegation
doctrine to limit legislative delegations of power."). But see Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 124650 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the delegations upheld before the New
Deal were more limited).
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1930S witnessed the only times that the Supreme Court has held a delegation unconstitutional, with delegation representing a central bone of
contention in the constitutional battle over the New Deal. 521 The centrality of delegation to that battle should not be surprising. Reflecting
the constitutional principle that administrative agencies can only exercise authority delegated to them, 522 delegation represents the foundation
on which the administrative state rests. In Professor Louis Jaffe's famous words, delegation is "the dynamo of modern government. '5 23 The
New Deal delegations sustained by the Court were notably open-ended,
5 24
including instructions for agencies to regulate in the "public interest.1
But over the ensuing eight decades the scope of delegations has expanded significantly further. Today, Congress has delegated substantial
policymaking authority to the executive branch across a wide array of
5 25
contexts.
Many anti-administrativists maintain that the Court's multiple decisions sustaining broad delegations represent a fundamental deviation
from the Constitution's separation of powers structure. These critiques
rest on contested views about the meaning of "legislative" and "executive" powercontested even among anti-administrativists themselves. 5 26 An additional reason for skepticism is the difficulty antiadministrativists face in constructing a plausible test for constitutionally
permissible delegations. Justice Thomas's effort to prohibit any delegation of policymaking authority in setting general rules is practically infeasible and at odds with longstanding practice. 5 27 But more functionalist assessments, focused on determining when a delegation goes too
far, are similarly unworkable. As Justice Scalia argued, once "the debate
over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of
principle but over a question of degree," it becomes hard to conclude
that courts are competent or "qualified to second-guess Congress. '5 28
Yet whatever their views on current nondelegation doctrine, both
anti-administrativists and supporters of administrative government
521 See supra p. 53.
522 See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section i From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2101 (2004).
523 Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 33 (1965).

524 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
525 See DeMuth, supra note 183, at 125-26.
526 See Magill, supra note 491, at 618-23; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI.L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002) (arguing that legislative power
simply means enactment of a congressional statute). Compare Lawson, supra note 179, at 376-78
(suggesting that the Constitution requires Congress to make "sufficiently important" decisions), with
Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1251 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that it is a mistake to assume that "any degree of policy judgment is permissible
when it comes to establishing generally applicable rules governing private conduct").
527 See generally Whittington & luliano, supra note 520.
528 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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should agree that the phenomenon of broad delegation is not at risk of
judicial invalidation. Justice Thomas aside, little support exists on the
Court for invalidating delegations to the executive branch on constitutional grounds. 529 More support exists for a variety of moves seen as
curtailing the scope of delegated power, such as interpreting delegations
narrowly or rejecting deference to agency determinations of the scope of
their delegated authority.5 30 All of these moves, however, accept the
basic phenomenon of broad delegation and seek to tame its perceived
capacity for abuse. The relevant constitutional question then becomes
what the separation of powers requires in a world of substantial delegation of policymaking authority to the executive branch. It is in this
context that the administrative state is constitutionally obligatory.
Put differently, the modern national administrative state is the constitutionally mandated consequence of delegation. 53 1 To see why, begin
with the Constitution's requirement that the President shall "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. 5 3 2 It follows that the administrative capacity the President needs in order to satisfy the take care duty is
also required. So far, few would disagree.5 33 What does that administrative capacity entail in the context of broad delegations? For starters,
it means sufficient bureaucratic apparatus and supervisory mechanisms
to adequately oversee execution of these delegated powers. It also requires sufficient administrative resources and personnel, in particular
adequate executive branch expertise and specialization, to be able to
faithfully execute these delegated responsibilities in contexts of tremendous uncertainty and complexity.5 34 Arguably, this means that professional and expert government employees are now constitutionally

529 See supra notes 1 -8--9 and accompanying text. Justice Gorsuch has indicated some sympathy with Justice Thomas's view. See supra note 120.
530 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 316-17 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing it is the role of the courts to determine whether agency has been delegated jurisdiction);
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000).
531 Cf Greene, supra note 490, at 124 ("[1f we accept sweeping delegations of lawmaking power
to the President, then to capture accurately the framers' principles ... we must also accept some
(though not all) congressional efforts at regulating presidential lawmaking."); Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 362-63 (2017) (arguing for accepting the reality
of delegation and analyzing what administrative structures would follow under formalist constitutionalist principles).
532 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
533 See supra notes 465-69 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional benefits of bureaucratic accountability). Compare Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 56u
U.S. 477, 484 (2010) ("The President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' if he
cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §
3)), with Strauss, supra note 55, at 704-05 ("[W]here Congress has assigned a function to a named
agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President's role - like that
of the Congress and the courts - is that of overseer and not decider.").
534 Cf VERMEULE, supra note 147, at 126-54 (describing the "pervasive presence of uncertainty
in the administrative state," id. at 153).
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required as well, and perhaps also the civil service, insofar as such career
staff are necessary to ensure expertise and institutional stability in
5 35
agencies.
Simply from the proposition that delegated power must be faithfully
executed, then, the outlines of a constitutionally mandated administrative state begin to emerge. Moreover, from this proposition some proposed anti-administrative measures, such as massively underfunding the
EPA without altering its statutory responsibilities or repealing environmental rules necessary to implement delegated authority without adopting an alternative enforcement regime,5 3 6 begin to look constitutionally
suspect.
Admittedly, the claim that the Constitution necessitates some level
of administrative resources, personnel, and activity seems to impute
more of a positive rights aspect to our generally negative rights constitutional order. An alternative view might insist that all the Constitution
requires is that the President ensure the laws are executed as faithfully
as possible given the resources Congress has provided, and that the
Constitution grants Congress discretion over whether and how much to
fund.5 37 Yet such a view ignores the extent to which, combined with
delegation, the take care duty and broader duty to supervise do carry
an affirmative dimension. Delegation comes with constitutional strings
attached. Having chosen to delegate broad responsibilities to the executive branch, Congress has a duty to provide the resources necessary for
the executive branch to adequately fulfill its constitutional functions .31
To be clear, such a duty is unlikely to be judicially enforceable. Judicially manageable standards for determining what counts as adequate
supervision, staffing, and resources to fulfill delegated responsibilities
will often be lacking, and a severe risk exists that courts would intrude
on the constitutional responsibilities of the other branches were they to
seek to play an enforcement role.5 39 Yet that the duty is dependent on
the political branches for its realization does not affect its constitutional
basis.
The constitutional consequences of delegation can be pushed further,
to include a requirement of some internal administrative constraints of

535 See BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 423, at 7 (arguing that modern government "requires
personnel of the highest order"); Michaels, supra note 471, at 237-39.
536 Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, White House Eyes Plan to Cut EPA Staff by One-Fifth,
EliminatingKey Programs,WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 201-7), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2Q1o7/03/oi/white-house-proposes-cutting-epa-staff-by-one-fifth-eliminatingkey-programs/ [https:Hperma.cc/5VG2-KV6W].
537 Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8 (discussing Congress's powers to raise revenues and make appropriations).
538 See Metzger, The ConstitutionalDuty to Supervise, supra note 260, at 1886-97.
539 See id. at 19o6-07.
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the kind described above. 540 Such a requirement would rest on the danger that broad delegations to the executive branch may create an imbalance of power among the branches and breed presidential unilateralism.
Moreover, external checks by Congress and the courts may be limited in
practice.5 4 1 Thus, arguably, an additional constitutional string on delegations to the executive branch is that such delegations must be structured so as to limit the potential for aggrandizement and preserve checks
and balances on governmental power.5 4 2 But even if delegation necessitates some internal constraint, it is harder (but not impossible) 543 to
claim that a specific checking measure is required. Moreover, even deriving a general requirement of internal constraint is debatable, given
the constitutional value also attached to effective governance and to
presidential oversight and supervisory control over the executive
branch. Hence, the fact that internal constraints play an important constitutional function in implementing the separation of powers is not
enough, on its own, to conclude that such structural measures are constitutionally mandated.
Finally, what about delegation itself: should any delegations of authority to the executive branch that typify contemporary government be
considered constitutionally mandated? The idea that delegation mandates delegation has an obvious and troubling circularity. It also risks
undercutting a critical formal link to democratic choices that justifies
imposing conditions from delegation. If Congress lacks power to rescind
delegations, and if delegations come with substantial administrative requirements attached, then decisions about the shape of government are
no longer subject to popular control. In the end, however, the most
important point is that the phenomenon of delegation represents such a
fundamental and necessary feature of contemporary government that it
is mandatory in practice. And from delegation key features of the administrative state follow.
See supra notes 474-88 and accompanying text.
See Metzger & Stack, supra note 459, at 1263-64 (describing limitations of external constraints
on agencies); see also Wurman, supra note 531, at 385-89 (arguing that allowing the legislative veto
would significantly enhance Congress's capacity to check the executive branch and should be held
constitutional as a result of delegation).
542 See Farina, supra note 194, at 487, 497-98 ("The issue posed by the delegation of regulatory
authority has come to be viewed purely in terms of whether the new allocation of power can be
adequately checked ....
" Id. at 487.); Greene, supra note 490, at 125-26 ("[M]uch of the Court's
post-New Deal checks and balances jurisprudence can be justified as an attempt to ensure fidelity
to the original understanding of checks and balances in a post-nondelegation doctrine world.");
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, ii6 YALE LJ.952, 104 (2007) (arguing that Chenery's contemporaneous statement requirement serves to cabin delegated power).
The requirement of some internal executive branch division also follows from the prohibition on
"omnicompetent" and "omnipowered" delegations that Professor Todd Rakoff identifies as the
A.LA. Schechter principle. Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of the Law in the American Administrative
State, ii TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 9, 21 -24 (1992).
543 See supra notes 534-35 and accompanying text (arguing that professional staff and the civil
service may be required today).
540
541
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2. Delegation and Current Anti-Administrative Challenges. Recognizing the implications of delegation has particular relevance for current constitutional attacks on the administrative state. Many of the features of the administrative state that anti-administrativists condemn the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial powers; administrative adjudication of private rights; and judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretationsarguably follow simply from the
phenomenon of delegation.
Take first the combination of powers: Adequately supervising executive branch personnel to ensure they faithfully execute their delegated
responsibilities means agency officials must specify what those responsibilities are for agency staff - and the broader the delegation, the more
specification is required. This entails interpreting statutes delegating
authority to determine what they require and allow, as well as developing and adopting policy that conforms to those delegations. Moreover,
faithfully executing delegated authority also entails applying these policies and requirements to specific actions and contexts within their ambit. Such actions of interpretation and application can be viewed as
simply different dimensions of executing the law, or as combined exercises of legislative, adjudicatory, and executive powers. 544 The broader
the delegation, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested, the more the latter
appears descriptively accurate. 545 Either way, the important point is
that these actions become constitutionally necessary activities for executive branch officials to perform as a result of delegation. Furthermore,
the constitutional imperatives to ensure that delegated authority is faithfully executed and to supervise delegated power entail that high-level
agency officials be able to review applications of that authority by lowerlevel agency staff. Or in other words, these legislative, judicial, and
executive functions must be combined not just in executive branch agencies, but more particularly in the heads of departments charged with
overseeing their respective department's activities.
Full-blown administrative adjudication follows less obviously from
delegation. It seems a stretch to claim that faithfully executing delegated
authority requires agencies to do so through a trial-type proceeding.
Certainly, if Congress has required an agency to implement its delegated
authority through rulemaking, it would be implausible to claim that an
agency must nonetheless engage in administrative adjudication to faithfully execute its delegated powers. Similarly, if Congress has prohibited
or even not authorized an agency to issue binding rules, then the power

544 See Magill, supra note 491, at 608-26; see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 305
n.4 (2013) ("Agencies make rules ... and conduct adjudications ... and have done so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities take 'legislative' and 'judicial' forms, but they are exercises of ... the 'executive Power."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. f)).
545 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 315 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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to do so cannot be inferred from delegation. 546 On the other hand, the
constitutional requirement to ensure that delegated authority is faithfully executed does entail action applying that authority. That means
agency staff will need to engage in actions that qualify as adjudication
5 47
in the constitutional sense - applying general rules to specific cases.
And insofar as an agency is therefore depriving an individual of property or liberty in a manner that would trigger due process, it may be
required to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before acting.5 48 Hence, some form of administrative adjudication may follow as
a constitutionally necessary consequence of delegation.
This leaves the question of judicial deference, increasingly the
flashpoint for anti-administrativist attacks.5 49 Although some antiadministrativists maintain that judicial deference is prohibited by
Article III, giving due weight to delegation complicates such a claim.
As Professor Henry Monaghan elaborated before Chevron was decided,
judicial deference can be viewed as simply an acknowledgement of the
scope of authority delegated to the executive branch.5 5 0 Unless such
delegations are unconstitutional, the constitutional separation of powers
system requires that the courts honor congressional policy choices. And
honoring congressional choices to delegate means deferring to agency
judgments within the sphere of the agency's constitutionally delegated
55 1
authority.
This delegation argument for deference is contingent on a determination that Congress has delegated authority over the question at issue.5 5 2 That is a question subject to robust debate. Scholars have long
criticized Chevron's presumption that when Congress delegates agency
authority to implement a statute it intends to delegate authority to fill
546 Current doctrine requires Congress to authorize rulemaking for an agency to have power to
do so, although grants of rulemaking authority are read broadly. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d iio6, iiog (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("We have said that a rule has [the]
force [of law] only if Congress has delegated legislative power to the agency and if the agency intended to exercise that power in promulgating the rule."); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn
Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, ii6 HARV. L. REV.
467, 472, 544-70 (2002) (describing the current practice of reading rulemaking grants broadly and
arguing this approach is historically mistaken).
547 See Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (i9o8).
548 See id.
549 See supra section I.B.2, pp. 24-28.
550 Monaghan, supra note 235, at 26 ("Judicial deference to agency 'interpretation' of law is
simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency." (emphasis
omitted)).
551 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 244, at 1145 (discussing "Chevron space").
552 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, I35 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) ("It is especially unlikely that Congress
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance
policy of this sort."); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("In
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has
intended such an implicit delegation.").
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gaps and ambiguities in the statute, arguing that the presumption is empirically unsound, at odds with the APA's text, and in tension with institutional incentives. Others have countered that the presumption has
greater empirical, textual, and institutional support than generally allowed, particularly given that the question is not whether Congress has
delegated but whether it has chosen an agency or a court as its delegate.5 5 3 To some extent, the answer to this question turns on the level
at which it is asked - congressional intent to delegate authority on a
specific issue is much harder to presume, but congressional intent to give
an agency broad authority to implement a statutory regime is easier to
identify.554 Regardless, this debate does not undercut the constitutional
point that if Congress has delegated such authority, then a necessary
consequence of acknowledging Congress's power to delegate is that
courts should defer to agencies' exercise of their delegated authorityand Chief Justice Roberts has acknowledged as much.5 5 5 Hence, a
strong case can be made that accepting delegation does beget deference,
leaving open the question of how much evidence of delegation should
be required.
Moreover, the strongest separation of powers responses to this delegation argument for deference also sound in delegation terms. Professor
Cynthia Farina's critique of Chevron, for example, contends that the
Chevron doctrine misunderstands the basis on which broad congressional delegations to the executive branch are constitutional: "If Congress chooses to delegate regulatory authority to agencies, part of the
price of delegation may be that the court, not the agency, must hold the
power to say what the statute means. '556 This view that the constitutional "price" of delegation is independent judicial judgment is debatable. It is at odds not only with Monaghan's account but also that offered
by Chief Justice Roberts in City of Arlington, under which the "price"
of delegation is determining whether Congress has delegated jurisdiction
557
over the issue in question, with Chevron deference acceptable if so.
Perhaps most interestingly, however, Farina offers this argument not as
553 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power. Uncertainty, Risk,
and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036-38 (2006) (listing
reasons Congress delegates, including why Congress might delegate to agencies over courts). Compare Beermann, supra note 194, at 788-94, 829 (critiquing Chevron as empirically unsound and at
odds with the APA), with Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom
the Inside - An Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 995-1oo6 (2013) (presenting empirical evidence that both supports and undermines Chevron's presumption).
554 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013) (arguing that delegation should be
assessed at a general level).
555 Id. at 316 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
556 Farina, supra note 194, at 498.
557 See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 317 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Whether Congress has conferred such power is the 'relevant question[] of law' that must be answered before affording
Chevron deference." (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012))); Monaghan, supra note
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an attack on administrative government as unconstitutional, but instead
much on the terms sketched here: accepting delegation and assessing
what constitutional requirements follow.
CONCLUSION
The 193os are long past, but eerily salient today in the face of widespread attacks on the national administrative state. Encompassing
measures from budgetary and regulatory rollbacks to broad new legislative constraints on rulemaking to legal challenges questioning the fundamental constitutionality of administrative government, these attacks
harken back to battles over administrative governance that took place
during the New Deal. As was true in that era, contemporary antiadministrativism is inseparably political and constitutional, rooted in
conservative antistatist constitutional commitments and opposition to
strong regulatory government. Yet to the extent anti-administrativism
rests on fears of unconstrained and consolidated power, the administrative state is the solution and not the problem. Against a background of
broad delegations to the executive branch and rising presidential unilateralism, the administrative state performs essential constitutional functions in supervising, constraining, and effectuating executive power.
Even further, in the world of broad delegations in which we live, core
features of the administrative state are now constitutionally required.
Few anti-administrativists are willing to seriously challenge delegation,
and judicial anti-administrativism in particular has a notably rhetorical
air, seemingly unwilling to follow through on the radical implications of
its constitutional complaints.
It is time to move past the constitutional anti-administrativism of
the 193os. That constitutional vision failed to persuade in its own time
and is now deeply out of step with the realities of national government.
Repeatedly voicing its claims threatens the administrative state's legitimacy for little practical gain and risks further politicizing the Court.
Doing so also precludes developing accounts of the separation of powers
that accept and build on the administrative state's essential role in our
constitutional order. Particularly in the face of the current siege of the
administrative state, there is a pressing need for engagement on questions too long excluded from our reigning constitutional discourse, such
as the scope and nature of constitutional obligations to govern.

